On the cryptographic potential of single-qubit rotations

arXiv:2606.23392 · quant-ph · Submitted 2026-06-22 · Read on arXiv

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Introduction to the show: ident: Quantum Radio. Generated commentary on the latest quantum physics and condensed matter papers.

Kai: We're looking at the paper: "On the cryptographic potential of single-qubit rotations".

Paper summary: Kai: To summarize this paper "On the cryptographic potential of single-qubit rotations" Alex B. Grilo Lucas Hanouz and Anne Marin Sorbonne University CNRS VeriQloud Paris France" they introduce two composably secure constructions demonstrating how parties in most quantum protocols can delegate trusted qubit preparation or measurement tasks to an untrusted provider and instead rely on a trusted single-qubit rotation device.

Mira: The thesis is that this is possible by focusing on the architecture called the Qline where intermediate nodes are limited only to performing single-qubit rotations, and these constructions show how this delegation works in most quantum cryptographic protocols.

Lev: Essentially, they prove that for most scenarios analogous to initial propositions of Quantum Key Distribution or Quantum Oblivious Transfer, users only need to either prepare single-qubit states and immediately transmit them or receive states and immediately measure them.

Kai: Even these less stringent conditions lead to serious challenges when you consider realistic full-scale networks because the cost of the required hardware can become prohibitive.

Mira: To address this, they propose a Qline architecture where intermediate nodes perform only single-qubit rotations and are not responsible for state preparation or measurement, but this structure supports several interesting protocols like Quantum-enhanced Classical multiparty computation.

Lev: The key contribution is that their framework allows any intermediate node to participate in these protocols as if it possessed a trusted source or detector, which significantly expands the functional capabilities of the Qline network.

Kai: This is achieved by shifting the requirement of trust from preparation and measurement devices to rotation units, allowing those components to be provided by a third-party quantum communication service provider while maintaining user security through standardized rotation-based devices.

Mira: So it's not about eliminating physical hardware entirely, but about redefining where the necessary trust lies within the protocol structure itself.

Lev: It suggests that the real work here is figuring out how to design and build those trusted single-qubit rotation devices in a way that scales efficiently for real hardware implementation.

Conclusion: Kai: So looking at "On the cryptographic potential of single-qubit rotations" by Grilo Hanouz and Marin, they are showing us that we can move away from needing fully trusted sources or detectors in many quantum communication protocols towards just needing reliable single-qubit rotation devices on a Qline network.

Mira: The title really highlights the idea that it's the *rotation* device, not the source or detector itself, that holds the cryptographic potential here, and they show how this delegation works for most scenarios.

Lev: What this means practically is that if you can certify a single-qubit rotation device, you could potentially standardize a major component in quantum networks instead of having to trust specialized preparation equipment at every intermediate node.

Kai: It's about creating a functional standardization of user hardware by making the rotation unit the trusted element, which opens up avenues for building more connected and scalable quantum communication infrastructures.

Mira: The implication is that we might be able to build protocols that are simpler in terms of required hardware trust, relying instead on standardized rotation-based devices for security across a network.

Alex B. Grilo, Lucas Hanouz, *Anne Marin

Sorbonne University · VeriQloud

quant-ph

Submitted: 2026-06-22

Updated: 2026-11-17

The gist: In this work, two composably secure constructions are introduced that demonstrate how parties in most quantum cryptographic protocols can delegate trusted qubit preparation or measurement tasks to an…

Key concepts

Trusted Single-Qubit Rotation Device
This is a device assumed to be trustworthy for performing specific single-qubit rotations (like RZ operations). Instead of trusting the entire qubit source or detector, parties can trust this rotation device, which then interacts with an untrusted component to achieve secure measurement or state preparation.
Composability Framework
This is a mathematical framework used to prove security. It ensures that if you use these new constructions in larger cryptographic systems, the security guarantees remain valid and sound. It allows the results to be integrated seamlessly into broader cryptographic protocols.
Qubit Measurement Implementation
This construction shows how a protocol requiring single-qubit measurements can be replaced by using a rotation device followed by an untrusted detector. Charlie rotates the state, and the untrusted detector measures it, securely implementing the required measurement task.

Terminology

Summary

In this work, two composably secure constructions are introduced that demonstrate how parties in most quantum cryptographic protocols can delegate trusted qubit preparation or measurement tasks to an untrusted provider and instead rely on a trusted single-qubit rotation device This work addresses the questions of what is the cryptographic potential of single-qubit rotation devices and which protocols they enable

Core Contributions

The main contributions consist of two constructions tailored respectively to qubit sources and detectors

  1. The first construction implements a trusted single-qubit measurement from a trusted single-qubit rotation device followed by a (possibly remote) untrusted detector

  2. The second construction describes some sufficient conditions for cryptographic protocols for which we can replace a trusted qubit source by a (possibly remote) untrusted single-qubit source and a trusted single-qubit rotation device

Framework and Security Analysis

The security analysis is carried out within the Abstract Cryptography framework [MR11] which endows our constructions with composability This property ensures that our results can be seamlessly integrated into broader cryptographic constructions while preserving the soundness of existing security proofs

Qubit Measurement Implementation

The first construction shows that in any protocol involving single-qubit measurements in a given plane, these trusted measurements can be securely replaced by a device that performs single-qubit rotations in that same plane followed by a measurement by an untrusted detector

  1. The system SDC of Charlie formalizes the intuition to measure an unknown state in a given basis θ, Charlie may simply rotate the input state by an angle −θ and ask the untrusted detector to measure the resulting qubit in the Hadamard basis and to announce the classical outcome

  2. The system SDC is defined such that it applies a RZ(−θn + rC n π) operation to each incoming qubit and outputs (θn)n∈[N] and (xC n)n∈[N] = (rC n ⊕ cn)n∈[N]

  3. Lemma 1 proves that the state distribution SDC n of Charlie securely and composably implements the task of measuring a single qubit

Qubit Source Implementation

The second construction addresses qubit preparation by relying on specific assumptions regarding the underlying protocol

  1. Assumption 1 decomposes P B into two distinct phases: State distribution and Classical post-processing

  2. Assumption 3 states that the probability density function pΘ which determines the sampling of (θn)n∈[N] is π-periodic

  3. The system SDC source formalizes Charlie’s state distribution, where he receives a qubit from an untrusted source, applies the RZ(θn) gate, and outputs the rotated qubit back at its outer interface

Protocol Applications

The results extend most single-qubit protocols to the Qline architecture, allowing any intermediate node to participate as if it possessed a trusted source or detector

  1. For Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), Theorem 1 implies that both players’ views of the protocol can equivalently be implemented using the device of Charlie

  2. For Quantum Oblivious Transfer (QOT), Theorem 3 shows that Charlie can securely assume the role of Alice in Quantum Oblivious Transfer using P C source

  3. Other promising candidates include Quantum Bit commitment (QBC) and Delegated Quantum Computing (DQC)

Theoretical Implications

The work suggests that the Qline possesses the versatility to support an even broader range of applications By shifting the requirement of trust from preparation and measurement devices to rotation units, our framework allows for a functional standardization of user hardware Although the construction presupposes a trusted quantum device, it provides a theoretical motivation for exploring experimental realization of certified single-qubit rotation devices

References

[BB14] Charles H. Bennett and Gilles Brassard. p. 0 Quantum cryptography: Public key distribution and coin tossing. p. 0 Theoretical Computer Science, 560:7–11, 2014

[BBCS91] Charles Bennett, Gilles Brassard, Claude Crépeau, and Marie-Hélène Skubiszewska. Practical quantum oblivious transfer. p. 1 volume 576, pages 351–366, 01 1991

[BF10] Niek J Bouman and Serge Fehr. Sampling in a quantum population, and applications. p. 1 In Annual Cryptology Conference. Springer, 2010

[CPE+17] Marco Clementi, Anna Pappa, Andreas Eckstein, Ian A. Walmsley, Elham Kashefi, and Stefanie Barz. Classical multiparty computation using quantum resources. p. 1 Phys. Rev. A, 96(062317), 2017

[DHM+24] Mina Doosti, Lucas Hanouz, Anne Marin, Elham Kashefi, and Marc Kaplan. Establishing shared secret keys on quantum line networks: Protocol and security. p. 1 In 2024 International Conference on Quantum Communications, Networking, and Computing (QCNC), pages 176–183, 2024

[GHM25] Alex B. Grilo, Lucas Hanouz, and Anne Marin. p. 0 Security of a secret sharing protocol on the qline. p. 1 ArXiv, abs/2504. p. 019702, 2025

[GL24] Alex B. Grilo and Philippe Lamontagne. p. 1 The round complexity of proofs in the bounded quantum storage model, 2024

[KLMO24] Elham Kashefi, Dominik Leichtle, Luka Music, and Harold Ollivier. Verification of quantum computations without trusted preparations or measurements, 2024

[KWW12] Robert Konig, Stephanie Wehner, and Jürg Wullschleger. Unconditional security from noisy quantum storage. p. 1 IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 58(3):1962–1984, March 2012

[MKA+22] Yao Ma, Elham Kashefi, Myrto Arapinis, Kaushik Chakraborty, and Marc Kaplan. Qenclave - a practical solution for secure quantum cloud computing. p. 1 npj Quantum Information, 8(1), November 2022

[MR11] Ueli Maurer and Renato Renner. Abstract cryptography. p. 2 In Proceedings of Innovations in Computer Science, ICS 2010, Tsinghua University Press, pages 1–21, 2011

[PLL+23] Beatrice Polacchi, Dominik Leichtle, Leonardo Limongi, Gonzalo Carvacho, Giorgio Milani, Nicolò Spagnolo, Marc Kaplan, Fabio Sciarrino, and Elham Kashefi. Multi-client distributed blind quantum computation with the qline architecture. p. 1 Nature Communications, 14(1):7743, 2023

[PR14] Christopher Portmann and Renato Renner. Cryptographic security of quantum key distribution. p. 0 ArXiv, abs/1409. p. 03525, 2014

[SHD+25] Matheus Sena, Georg Harder, Ronny Döring, Ralf-Peter Braun, Michaela Ritter, Oliver Holschke, Marc Kaplan, and Marc Geitz. Deploying the qline system for a qkd metropolitan network on the berlin openqkd testbed. p. 1 IEEE Photonics Journal, 17(1):1–11, 2025

[STB+05] Christian Schmid, Pavel Trojek, Mohamed Bourennane, Christian Kurtsiefer, Marek Żukowski, and Harald Weinfurter. Experimental single qubit quantum secret sharing. p. 1 Physical Review Letters, 95(23), December 2005

[TL17] Marco Tomamichel and Anthony Leverrier. A largely self-contained and complete security proof for quantum key distribution. p. 0 Quantum, 1:14, July 2017

[WST08] Stephanie Wehner, Christian Schaffner, and Barbara M. Terhal. Cryptography from noisy storage. p. 0 Phys. Rev. Lett.

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Improvements for AI systems

  1. State distribution systems can be securely replaced by untrusted single-qubit rotation devices followed by a measurement by an untrusted detector. This allows for functional standardization of user hardware where physical sources and detectors no longer need to be trusted, potentially being provided by a third-party service provider.

  2. The framework enables the extension of most single-qubit protocols to the Qline architecture, allowing any intermediate node to participate as if it possessed a trusted source or detector, significantly expanding functional capabilities.

  3. Qubits can be prepared by an untrusted source and run through a trusted single-qubit rotation device, achieving the desired state preparation in most common quantum cryptographic protocols under specific conditions.

  4. The system SDC source enables Charlie to assume the role of Alice in certain protocols by receiving qubits from an untrusted source, applying a RZ(theta n) gate, and outputting rotated qubits, even if Charlie does not implement the ideal source SDA.

  5. The system SDCNOT allows for state distribution where a qubit is received from an untrusted source, entangled with a second qubit in the |0> state via CNOT, and measured in the -theta n basis to produce flipped output angles theta prime n equal to theta n plus xn pi modulo 2 pi.

  6. The system SDEB allows for entanglement-based implementation where Charlie receives two qubits from an untrusted source, measures one qubit in the -theta n basis, and outputs the second qubit, enabling secure implementation of certain protocols like prepare-and-measure QKD.

Sources

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