Domination-Avoiding Learning Agents Cannot Collude
cs.GT
Submitted: 2026-05-31
Updated: 2026-11-03
Terminology
Sources
- Chaos in Autobidding Auctions
- Agents of Chaos
- Algorithmic Collusion by Large Language Models
- The Economics of No-regret Learning Algorithms
- Algorithmic Collusion Without Threats
- Online Optimization Algorithms in Repeated Price Competition: Equilibrium Learning and Algorithmic Collusion
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