Liquidity-Based Audit of Algorithmic Trading Strategies
Irene Aldridge
econ.EM, cs.LG, q-fin.CP, q-fin.RM, stat.ML
Submitted: 2026-06-27
Comments: 32 pages
License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
The gist: We show that net demand for liquidity by algo strategies is identifiable from its trade and price history alone, with no knowledge of its signal or optimization problem.
Terminology
Abstract
We show that net demand for liquidity by algo strategies is identifiable from its trade and price history alone, with no knowledge of its signal or optimization problem. An exact multi-period regret decomposition implies that the sign of this statistic classifies a linear strategy as a net liquidity consumer or provider, recovering the Kyle (1985) informed-trader/market-maker dichotomy from observables alone. Under an AR(1) cost process, the same statistic equals the product of strategy size and the squared Roll (1984) implied spread, making the correction a direct proxy for prevailing illiquidity. Extending to endogenous price impact and aggregating across N correlated strategies yields a liquidity-balance condition whose violation produces welfare loss scaling as N squared, a closed-form fire-sale externality. We calibrate to CRSP equity data (2016-2025), tracking implied spreads through the COVID-19 and 2022 rate-shock episodes, with an estimator computable in O(Tnd) time.
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