Welfarist Control Design - How to fulfill the societal mandate in multi-agent control?

arXiv:2606.23931 · eess.SY, cs.MA, cs.SY, math.OC · Submitted 2026-06-22 · Read on arXiv

Listen

Radio episode about this paper

Transcript

Introduction to the show: ident: Robotics Radio. Generated commentary on the latest robotics and control papers.

Rosa: We're looking at the paper: "Welfarist Control Design - How to fulfill the societal mandate in multi-agent control?".

Dev: Here's the gist of the paper. The core of most socio-technical systems lies a scarce resource that is allocated among agents: highway lanes, public transit, road space, water rights, energy access, grid capacity, user attention, pollution rights, etc.

Rosa: With further automation of the underlying allocation processes, control engineers are increasingly tasked to make decisive assumptions regarding what society wants.

Dev: In practice to date, design choices are largely driven by industry norms and conventions rather than a result of conscientiously responsible and ethical design.

Rosa: The Central Challenge of Resource Allocation Central challenges for a society are distributing goods and regulating access to services that meet primary needs for its population: water, food, transportation, energy, internet, and healthcare.

Title and authors: Rosa: So, looking at the title and authors again, "Welfarist Control Design - How to fulfill the societal mandate in multi-agent control?" it really hammers home that the goal isn't just technical performance; it’s about meeting a set of societal requirements for how resources are distributed.

Dev: It suggests they’re not just looking at making a system run fast or accurate, but also how that system behaves ethically and equitably in terms of resource allocation. The focus is on the mandate itself, which could be anything from ensuring universal access to water to managing energy distribution fairly.

Taro: From my side, I wonder if this means we’re moving toward designing systems where the fairness criteria are baked into the core control objective rather than being an afterthought we try to patch in later.

Rosa: That’s a fair point, Taro. The paper argues that the key is starting by aggregating individual agent preferences into those control design objectives right at the beginning of the process. They want to build fairness in from day one through that aggregation step.

Dev: And they use this aggregated preference structure to then ensure and certify that those specifications are met throughout the system's operation, which is where the feedback nature of control systems becomes really important for appropriate allocation.

The paper's summary: Rosa: The core idea they present in "Welfarist Control Design - How to fulfill the societal mandate in multi-agent control?" is that we need a framework to certify the fulfillment of that societal mandate for fair, efficient, and equitable use of shared resources. They frame this as a problem where decision-making systems need to align their closed loop behavior directly with agent preferences.

Dev: They are looking at how trading off individual interests in a way that matches that broader societal mandate across different possible allocations can be done using tools like Pareto efficient control or cooperative game theory. It’s about finding the right overall social welfare function that encodes all those tradeoffs between what individuals want and what society needs.

Taro: I see them talking about how fairness isn't just about who gets what outcome, but also *how* those outcomes are reached procedurally, which is a subtle but important distinction for me when thinking about real-world system failures.

Rosa: Exactly. They say that the perceived fairness of the distribution and allocation of a resource among those being served is critical to societal acceptance, not just which specific outcomes are reached. The procedure itself determines whether a solution gets endorsed or accepted, which is something they’re trying to address directly in control design.

The paper's improvements: Dev: So what they suggest as improvements involves defining a Social Cost Functional that assigns a social preference relation to every possible cost profile. This functional has to satisfy several Welfarist Axioms, which really forces the designer to make their normative requirements explicit and focus on the right types of cost functions.

Rosa: They go into practice by developing dynamic welfarism, applying these social choice principles across three major control settings: online feedback optimization, Markov decision processes, and model predictive control. This shows how you can use these principles in actual dynamic situations where decisions are happening over time.

Taro: That’s interesting because it means we can use feedback to compensate for outside factors, giving a new way to look at fairness between what you plan before and what actually happens after the decision is made.

Dev: Right. Online Rawlsian optimization, for example, uses the maximin social cost functional to transfer resources to the agent that is experiencing the highest cost right now. It’s a direct implementation of distributive justice in a closed loop system.

Conclusion: Rosa: So to wrap up, this paper with its focus on "Welfarist Control Design - How to fulfill the societal mandate in multi-agent control?" shows that we can use social choice principles to design control systems that are explicitly aimed at matching societal goals for resource allocation.

Dev: It gives us a concrete recipe: first you figure out the agents’ preferences and define their costs, then you determine how comparable those costs are—that's the comparability level—and that uniquely determines the functional form of the social cost function.

Taro: I just think it sets a high bar for what we need to consider when we design autonomous systems; it’s not enough to just optimize for efficiency, you have to specify what kind of fairness you are trying to achieve.

Rosa: It definitely moves the conversation toward designing systems that are more transparent and explainable about why they make certain allocation choices, which I think is crucial for public acceptance of automated infrastructure.

Dev: We’ll keep looking at how these axiomatic guarantees translate into the complex architectures of real-time control, but this work gives us a solid theoretical foundation for demanding better alignment in our AI systems.

Sophie Hall, Kai Zhang, Ilia Shilov, Heinrich H. Nax, Saverio Bolognani

eess.SY, cs.MA, cs.SY, math.OC

Submitted: 2026-06-22

Updated: 2026-11-04

License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

Importance score: 68/100

The gist: The core of most socio-technical systems lies a scarce resource that is allocated among agents: highway lanes, public transit, road space, water rights, energy access, grid capacity…

Key concepts

Welfarist Control Framework
This framework aims to make automated control systems align with societal goals by trading off individual interests fairly. It uses principles from social choice theory to define a Social Cost Functional that ensures decisions maximize long-run social welfare while respecting fairness axioms.
Social Cost Functional (SCFL)
The SCFL is a mathematical tool used to assign a preference relation to every possible cost profile in the system. It must satisfy Welfarist Axioms, which help designers explicitly state normative requirements and ensure the resulting social ranking can be represented by a numerical Social Cost Function.
Dynamic Application in Control Settings
The paper demonstrates how these social choice principles can be applied to real-world control problems like online feedback optimization and Markov Decision Processes (MDPs). This shows how welfarism provides new perspectives on fairness, such as ex-ante versus ex-post considerations.
Welfarist Design Procedure
This is a practical recipe for designing multi-agent systems. It involves identifying agent preferences, determining the level of comparability between agents' costs (e.g., can differences be compared?), and then solving an optimization problem to find the resulting Social Cost Function.

Terminology

Summary

The core of most socio-technical systems lies a scarce resource that is allocated among agents: highway lanes, public transit, road space, water rights, energy access, grid capacity, user attention, pollution rights, etc. p. 0

Where the paper says it

Sophie Hall, Kai Zhang, Ilia Shilov, Heinrich H. Nax, Saverio Bolognani Summary A t the core of most socio-technical systems lies a scarce resource that is allocated among agents: highway lanes, public transit, road space, water rights, energy access, grid capacity, user attention, pollution rights, etc.

With further automation of the underlying allocation processes, control engineers are increasingly tasked to make decisive assumptions regarding what society wants. p. 0
Where the paper says it

Nax, Saverio Bolognani Summary A t the core of most socio-technical systems lies a scarce resource that is allocated among agents: highway lanes, public transit, road space, water rights, energy access, grid capacity, user attention, pollution rights, etc. With further automation of the underlying allocation processes, control engineers are increasingly tasked to make decisive assumptions regarding what society wants.

In practice to date, design choices are largely driven by industry norms and conventions rather than a result of conscientiously responsible and ethical design. p. 0
Where the paper says it

With further automation of the underlying allocation processes, control engineers are increasingly tasked to make decisive assumptions regarding what society wants. In practice to date, design choices are largely driven by industry norms and conventions rather than a result of conscientiously responsible and ethical design.

The Central Challenge of Resource Allocation

Central challenges for a society are distributing goods and regulating access to services that meet primary needs for its population: water, food, transportation, energy, internet, and healthcare. Implicit in all of them is a collective agreement that society has some kind of governance mandate to ensure universal access, fairness, safety, sustainability, and accountability in the production and delivery. p. 0

Where the paper says it

C entral challenges for a society are distributing goods and regulating access to services that meet primary needs for its population: water, food, transportation, energy, internet, and healthcare. Implicit in all of them is a collective agreement that society has some kind of governance mandate to ensure universal access, fairness, safety, sustainability, and accountability in the production and delivery.

The core challenge resulting from the scarcity of the resource that needs to be distributed lies in the heterogeneous nature of the recipients, who experience different utility or cost when receiving the same service or good. p. 0
Where the paper says it

This creates challenges and, more importantly, opportunities to fulfill the values underpinning the societal mandate more closely and more efficiently than ever before. The core challenge resulting from the scarcity of the resource that needs to be distributed lies in the heterogeneous nature of the recipients, who experience different utility or cost when receiving the same service or good.

Ideally, when aligned with the societal mandate, automation can tradeoff these competing interests fairly or can satisfy them with fewer resources (that is, more sustainably). p. 0
Where the paper says it

The core challenge resulting from the scarcity of the resource that needs to be distributed lies in the heterogeneous nature of the recipients, who experience different utility or cost when receiving the same service or good. Ideally, when aligned with the societal mandate, automation can tradeoff these competing interests fairly or can satisfy them with fewer resources (that is, more sustainably).

The Welfarist Control Framework

Trading off individual interests in a way that matches the societal mandate across alternative allocations is really at the heart of many social-technical systems. In control, this is pursued under a variety of headers including Pareto efficient control (multi-objective optimization) [1], cooperative game theory [2], and equity-, equality- and fairness-oriented control [3, 4]. p. 0

Where the paper says it

Trading off individual interests in a way that matches the societal mandate across alternative allocations is really at the heart of many social-technical systems. In control, this is pursued under a variety of headers including Pareto efficient control (multi-objective optimization) [1], cooperative game theory [2], and equity-, equality- and fairness-oriented control [3, 4].

The goal of welfarist control design is to align the closed loop behavior to the preferences of the agents. p. 1
Where the paper says it

In control problems, repeated decisions are taken and affect the outcome through a dynamical system. The goal of welfarist control design is to align the closed loop behavior to the preferences of the agents.

This is achieved by taking welfarist decisions in repeated settings, under noise and uncertainty, from online measurements, all while adhering to the fundamental axioms and certifiably maximizing social welfare in the long run. p. 1
Where the paper says it

Today, perhaps, the time is ripe to make those lessons concrete for applied control problems where automation is effectively already happening and impossibilities are plausibly surmountable, so that the loop can be closed between social choice theory and dynamical systems. That is what we consider welfarist control: taking welfarist decisions in repeated settings, under noise and uncertainty, from online measurements, all while adhering to the fundamental axioms and certifiably maximizing social welfare in the long run.

Axiomatic Foundation for Social Cost Functions

The theory of social choice has pondered over these issues in the abstract for almost 100 years. The welfarist approach requires defining a Social Cost Functional (SCFL) that assigns a social preference relation to every admissible cost profile. p. 2

Where the paper says it

We require this relation to be complete and transitive1 , so that it defines a rational social ranking over feasible outcomes. A social cost functional is then a rule that assigns such a ranking to every admissible cost profile.

This SCFL must satisfy several Welfarist Axioms, which serve to make the designer’s normative requirements explicit and narrow attention to those SCFLs whose induced social rankings admit a numerical representation by a Social Cost Function (SCF). p. 2
Where the paper says it

In the sidebar “What breaks without the welfarist axioms” we provide some examples of what can happen if these axioms are relaxed. Second, they narrow attention to those SCFLs whose induced social rankings admit a numerical representation by a Social Cost Function (SCF).

Dynamic Application in Control Settings

The paper develops dynamic welfarism by applying social choice principles to three well-known control settings: online feedback optimization, Markov decision processes, and model predictive control. It demonstrates that feedback allows compensating exogenous factors: outcomes/decisions, welfarism in a stochastic setting gives a new control perspective on ex-ante vs ex-post fairness, and predictive control tools allow welfarism over time with predictions and constraints. p. 1

Where the paper says it

In a next step, we develop dynamic welfarism by applying social choice principles to three well-known control settings: online feedback optimization, Markov decision processes, and model predictive control. We demonstrate that » feedback allows compensating exogenous factors: outcomes/decisions; » welfarism in a stochastic setting gives a new control perspective on ex-ante vs ex-post fairness; » predictive control tools allow welfarism over time with predictions and constraints.

Welfarist Design Procedure in Practice

The welfarist design procedure for multi-agent decision can now be stated as a simple recipe: 1) Identify the agents’ preferences. Define the feasible set X and the individual cost functions Ji. p. 7

Where the paper says it

Welfarist Design Procedure The welfarist design procedure for multi-agent decision can now be stated as a simple recipe: 1) Identify the agents’ preferences. Define the feasible set X and the individual cost functions Ji .

2) Determine the level of comparability. p. 7
Where the paper says it

Define the feasible set X and the individual cost functions Ji . 2) Determine the level of comparability.

Ask: can cost differences be compared across agents (CUC)? p. 7
Where the paper says it

2) Determine the level of comparability. Ask: can cost differences be compared across agents (CUC)?

Can both cost levels and differences also be compared (CFC)? p. 7
Where the paper says it

Ask: can cost differences be compared across agents (CUC)? Can both cost levels and differences also be compared (CFC)?

Can nothing cardinal be compared across agents (CNC)? p. 7
Where the paper says it

Can both cost levels and differences also be compared (CFC)? Can nothing cardinal be compared across agents (CNC)?

Are only ordinal rankings available (OLC)? p. 7
Where the paper says it

Can nothing cardinal be compared across agents (CNC)? Are only ordinal rankings available (OLC)?

The comparability level then uniquely determines the functional form of the admissible social cost function. p. 7
Where the paper says it

Are only ordinal rankings available (OLC)? The comparability level then uniquely determines the functional form of the admissible social cost function (Table 1).

3) Solve and report. p. 7
Where the paper says it

The comparability level then uniquely determines the functional form of the admissible social cost function (Table 1). 3) Solve and report.

Optimize the resulting social cost function over X, and state the adopted comparability level together with the resulting SCF as part of the design specification. p. 7
Where the paper says it

3) Solve and report. Optimize the resulting social cost function over X , and state the adopted comparability level together with the resulting SCF as part of the design specification.

Welfarist Feedback Optimization in Dynamic Systems

Feedback optimization allows to design iterative policies for the choice of u based on feedback measurements of the outcome x so that the system is driven to an optimal outcome x⋆ that is best aligned (in a welfarist sense) to the preferences of the agents. The gradient step takes the form u t+1 = ΠU h(u t − α∇Ce(u t))⊤i(7). p. 9

Where the paper says it

For the reasons listed above, Ce(u) in general cannot be evaluated, but it is instrumental for the design procedure. The projected gradient descent step takes the form u t+1 = ΠU h u t − α∇Ce(u t ) ⊤ i (7) where the gradient ∇Ce can be computed via chain-rule differentiation on the composite function (6): ∇Ce(u) = ∇C(J(h(u, w)))∇J(h(u, w))∇uh(u, w) Notice that the differentiation requires knowing the sensitivity ∇uh(u, w), that is, the marginal effect of the decision on the outcome3 , but does not require to evaluate h(u, w) numerically, as the outcome x can be measured.

Online Rawlsian optimization, which uses the maximin SCF, transfers resources to the agent that is suffering the highest cost. p. 4
Where the paper says it

(1) This is the Rawlsian maximin rule: the social cost equals the cost of the worst-off agent. The designer allocates resources to minimize the maximum individual cost, thereby focusing on protecting the most disadvantaged agent.

Welfarist Control of Markov Decision Processes

Markov decision processes (MDPs) are a standard framework for modeling uncertainty in dynamic decision-making problems. The SCF C(·) enters the problem as the third aggregation operator, applied across agents. p. 8

Where the paper says it

Illustrative Example: Fair Power Generation Curtailment (cont’d) L et us revisit the curtailment problem under a welfarist lens, and see how the proposed design procedure can be applied to this specific application. Step 1: Identify the agents’ preferences Suppose prosumer i incurs a cost from curtailment according to Ji(xi) = θi (p¯i − xi).

The optimal occupancy measure σ∗ solves SEC: min σ ∑t C(J(x t, u t)) (10a) s. p. 2
Where the paper says it

Trading off equality and efficiency has been expressed as “the big tradeoff” [15], and many fairness indices used in control can be understood as cutting that tradeoff in a specific way. Any such index is a joint measure that takes the preferences of all affected agents and selects a “fair” outcome.

t. (10b) − (10d). ECS is structurally different and requires a non-Markovian policy π t(u tx 0, u 0, x 1, u 1,. p. 5
Where the paper says it

Continuity is a core well-posedness property when social rankings are computed or embedded in numerical optimization procedures. In dynamic control settings, discontinuities in the resulting decision policy (that is, in the controller) are problematic: they can cause rapidly switching (“chattering”) allocations when measurements fluctuate over time, are noisy, or arise within a feedback loop.

.., x t) that makes decisions based on history. p. 1
Where the paper says it

decision u dynamical system control exogeneous factors w decision maker outcome x agents’ costs Ji(x) agents’ costs Ji(x) dynamic social choice outcome x social choice FIGURE 1 In standard social choice, a welfarist stance is used to select an outcome based on the agents’ preferences. In control problems, repeated decisions are taken and affect the outcome through a dynamical system.

Welfarist Model Predictive Control

Model predictive control (MPC) is an optimization-based receding-horizon control technique where the designer needs to decide an objective, function of the T−long sequences of inputs and outputs for the program min x, u objective (12a) s.t. x t+1 = f(x t, u t) t ∈ [0, T − 1]. Tracking a welfarist steady state is determined as the solution of (x̄, ū) = argmin u∈U, x∈X C(J(x, u)) s. p. 9

Where the paper says it

We assume that the cost J(x) of the agents is available in functional form, together with an appropriate comparability level. As discussed earlier, the comparability level guides the choice of the SCF C(J(x)), which in turn allows us to define the steady-state optimization problem (u ⋆ , x ⋆ ) = argmin u,x C(J(x)) subject to x = h(u, w) u ∈ U, (5) where U is the feasible decision space (e.

t. x = f(x, u).

Conclusion and Outlook

The Welfarist framework promises to attain higher levels of transparency, fairness, and explainability which will improve social acceptance of automation of critical infrastructure and automated allocation of essential resources. Many control applications will require further development in order to fully translate and certify the axiomatic guarantees of social choice within the complex and interconnected control architectures that characterize control applications more generally.

Green — the paper says it, and the page is printed. Red — no passage carries it, so treat that sentence as unverified. The same check runs on your own text: check a summary against its source, $5.

Improvements for AI systems

  1. Social Choice Integration for Control Design: AI systems can be designed to align closed loop behavior with societal mandates by aggregating individual agent preferences into control design objectives. This allows systems to trade off individual interests in a way that matches the societal mandate across alternative allocations.

  2. Axiomatic Allocation Framework: AI engineers can use welfarist axioms such as Pareto Principle, Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, and Pairwise Continuity to rigorously justify social rankings for resource allocation. This provides a principled approach where the designer’s normative requirements [are] explicit and the resulting social ranking is certifiably maximizing social welfare in the long run.

  3. Dynamic Control Policy Generation: AI systems can implement feedback optimization, online Nash optimization, or online Rawlsian optimization to generate real-time decisions. For instance, using an online Rawlsian update transfers resources to the agent that is suffering the highest cost, implementing a form of distributive justice in closed-loop systems.

  4. Model Predictive Control (MPC) for Dynamic Allocation: AI can employ MPC with welfarist objectives to maximize welfare over a finite horizon while accounting for constraints and predictions. This allows for tracking a welfarist steady state or optimizing the objective function over sequences of inputs and outputs, ensuring that the system adheres to fairness criteria across time.

  5. Uncertainty Handling in MDPs: When modeling uncertain environments using Markov Decision Processes (MDPs), AI can utilize different welfare criteria like SCE, SEC, CES, and ECS to determine optimal policies. This allows for ex-ante or ex-post fairness decisions based on whether the system prioritizes average stage outcomes or the realized sequence of costs.

  6. Robustness Guarantees in MPC: By using a welfarist objective in open loop MPC programs, AI can aim for stability of the welfarist steady-state, ensuring safety in sociotechnical systems and avoiding resource depletion through dissipativity proofs.

  7. Trajectory-wise Optimization: AI can extend computational methods like receding horizon optimization to solve Welfarist decision problems over trajectories. This allows designers to choose objectives like Welfarism over time, which can compensate for utility losses at one time step by planning for gains later in the prediction horizon.

Abstract

At the core of most socio-technical systems lies a scarce resource that is allocated among agents: highway lanes, public transit, road space, water rights, energy access, grid capacity, user attention, pollution rights, etc. With further automation of the underlying allocation processes, control engineers are increasingly tasked with making decisive assumptions regarding what society wants. In practice to date, design choices are largely driven by industry norms and conventions rather than a result of conscientiously responsible and ethical design. In this paper, we look at tools available to control engineers to design systems in a more principled manner in order to match the societal mandate. We consider three control design paradigms: online feedback optimization, control of Markov decision processes, and model predictive control. Beginning with aggregating individual agents' preferences into control design objectives, subsequently ensuring and certifying the fulfillment of those specifications, we argue that the feedback nature of control systems enables appropriate allocation of the shared resources in ways hitherto unparalleled.

Sources

Related papers