On the Complexity of Correlated Equilibria Beyond Normal-Form Games
cs.GT
Submitted: 2026-05-17
Updated: 2026-11-13
Comments: Supersedes arXiv:2406.13116. Abstract abridged due to arXiv length limit. This version merges in content from arXiv:2610.28141
License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
Terminology
Sources
- Quadratic Speedup for Computing Contraction Fixed Points
- On the Complexity of the Optimal Correlated Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games
- Bayes correlated equilibria, no-regret dynamics in Bayesian games, and the price of anarchy
- Expected Variational Inequalities
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