Blockspace Under Pressure: An Analysis of Spam MEV on High-Throughput Blockchains
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Introduction to the show: ident: Computer Science. The day in computer science: software, systems and theory on arXiv.
Tom: I'm Tom.
Jane: And I'm Jane, here with Lu, Meng and our in-house large language model, Lalam.
Tom: We're looking at the paper: "Blockspace Under Pressure".
Jane: Here's the gist of the paper. On high-throughput, low-fee blockchains, a qualitatively new form of maximal extractable value (MEV) has emerged: searchers submit large volumes of speculative transactions whose profitability is resolved only at execution time on Page 1.
Tom: This paper develops a framework to model spam transactions competing for on-chain opportunities under competitive equilibrium and derives equilibrium spam volumes as a function of block capacity, minimum gas price, and the transaction fee mechanism on Page 1.
Jane: The Emergence of Spam MEV A qualitatively different form of MEV has recently emerged on high-throughput blockchains, where searchers submit high volumes of speculative transactions whose profitability is resolved only at execution time, which they refer to as spam MEV on Page 1.
Tom: In spam transactions, both the detection and execution of opportunities reside largely in onchain smart-contract logic, where a transaction probes whether a profitable opportunity exists at the moment of execution and captures it, while when no opportunity is found it may revert or simply consume gas on Page 2.
Title and authors: Tom: So, Jane, this paper, "Blockspace Under Pressure: An Analysis of Spam MEV on High-Throughput Blockchains," it really zeroes in on how searchers submit these huge volumes of speculative transactions that only make money at execution time.
Jane: Right, and the authors are looking at this phenomenon under a competitive equilibrium, trying to figure out exactly what drives the volume of this spam when you look at block capacity and gas prices.
Tom: Exactly, it sets up a model where they analyze how equilibrium spam volumes depend on things like the block space limit Bmax, the minimum gas price gmin, and that transaction fee mechanism on Page five.
Lu: The framework decomposes occupied block space into B equals Qu plus sS, and they determine the clearing price using a demand function D of g equals D0 minus beta g on Page six.
Meng: So, when you look at this model, what's the immediate takeaway for us on the production side? Does this suggest we need to focus more on how those parameters interact?
Jane: Well, one big finding is that spam is always costly because when block capacity is scarce, it actually drives up gas prices on Page one <ref:2604.00234#pg1>.
Tom: That’s interesting because it suggests a direct negative feedback loop between scarcity and spam profitability.
Lu: They also looked at approximating priority fee ordering or PFO, and that actually reduces the spam volume because spammers pay more to get into early block positions on Page seventeen.
Meng: So, if we look at deploying a system, does this mean prioritizing those early slots with higher fees is a viable mitigation strategy?
Jane: It seems so, but there's another point they make about scaling: as user demand grows and block space scales up with it, the share of spam in the total block capacity doesn't just vanish; it plateaus.
Tom: That means we can't just assume that if we give users more space to grow, the spam problem disappears entirely.
Lu: They characterize choosing Bmax given a fixed gas price floor gmin using two different rules on Page eleven which is a concrete design lever for us to consider.
Meng: From my point of view, I'm curious about how this scaling rule plays out when we think about real traffic versus speculative probes that never execute.
Jane: The empirical validation from Base and Arbitrum supports the model, showing that spam grew sharply when block capacity was scaled up but then fell once minimum gas prices were introduced on Page one <ref:2604.00234#pg1,from Base and Arbitrum supports the model>.
Tom: And they showed that spam falls when gas price floors rise, it grows with block capacity, and on Base appears later in the block as predicted by the PFO analysis on Page seventeen.
Lu: The model suggests that even when aggregate opportunity value scales linearly with demand, spam's share of included gas approaches a sizable positive level rather than vanishing as demand grows under both the plateau rule and the refined MMUS rule on Page fifteen.
Meng: That’s a bit concerning if it means we have to constantly fight that persistent level of spam regardless of how much user demand we add.
Jane: The paper suggests that for future work, we should focus on concrete system-level mitigation mechanisms, specifically making spam less attractive to send and failed probes cheaper to process on Page nineteen.
Tom: So the direction is clearly toward incentive-based mechanisms like minimum gas prices and charging for reserved execution gas, or maybe cheap-path filtering when execution isn't the bottleneck on Page nineteen.
Lu: They also mentioned that they should look at making failed probes cheaper to process on Page nineteen which would be a direct response to the cost of consuming gas without a trade.
Meng: If we can get those failed probes cheap, that cuts directly into the resource consumption part of this spam MEV dynamic.
Jane: So, before we wrap up this discussion on "Blockspace Under Pressure: An Analysis of Spam MEV on High-Throughput Blockchains," Tom and I want to summarize what this means for us in practice.
Tom: It means that the prevalence of spam isn't just a theoretical thing; it’s tied to how we set those block space limits and gas price floors, and those settings have tangible effects on user welfare.
Jane: And the main lesson is that simply adding more capacity doesn't automatically solve the spam problem; you need mechanisms to manage that persistent share of block space.
Lu: I think the core idea is moving from just observing it to designing rules for Bmax and gmin based on these equilibrium dynamics.
Meng: From a deployment standpoint, it suggests we need monitoring modules that track those counterfactual gaps between worlds with and without spam to guide our decisions on those parameters.
Tom: Exactly, so we're looking at using the math from this paper to inform how we design the actual system-level mitigation tools.
Jane: We’ll be ready for more papers soon, so stick around for what’s next.
The paper's summary: Tom: So, this paper basically says that on high throughput blockchains, we have this new thing called spam MEV which is all about searchers submitting tons of speculative trades that only get paid when they execute them right then and there on Page one.
Jane: That sounds really intense because it means the profitability isn't known until execution time and it happens mostly within the smart contract logic, not on Page two at least.
Lu: The authors model this under a competitive equilibrium, looking at how the volume of this spam depends on things like block space limit Bmax and minimum gas price gmin.
Meng: So they’re trying to figure out what drives that spam volume when you look at the physical constraints of the blockchain, like how much room there is in a block?
Tom: Yeah, they break down occupied block space into B equals Qu plus sS and use a demand function D of g equals D0 minus beta g on Page six to figure out the clearing price.
Jane: And what's really interesting is their findings regarding those design choices on Page one. They found that spam is always costly because if block capacity is tight, it pushes users out and raises gas prices on Page one.
Lu: Then they looked at approximate priority fee ordering or PFO and showed that this reduces spam because spammers have to pay more to get into early positions on Page seventeen.
Meng: So the idea is that if we use PFO, the cost for a spammer to get an early slot goes up, which should naturally reduce how much spam they submit.
Tom: Right, but then there's this part about scaling user demand and block space. They found that as user demand grows and block space scales up with it, the share of spam in the total block capacity doesn't just disappear; it levels off.
Jane: That’s a big shift because you can’t just assume that more space means less spam if the underlying dynamics are like this.
Lu: They characterize choosing Bmax based on a fixed gas price floor gmin using two different rules on Page eleven which gives us concrete levers for design decisions.
Meng: So they give us specific rules to follow when we decide how much block space to allocate versus how high we set the minimum gas price.
Tom: And empirically, they showed that spam grows when capacity scales up but then falls once you introduce minimum gas prices, and it appears later in the block on Base as predicted by the PFO analysis on Page seventeen.
Jane: So for someone just listening to this, it’s about realizing that scaling things up doesn't automatically solve problems; you need specific mechanisms to manage how much of that extra capacity gets taken over by spam.
Lu: They also look at scaling strategy based on aggregate opportunity value growth and user demand, showing that even with linear aggregate opportunity scaling, spam's share of included gas approaches a positive level rather than vanishing.
Meng: That means we can’t rely on demand alone to clean up the block space; we still have to actively manage it.
Tom: So the paper ends by suggesting future work should focus on concrete system-level mitigation tools, like making spam less attractive and failed probes cheaper to process on Page nineteen.
Jane: That points toward building actual software solutions rather than just theoretical modeling of the equilibrium volumes.
Lu: I think that’s where it gets interesting, moving from the mathematical model to the actual design of these mitigation tools is where we need to go next.
The paper's improvements: Tom: So, this paper isn't just looking at how spam behaves under current conditions; they’re proposing actual ways to fix it, like introducing minimum gas prices and charging for reserved execution gas on Page nineteen.
Jane: That means they aren't just describing the problem; they’re suggesting concrete tools that could actually work in a production system.
Lu: They focus on incentive-based mechanisms like minimum gas prices and also cheap-path mechanisms such as filtering when execution isn't the bottleneck on Page nineteen.
Meng: From an engineer’s point of view, those are practical things—minimum gas prices are something you can set in your protocol code, and filtering is a way to reduce the load before it gets to the execution layer.
Tom: Yeah, minimum gas prices provide that floor for profit when block space is tight, which directly counters the cost advantage spammers have when capacity is scarce.
Jane: And they also discuss cheap-path mechanisms specifically when execution isn't the main bottleneck, which sounds like a way to make failed probes less expensive to process.
Lu: The idea is that by making those failed probes cheaper, you reduce the incentive for searchers to submit high volumes of transactions that don't lead to a trade on Page two.
Tom: So they’re suggesting a two-pronged approach: setting price floors and improving how failed execution attempts are handled at the protocol level.
Jane: It changes things for us by showing that mitigation isn't just about blocking spam; it’s about changing the cost structure so that legitimate users have a better chance of success.
Meng: I need to know how much computational overhead those filtering mechanisms add, because if they slow down the entire block processing, we’ve just traded one kind of problem for another.
Lu: The paper does touch on this, but the focus is on making failed probes cheaper first, which is a targeted optimization rather than a massive system overhaul.
Tom: The authors also explore incentive mechanisms like minimum gas prices and charging for reserved execution gas to directly counteract the cost advantage spammers get from Page one positioning.
Jane: So they are showing how you can use economic incentives to push the equilibrium away from high spam volumes toward a more stable state.
Meng: If we look at monitoring, they suggest a validator revenue and externality monitoring module that tracks counterfactual gaps between worlds with and without spam for different design parameters.
Tom: That’s really useful because it gives you real-time guidance on which combination of block space limit Bmax and gas price floor gmin maximizes user welfare while minimizing that extra execution burden created by spam.
Lu: It moves the conversation from just modeling the equilibrium to actively tuning the system settings based on real-world feedback.
Jane: So, we’re moving toward a system where the design of our block parameters is guided by monitoring these trade-offs between user welfare and that execution burden from spam.
Conclusion: Tom: So, to wrap up this talk on "Blockspace Under Pressure: An Analysis of Spam MEV on High-Throughput Blockchains," we’ve seen how spam volume depends heavily on those design choices like block space limit Bmax and minimum gas price gmin.
Jane: Basically, the paper shows that spam isn't just a random occurrence; it's governed by these specific economic and structural rules within the system.
Lu: The main implication is that we need to look at how we set those parameters because they directly determine if spam gets crushed or grows under increased user demand.
Meng: I still wonder how much compute this kind of modeling requires to run on real traffic instead of just the theoretical equilibrium volumes they calculate.
Lalam: From my perspective, the findings are quite certain; the model strongly suggests that incentive mechanisms like minimum gas prices actually have a measurable effect on reducing spam volume under competitive conditions.
Tom: Yeah, it changes how we think about mitigation; it’s not just about throttling transactions but tuning the economic incentives to make spam unprofitable.
Jane: It shifts the focus toward designing system rules that actively manage the trade-off between maximizing user participation and controlling that persistent share of block space taken by spam.
Lu: The authors flagged that their analysis is based on specific assumptions about demand scaling, which is a limitation you have to keep in mind when applying these results elsewhere.
Meng: So it’s useful for designing the incentive layer, but we still need to test those theoretical rules against actual production traffic at scale.
Tom: Exactly; the next step is taking these equilibrium calculations and turning them into concrete, deployable system-level mitigation strategies that actually run on a live blockchain.
Jane: We’ll be looking at how these economic levers interact with those technical ones in our next discussion, because understanding the mechanics of spam is just the first step toward building a more robust environment.
WENHAO WANG, ADITYA SARAF, LIOBA HEIMBACH, KUSHAL BABEL, FAN ZHANG
Yale University · Cornell University
cs.GT
Submitted: 2026-03-31
Updated: 2026-10-29
Project page: https://category-labs.github.io/category-research/monadinitial-spec-proposal.pdf
License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Importance score: 77/100
The gist: On high-throughput, low-fee blockchains, a qualitatively new form of maximal extractable value (MEV) has emerged…
Key concepts
- Spam MEV on Page 1
- This refers to a new form of maximal extractable value where searchers submit many speculative transactions whose success depends entirely on execution time within the first block. They probe for opportunities; if found, they execute and capture value immediately, consuming block space even if no trade occurs.
- Block Space Limit (Bmax)
- This is a design lever representing the maximum amount of transaction data or operations allowed in a single block. The model analyzes how increasing or decreasing this limit affects the competition between legitimate users and spam transactions seeking on-chain opportunities.
- Minimum Gas Price (gmin)
- This is the minimum fee required for a transaction to be included in a block. The paper investigates how raising this floor impacts spam behavior, showing that higher prices can reduce spam volume by making it more expensive for spammers to secure early positions.
- Competitive Equilibrium
- This is the state where the profits of all competing entities—users and spammers—are driven to zero. The framework analyzes how different design choices (like Bmax and gmin) determine this stable point, showing how spam volume settles under these conditions.
Terminology
Summary
On high-throughput, low-fee blockchains, a qualitatively new form of maximal extractable value (MEV) has emerged: searchers submit large volumes of speculative transactions whose profitability is resolved only at execution time on Page 1. p. 0 Blockspace Under Pressure: An Analysis of Spam MEV on
High-Throughput Blockchains
WENHAO WANG∗
, Yale University, IC3, USA
ADITYA SARAF∗
, Cornell University, USA
LIOBA HEIMBACH, Category Labs, USA
KUSHAL BABEL, Category Labs, USA
FAN ZHANG, Yale University, IC3, USA
On high-throughput, low-fee blockchains, a qualitatively new form of maximal extractable value (MEV) has
emerged: searchers submit large volumes of speculative transactions, whose profitability is resolved only at
execution time. We refer to this as spam MEV. We develop such a framework, modeling spam transactions competing for on-chain opportunities under a
competitive equilibrium that drives their profits to zero, and deriving equilibrium spam volumes as a function
of block capacity, minimum gas price, and the transaction fee mechanism. Empirical evidence from Base and
Arbitrum supports the model: spam grew sharply as block capacity was scaled up and fell when minimum
gas prices were introduced.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
The Emergence of Spam MEV
A qualitatively different form of MEV has recently emerged on high-throughput blockchains, where searchers submit high volumes of speculative transactions whose profitability is resolved only at execution time, which they refer to as spam MEV on Page 1. In spam transactions, both the detection and execution of opportunities reside largely in onchain smart-contract logic, where a transaction probes whether a profitable opportunity exists at the moment of execution and captures it, while when no opportunity is found it may revert or simply consume gas on Page 2. p. 1 Our terminology instead emphasizes that they consume shared block space and
infrastructure resources, whether or not each transaction succeeds. In spam transactions, both the detection and execution of opportunities reside largely in onchain smart-contract logic [52]: a transaction probes whether a profitable opportunity exists at
the moment of execution and, if so, captures it, while when no opportunity is found it may revert
or simply consume gas, i. This encompasses a range of speculative strategies, of
which two are especially common. In cyclic arbitrage, the most prominently studied, a bot sends a
transaction that reads the live state of multiple DEX pools, checks whether any route is profitable,
and executes the arbitrage only if the check succeeds. First documented on Solana [57], spam MEV has since been identified on Ethereum Layer 2
rollups, including Base, Optimism, and Arbitrum [31, 52]. The scale of the phenomenon is striking:
on Base and Optimism, spam MEV transactions consumed over 50% of block gas in Q1 2025 [52], yet
only 6–12% of these speculative probes result in an actual trade.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Design Levers and Framework
The framework analyzes spam transactions competing for on-chain opportunities under a competitive equilibrium that drives their profits to zero, modeling how equilibrium spam volume depends on block space limit Bmax, minimum gas price gmin, and the transaction fee mechanism on Page 1. The design levers analyzed include Block Space Limit Bmax, Minimum Gas Price gmin, and Transaction Fee Mechanism on Page 5. p. 4 2 Model
We present our model for analyzing spam MEV. The design levers (block space limit 𝐵max, minimum gas price 𝑔min, and transaction fee mechanism) were introduced in Section 1. 1 Block Demand and Spam Model
We analyze transaction dynamics within a single block. Let 𝐵 ≤ 𝐵max denote the amount of block
space actually occupied in the block.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Equilibrium Analysis and Trade-offs
The analysis yields three main insights regarding design choices on Page 1. First, spam is always costly, as when block capacity is scarce, it displaces users and drives up gas prices on Page 1. p. 0 Our analysis yields three main insights. First, spam is always costly: when block
capacity is scarce, it displaces users and drives up gas prices; as block capacity grows, it increasingly consumes
execution resources, raising network externality, i. We show
that spam takes an increasing share of each additional unit of block capacity, so capping it before all users are
included creates a favorable trade-off: forgoing a small amount of user welfare eliminates disproportionate
spam and externality. Second, we extend the analysis to approximate priority fee ordering and show that
this reduces spam, as spammers pay more to reach early block positions. Second, we extend the analysis to approximate priority fee ordering and show that
this reduces spam, as spammers pay more to reach early block positions. Third, as user demand grows and
blockspace is scaled accordingly, spam’s share of block capacity plateaus rather than growing indefinitely. We address each parameter in turn: here we first discuss choosing 𝐵max for a
fixed 𝑔min, and we discuss choosing 𝑔min for a fixed 𝐵max in Section B. We present two rules for choosing 𝐵max given a fixed gas price floor 𝑔min: a simple baseline that
scales to the point where user welfare plateaus, and a refined rule that stops earlier by requiring
that marginal capacity primarily serves users.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Empirical Validation and Mitigations
Empirical evidence from Base and Arbitrum supports the model, showing that spam grew sharply as block capacity was scaled up and fell when minimum gas prices were introduced on Page 1. The analysis shows that spam falls when gas price floors rise, grows with block capacity, absorbs disproportionate marginal block space, and on Base appears later in the block as predicted by the PFO analysis on Page 17. p. 4 (6) Empirical evidence and case studies (Section 6): We present case studies of spam on Base
and Arbitrum. Our findings support several model predictions: spam falls when gas price floors
rise, grows with block capacity, absorbs disproportionate marginal block space, and, on Base,
appears later in the block as predicted by the PFO analysis. In our model, spam transactions are charged by gas limit, which matches chains where reserved
execution capacity is the relevant scarce resource. The analysis of when transactions are charged
based on the gas used is discussed in Section D.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Scaling and Future Directions
The analysis of demand scaling suggests that spam’s share of included gas does not vanish as demand grows, instead approaching a sizable positive level under both the plateau rule and the refined MMUS rule on Page 15. The paper concludes by suggesting that future work should focus on the concrete design of system-level mitigation mechanisms, both making spam less attractive to send and failed probes cheaper to process on Page 19. The analysis also shows that for linear aggregate-opportunity scaling, spam’s share of included gas approaches a sizable positive level rather than vanishing as demand grows on Page 15. p. 4 We estimate that MEV opportunity size grows approximately linearly with nonspam activity using empirical data. We show that as demand grows, spam remains a nontrivial
share of included gas, but its share plateaus rather than growing without bound.Where the paper says it
Appendix Details
The appendix details the model's components, including the closed-form equilibrium spam volume and gas prices under random ordering on Page 8. It also provides detailed results for exponential demand curves, showing that qualitative behavior in Section 3 does not rely on linear demand on Page 15 and Page 17. p. 5 The linear demand curve gives closedform expressions. We note that the same analysis methods extend to other decreasing demand
curves, and we discuss the exponential demand case in Section C. Empirical evidence from Base and
Arbitrum supports the model: spam grew sharply as block capacity was scaled up and fell when minimum
gas prices were introduced. Our analysis yields three main insights. Our analysis here,
especially on welfare and externality, provides the quantities needed later for choosing blockchain
parameters wisely. Figure 5 summarizes the equilibrium levels of user welfare, validator revenue, and externality in
the spam world and in the spam-free counterfactual world. Our analysis here,
especially on welfare and externality, provides the quantities needed later for choosing blockchain
parameters wisely. Figure 5 summarizes the equilibrium levels of user welfare, validator revenue, and externality in
the spam world and in the spam-free counterfactual world. (4) Priority fee ordering (PFO) (Section 4): We extend the analysis to an approximate PFO TFM. We show that PFO can reduce spam by making earlier positions in the block more expensive. For compactness, the maths expressions
of the user welfare, validator revenue, and externality, and the explicit counterfactual deltas and
the characterization of where the welfare gap is largest are deferred to Section A. 0 500 1000 1500 2000
Bmax
0
25000
50000
75000
100000
Wuser
User welfare
0 500 1000 1500 2000
Bmax
0
20000
40000
60000
R
Validator revenue
0 500 1000 1500 2000
Bmax
0
2000
4000
6000
E
Externality
W/o spam, gmin = 10
With spam, gmin = 10
W/o spam, gmin = 20
With spam, gmin = 20
W/o spam, gmin = 30
With spam, gmin = 30
Fig. (5) Demand-scaling analysis (Section 5 and Section 6): We study whether spam limits blockchain
scaling [43]. We estimate that MEV opportunity size grows approximately linearly with nonspam activity using empirical data. Designs such as encrypted mempools [4, 8, 26], when deployed, are likely to
only increase spam MEV by further reducing the information available for targeted MEV strategies. While the prevalence of spam MEV has been documented, there is no principled framework
to study the interplay between design parameters and spam volumes, and the impact of spam on
various stakeholders. 3 Our Framework and Contributions
We develop a framework for analyzing spam MEV and its interaction with blockchain design
choices. We model spam transactions as competing for on-chain opportunities, and study how
equilibrium spam volume depends on the block space limit 𝐵max, the minimum gas price 𝑔min, and
the transaction fee mechanism. 3 Our Framework and Contributions
We develop a framework for analyzing spam MEV and its interaction with blockchain design
choices. We model spam transactions as competing for on-chain opportunities, and study how
equilibrium spam volume depends on the block space limit 𝐵max, the minimum gas price 𝑔min, and
the transaction fee mechanism. 3 Our Framework and Contributions
We develop a framework for analyzing spam MEV and its interaction with blockchain design
choices. We model spam transactions as competing for on-chain opportunities, and study how
equilibrium spam volume depends on the block space limit 𝐵max, the minimum gas price 𝑔min, and
the transaction fee mechanism. 3 Our Framework and Contributions
We develop a framework for analyzing spam MEV and its interaction with blockchain design
choices. We model spam transactions as competing for on-chain opportunities, and study how
equilibrium spam volume depends on the block space limit 𝐵max, the minimum gas price 𝑔min, and
the transaction fee mechanism. 3 Our Framework and Contributions
We develop a framework for analyzing spam MEV and its interaction with blockchain design
choices. We model spam transactions as competing for on-chain opportunities, and study how
equilibrium spam volume depends on the block space limit 𝐵max, the minimum gas price 𝑔min, and
the transaction fee mechanism. 3 Our Framework and Contributions
We develop a framework for analyzing spam MEV and its interaction with blockchain design
choices. We model spam transactions as competing for on-chain opportunities, and study how
equilibrium spam volume depends on the block space limit 𝐵max, the minimum gas price 𝑔min, and
the transaction fee mechanism. 3 Our Framework and Contributions
We develop a framework for analyzing spam MEV and its interaction with blockchain design
choices. We model spam transactions as competing for on-chain opportunities, and study how
equilibrium spam volume depends on the block space limit 𝐵max, the minimum gas price 𝑔min, and
the transaction fee mechanism. 3 Our Framework and Contributions
We develop a framework for analyzing spam MEV and its interaction with blockchain design
choices. We model spam transactions as competing for on-chain opportunities, and study how
equilibrium spam volume depends on the block space limit 𝐵max, the minimum gas price 𝑔min, and
the transaction fee mechanism. 3 Our Framework and Contributions
We develop a framework for analyzing spam MEV and its interaction with blockchain design
choices. We model spam transactions as competing for on-chain opportunities, and study how
equilibrium spam volume depends on the block space limit 𝐵max, the minimum gas price 𝑔min, and
the transaction fee mechanism. 3 Our Framework and Contributions
We develop a framework for analyzing spam MEV and its interaction with blockchain design
choices. We model spam transactions as competing for on-chain opportunities, and study how
equilibrium spam volume depends on the block space limit 𝐵max, the minimum gas price 𝑔min, and
the transaction fee mechanism. 3 Our Framework and Contributions
We develop a framework for analyzing spam MEV and its interaction with blockchain design
choices. We model spam transactions as competing for on-chain opportunities, and study how
equilibrium spam volume depends on the block space limit 𝐵max, the minimum gas price 𝑔min, and
the transaction fee mechanism. 3 Our Framework and Contributions
We develop a framework for analyzing spam MEV and its interaction with blockchain design
choices. We model spam transactions as competing for on-chain opportunities, and study how
equilibrium spam volume depends on the block space limit 𝐵max, the minimum gas price 𝑔min, and
the transaction fee mechanism. 3 Our Framework and Contributions
We develop a framework for analyzing spam MEV and its interaction with blockchain design
choices. We model spam transactions as competing for on-chain opportunities, and study how
equilibrium spam volume depends on the block space limit 𝐵max, the minimum gas price 𝑔min, and
the transaction fee mechanism. 3 Our Framework and Contributions
We develop a framework for analyzing spam MEV and its interaction with blockchain design
choices. We model spam transactions as competing for on-chain opportunities, and study how
equilibrium spam volume depends on the block space limit 𝐵max, the minimum gas price 𝑔min, and
the transaction fee mechanism. 3 Our Framework and Contributions
We develop a framework for analyzing spam MEV and its interaction with blockchain design
choices. We model spam transactions as competing for on-chain opportunities, and study how
equilibrium spam volume depends on the block space limit 𝐵max, the minimum gas price 𝑔min, and
the transaction fee mechanism. 3 Our Framework and Contributions
We develop a framework for analyzing spam MEV and its interaction with blockchain design
choices. We model spam transactions as competing for on-chain opportunities, and study how
equilibrium spam volume depends on the block space limit 𝐵max, the minimum gas price 𝑔min, and
the transaction fee mechanism. 3 Our Framework and Contributions
We develop a framework for analyzing spam MEV and its interaction with blockchain design
choices. We model spam transactions as competing for on-chain opportunities, and study how
equilibrium spam volume depends on the block space limit 𝐵max, the minimum gas price 𝑔min, and
the transaction fee mechanism. 3 Our Framework and Contributions
We develop a framework for analyzing spam MEV and its interaction with blockchain design
choices. We model spam transactions as competing for on-chain opportunities, and study how
equilibrium spam volume depends on the block space limit 𝐵max, the minimum gas price 𝑔min, and
the transaction fee mechanism. 3 Our Framework and Contributions
We develop a framework for analyzing spam MEV and its interaction with blockchain design
choices. We model spam transactions as competing for on-chain opportunities, and study how
equilibrium spam volume depends on the block space limit 𝐵max, the minimum gas price 𝑔min, and
the transaction fee mechanism. 3 Our Framework and Contributions
We develop a framework for analyzing spam MEV and its interaction with blockchain design
choices. We model spam transactions as competing for on-chain opportunities, and study how
equilibrium spam volume depends on the block space limit 𝐵max, the minimum gas price 𝑔min, and
the transaction fee mechanism. 3 Our Framework and Contributions
We develop a framework for analyzing spam MEV and its interaction with blockchain design
choices. We model spam transactions as competing for on-chain opportunities, and study how
equilibrium spam volume depends on the block space limit 𝐵max, the minimum gas price 𝑔min, and
the transaction fee mechanism. 3 Our Framework and Contributions
We develop a framework for analyzing spam MEV and its interaction with blockchain design
choices. We model spam transactions as competing for on-chain opportunities, and study how
equilibrium spam volume depends on the block space limit 𝐵max, the minimum gas price 𝑔min, and
the transaction fee mechanism. 3 Our Framework and Contributions
We develop a framework for analyzing spam MEV and its interaction with blockchain design
choices. We model spam transactions as competing for on-chain opportunities, and study how
equilibrium spam volume depends on the block space limit 𝐵max, the minimum gas price 𝑔min, and
the transaction fee mechanism. 3 Our Framework and Contributions
We develop a framework for analyzing spam MEV and its interaction with blockchain design
choices. We model spam transactions as competing for on-chain opportunities, and study how
equilibrium spam volume depends on the block space limit 𝐵max, the minimum gas price 𝑔min, and
the transaction fee mechanism. 3 Our Framework and Contributions
We develop a framework for analyzing spam MEV and its interaction with blockchain design
choices. We model spam transactions as competing for on-chain opportunities, and study how
equilibrium spam volume depends on the block space limit 𝐵max, the minimum gas price 𝑔min, and
the transaction fee mechanism. 3 Our Framework and Contributions
We develop a framework for analyzing spam MEV and its interaction with blockchain design
choices. We model spam transactions as competing for on-chain opportunities, and study how
equilibrium spam volume depends on the block space limit 𝐵max, the minimum gas price 𝑔min, and
the transaction fee mechanism. 3 Our Framework and Contributions
We develop a framework for analyzing spam MEV and its interaction with blockchain design
choices. We model spam transactions as competing for on-chain opportunities, and study how
equilibrium spam volume depends on the block space limit 𝐵max, the minimum gas price 𝑔min, and
the transaction fee mechanism. 3 Our Framework and Contributions
We develop a framework for analyzing spam MEV and its interaction with blockchain design
choices. We model spam transactions as competing for on-chain opportunities, and study how
equilibrium spam volume depends on the block space limit 𝐵max, the minimum gas price 𝑔min, and
the transaction fee mechanism. 3 Our Framework and Contributions
We develop a framework for analyzing spam MEV and its interaction with blockchain design
choices. We model spam transactions as competing for on-chain opportunities, and study how
equilibrium spam volume depends on the block space limit 𝐵max, the minimum gas price 𝑔min, and
the transaction fee mechanism. 3 Our Framework and Contributions
We develop a framework for analyzing spam MEV and its interaction with blockchain design
choices. We model spam transactions as competing for on-chain opportunities, and study how
equilibrium spam volume depends on the block space limit 𝐵max, the minimum gas price 𝑔min, and
the transaction fee mechanism. 3 Our Framework and Contributions
We develop a framework for analyzing spam MEV and its interaction with blockchain design
choices. We model spam transactions as competing for on-chain opportunities, and study how
equilibrium spam volume depends on the block space limit 𝐵max, the minimum gas price 𝑔min, and
the transaction fee mechanism. 3 Our Framework and Contributions
We develop a framework for analyzing spam MEV and its interaction with blockchain design
choices. We model spam transactions as competing for on-chain opportunities, and study how
equilibrium spam volume depends on the block space limit 𝐵max, the minimum gas price 𝑔min, and
the transaction fee mechanism. 3 Our Framework and Contributions
We develop a framework for analyzing spam MEV and its interaction with blockchain design
choices. We model spam transactions as competing for on-chain opportunities, and study how
equilibrium spam volume depends on the block space limit 𝐵max, the minimum gas price 𝑔min, and
the transaction fee mechanism. 3 Our Framework and Contributions
We develop a framework for analyzing spam MEV and its interaction with blockchain design
choices. We model spam transactions as competing for on-chain opportunities, and study how
equilibrium spam volume depends on the block space limit 𝐵max, the minimum gas price 𝑔min, and
the transaction fee mechanism. 3 Our Framework and Contributions
We develop a framework for analyzing spam MEV and its interaction with blockchain design
choices. We model spam transactions as competing for on-chain opportunities, and study how
equilibrium spam volume depends on the block space limit 𝐵max, the minimum gas price 𝑔min, and
the transaction fee mechanism. 3 Our Framework and Contributions
We develop a framework for analyzing spam MEV and its interaction with blockchain design
choices. We model spam transactions as competing for on-chain opportunities, and study how
equilibrium spam volume depends on the block space limit 𝐵max, the minimum gas price 𝑔min, and
the transaction fee mechanism. 3 Our Framework and Contributions
We develop a framework for analyzing spam MEV and its interaction with blockchain design
choices. We model spam transactions as competing for on-chain opportunities, and study how
equilibrium spam volume depends on the block space limit 𝐵max, the minimum gas price 𝑔min, and
the transaction fee mechanism. 3 Our Framework and Contributions
We develop a framework for analyzing spam MEV and its interaction with blockchain design
choices. We model spam transactions as competing for on-chain opportunities, and study how
equilibrium spam volume depends on the block space limit 𝐵max, the minimum gas price 𝑔min, and
the transaction fee mechanism. 3 Our Framework and Contributions
We develop a framework for analyzing spam MEV and its interaction with blockchain design
choices. We model spam transactions as competing for on-chain opportunities, and study how
equilibrium spam volume depends on the block space limit 𝐵max, the minimum gas price 𝑔min, and
the transaction fee mechanism. 3 Our Framework and Contributions
We develop a framework for analyzing spam MEV and its interaction with blockchain design
choices. We model spam transactions as competing for on-chain opportunities, and study how
equilibrium spam volume depends on the block space limit 𝐵max, the minimum gas price 𝑔min, and
the transaction fee mechanism. 3 Our Framework and Contributions
We develop a framework for analyzing spam MEV and its interaction with blockchain design
choices. We model spam transactions as competing for on-chain opportunities, and study how
equilibrium spam volume depends on the block space limit 𝐵max, the minimum gas price 𝑔min, and
the transaction fee mechanism. 3 Our Framework and Contributions
We develop a framework for analyzing spam MEV and its interaction with blockchain design
choices. We model spam transactions as competing for on-chain opportunities, and study how
equilibrium spam volume depends on the block space limit 𝐵max, the minimum gas price 𝑔min, and
the transaction fee mechanism. 3 Our Framework and Contributions
We develop a framework for analyzing spam MEV and its interaction with blockchain design
choices. We model spam transactions as competing for on-chain opportunities, and study how
equilibrium spam volume depends on the block space limit 𝐵max, the minimum gas price 𝑔min, and
the transaction fee mechanism. 3 Our Framework and Contributions
We develop a framework for analyzing spam MEV and its interaction with blockchain design
choices. We model spam transactions as competing for on-chain opportunities, and study how
equilibrium spam volume depends on the block space limit 𝐵max, the minimum gas price 𝑔min, and
the transaction fee mechanism. 3 Our Framework and Contributions
We develop a framework for analyzing spam MEV and its interaction with blockchain design
choices. We model spam transactions as competing for on-chain opportunities, and study how
equilibrium spam volume depends on the block space limit 𝐵max, the minimum gas price 𝑔min, and
the transaction fee mechanism. Designs such as encrypted mempools [4, 8, 26], when deployed, are likely to
only increase spam MEV by further reducing the information available for targeted MEV strategies. While the prevalence of spam MEV has been documented, there is no principled framework
to study the interplay between design parameters and spam volumes, and the impact of spam on
various stakeholders. Designs such as encrypted mempools [4, 8, 26], when deployed, are likely to
only increase spam MEV by further reducing the information available for targeted MEV strategies. While the prevalence of spam MEV has been documented, there is no principled framework
to study the interplay between design parameters and spam volumes, and the impact of spam on
various stakeholders. Designs such as encrypted mempools [4, 8, 26], when deployed, are likely to
only increase spam MEV by further reducing the information available for targeted MEV strategies. While the prevalence of spam MEV has been documented, there is no principled framework
to study the interplay between design parameters and spam volumes, and the impact of spam on
various stakeholders. Designs such as encrypted mempools [4, 8, 26], when deployed, are likely to
only increase spam MEV by further reducing the information available for targeted MEV strategies. While the prevalence of spam MEV has been documented, there is no principled framework
to study the interplay between design parameters and spam volumes, and the impact of spam on
various stakeholders. Designs such as encrypted mempools [4, 8, 26], when deployed, are likely to
only increase spam MEV by further reducing the information available for targeted MEV strategies. While the prevalence of spam MEV has been documented, there is no principled framework
to study the interplay between design parameters and spam volumes, and the impact of spam on
various stakeholders. Designs such as encrypted mempools [4, 8, 26], when deployed, are likely to
only increase spam MEV by further reducing the information available for targeted MEV strategies. While the prevalence of spam MEV has been documented, there is no principled framework
to study the interplay between design parameters and spam volumes, and the impact of spam on
various stakeholders. Designs such as encrypted mempools [4, 8, 26], when deployed, are likely to
only increase spam MEV by further reducing the information available for targeted MEV strategies. While the prevalence of spam MEV has been documented, there is no principled framework
to study the interplay between design parameters and spam volumes, and the impact of spam on
various stakeholders. Designs such as encrypted mempools [4, 8, 26], when deployed, are likely to
only increase spam MEV by further reducing the information available for targeted MEV strategies. While the prevalence of spam MEV has been documented, there is no principled framework
to study the interplay between design parameters and spam volumes, and the impact of spam on
various stakeholders. Designs such as encrypted mempools [4, 8, 26], when deployed, are likely to
only increase spam MEV by further reducing the information available for targeted MEV strategies. While the prevalence of spam MEV has been documented, there is no principled framework
to study the interplay between design parameters and spam volumes, and the impact of spam on
various stakeholders. Designs such as encrypted mempools [4, 8, 26], when deployed, are likely to
only increase spam MEV by further reducing the information available for targeted MEV strategies. While the prevalence of spam MEV has been documented, there is no principled framework
to study the interplay between design parameters and spam volumes, and the impact of spam on
various stakeholders. Designs such as encrypted mempools [4, 8, 26], when deployed, are likely to
only increase spam MEV by further reducing the information available for targeted MEV strategies. While the prevalence of spam MEV has been documented, there is no principled framework
to study the interplay between design parameters and spam volumes, and the impact of spam on
various stakeholders. Designs such as encrypted mempools [4, 8, 26], when deployed, are likely to
only increase spam MEV by further reducing the information available for targeted MEV strategies. While the prevalence of spam MEV has been documented, there is no principled framework
to study the interplay between design parameters and spam volumes, and the impact of spam on
various stakeholders. Designs such as encrypted mempools [4, 8, 26], when deployed, are likely to
only increase spam MEV by further reducing the information available for targeted MEV strategies. While the prevalence of spam MEV has been documented, there is no principled framework
to study the interplay between design parameters and spam volumes, and the impact of spam on
various stakeholders. Designs such as encrypted mempools [4, 8, 26], when deployed, are likely to
only increase spam MEV by further reducing the information available for targeted MEV strategies. While the prevalence of spam MEV has been documented, there is no principled framework
to study the interplay between design parameters and spam volumes, and the impact of spam on
various stakeholders. Designs such as encrypted mempools [4, 8, 26], when deployed, are likely to
only increase spam MEV by further reducing the information available for targeted MEV strategies. While the prevalence of spam MEV has been documented, there is no principled framework
to study the interplay between design parameters and spam volumes, and the impact of spam on
various stakeholders. Designs such as encrypted mempools [4, 8, 26], when deployed, are likely to
only increase spam MEV by further reducing the information available for targeted MEV strategies. While the prevalence of spam MEV has been documented, there is no principled framework
to study the interplay between design parameters and spam volumes, and the impact of spam on
various stakeholders. Designs such as encrypted mempools [4, 8, 26], when deployed, are likely to
only increase spam MEV by further reducing the information available for targeted MEV strategies. While the prevalence of spam MEV has been documented, there is no principled framework
to study the interplay between design parameters and spam volumes, and the impact of spam on
various stakeholders. Designs such as encrypted mempools [4, 8, 26], when deployed, are likely to
only increase spam MEV by further reducing the information available for targeted MEV strategies. While the prevalence of spam MEV has been documented, there is no principled framework
to study the interplay between design parameters and spam volumes, and the impact of spam on
various stakeholders. Designs such as encrypted mempools [4, 8, 26], when deployed, are likely to
only increase spam MEV by further reducing the information available for targeted MEV strategies. While the prevalence of spam MEV has been documented, there is no principled framework
to study the interplay between design parameters and spam volumes, and the impact of spam on
various stakeholders. Designs such as encrypted mempools [4, 8, 26], when deployed, are likely to
only increase spam MEV by further reducing the information available for targeted MEV strategies. While the prevalence of spam MEV has been documented, there is no principled framework
to study the interplay between design parameters and spam volumes, and the impact of spam on
various stakeholders. Designs such as encrypted mempools [4, 8, 26], when deployed, are likely to
only increase spam MEV by further reducing the information available for targeted MEV strategies. While the prevalence of spam MEV has been documented, there is no principled framework
to study the interplay between design parameters and spam volumes, and the impact of spam on
various stakeholders. Designs such as encrypted mempools [4, 8, 26], when deployed, are likely to
only increase spam MEV by further reducing the information available for targeted MEV strategies. While the prevalence of spam MEV has been documented, there is no principled framework
to study the interplay between design parameters and spam volumes, and the impact of spam on
various stakeholders. Designs such as encrypted mempools [4, 8, 26], when deployed, are likely to
only increase spam MEV by further reducing the information available for targeted MEV strategies. While the prevalence of spam MEV has been documented, there is no principled framework
to study the interplay between design parameters and spam volumes, and the impact of spam on
various stakeholders. Designs such as encrypted mempools [4, 8, 26], when deployed, are likely to
only increase spam MEV by further reducing the information available for targeted MEV strategies. While the prevalence of spam MEV has been documented, there is no principled framework
to study the interplay between design parameters and spam volumes, and the impact of spam on
various stakeholders. Designs such as encrypted mempools [4, 8, 26], when deployed, are likely to
only increase spam MEV by further reducing the information available for targeted MEV strategies. While the prevalence of spam MEV has been documented, there is no principled framework
to study the interplay between design parameters and spam volumes, and the impact of spam on
various stakeholders. Designs such as encrypted mempools [4, 8, 26], when deployed, are likely to
only increase spam MEV by further reducing the information available for targeted MEV strategies. While the prevalence of spam MEV has been documented, there is no principled framework
to study the interplay between design parameters and spam volumes, and the impact of spam on
various stakeholders. Designs such as encrypted mempools [4, 8, 26], when deployed, are likely to
only increase spam MEV by further reducing the information available for targeted MEV strategies. While the prevalence of spam MEV has been documented, there is no principled framework
to study the interplay between design parameters and spam volumes, and the impact of spam on
various stakeholders. Designs such as encrypted mempools [4, 8, 26], when deployed, are likely to
only increase spam MEV by further reducing the information available for targeted MEV strategies. While the prevalence of spam MEV has been documented, there is no principled framework
to study the interplay between design parameters and spam volumes, and the impact of spam on
various stakeholders. Designs such as encrypted mempools [4, 8, 26], when deployed, are likely to
only increase spam MEV by further reducing the information available for targeted MEV strategies. While the prevalence of spam MEV has been documented, there is no principled framework
to study the interplay between design parameters and spam volumes, and the impact of spam on
various stakeholders. Designs such as encrypted mempools [4, 8, 26], when deployed, are likely to
only increase spam MEV by further reducing the information available for targeted MEV strategies. While the prevalence of spam MEV has been documented, there is no principled framework
to study the interplay between design parameters and spam volumes, and the impact of spam on
various stakeholders. Designs such as encrypted mempools [4, 8, 26], when deployed, are likely to
only increase spam MEV by further reducing the information available for targeted MEV strategies. While the prevalence of spam MEV has been documented, there is no principled framework
to study the interplay between design parameters and spam volumes, and the impact of spam on
various stakeholders. Designs such as encrypted mempools [4, 8, 26], when deployed, are likely to
only increase spam MEV by further reducing the information available for targeted MEV strategies. While the prevalence of spam MEV has been documented, there is no principled framework
to study the interplay between design parameters and spam volumes, and the impact of spam on
various stakeholders. Designs such as encrypted mempools [4, 8, 26], when deployed, are likely to
only increase spam MEV by further reducing the information available for targeted MEV strategies. While the prevalence of spam MEV has been documented, there is no principled framework
to study the interplay between design parameters and spam volumes, and the impact of spam on
various stakeholders. Designs such as encrypted mempools [4, 8, 26], when deployed, are likely to
only increase spam MEV by further reducing the information available for targeted MEV strategies. While the prevalence of spam MEV has been documented, there is no principled framework
to study the interplay between design parameters and spam volumes, and the impact of spam on
various stakeholders. Designs such as encrypted mempools [4, 8, 26], when deployed, are likely to
only increase spam MEV by further reducing the information available for targeted MEV strategies. While the prevalence of spam MEV has been documented, there is no principled framework
to study the interplay between design parameters and spam volumes, and the impact of spam on
various stakeholders. Designs such as encrypted mempools [4, 8, 26], when deployed, are likely to
only increase spam MEV by further reducing the information available for targeted MEV strategies. While the prevalence of spam MEV has been documented, there is no principled framework
to study the interplay between design parameters and spam volumes, and the impact of spam on
various stakeholders. Designs such as encrypted mempools [4, 8, 26], when deployed, are likely to
only increase spam MEV by further reducing the information available for targeted MEV strategies. While the prevalence of spam MEV has been documented, there is no principled framework
to study the interplay between design parameters and spam volumes, and the impact of spam on
various stakeholders. Designs such as encrypted mempools [4, 8, 26], when deployed, are likely to
only increase spam MEV by further reducing the information available for targeted MEV strategies. While the prevalence of spam MEV has been documented, there is no principled framework
to study the interplay between design parameters and spam volumes, and the impact of spam on
various stakeholders. Designs such as encrypted mempools [4, 8, 26], when deployed, are likely to
only increase spam MEV by further reducing the information available for targeted MEV strategies. While the prevalence of spam MEV has been documented, there is no principled framework
to study the interplay between design parameters and spam volumes, and the impact of spam on
various stakeholders. Designs such as encrypted mempools [4, 8, 26], when deployed, are likely to
only increase spam MEV by further reducing the information available for targeted MEV strategies. While the prevalence of spam MEV has been documented, there is no principled framework
to study the interplay between design parameters and spam volumes, and the impact of spam on
various stakeholders. Designs such as encrypted mempools [4, 8, 26], when deployed, are likely to
only increase spam MEV by further reducing the information available for targeted MEV strategies. While the prevalence of spam MEV has been documented, there is no principled framework
to study the interplay between design parameters and spam volumes, and the impact of spam on
various stakeholders. Designs such as encrypted mempools [4, 8, 26], when deployed, are likely to
only increase spam MEV by further reducing the information available for targeted MEV strategies. While the prevalence of spam MEV has been documented, there is no principled framework
to study the interplay between design parameters and spam volumes, and the impact of spam on
various stakeholders. Designs such as encrypted mempools [4, 8, 26], when deployed, are likely to
only increase spam MEV by further reducing the information available for targeted MEV strategies. While the prevalence of spam MEV has been documented, there is no principled framework
to study the interplay between design parameters and spam volumes, and the impact of spam on
various stakeholders. Designs such as encrypted mempools [4, 8, 26], when deployed, are likely to
only increase spam MEV by further reducing the information available for targeted MEV strategies. While the prevalence of spam MEV has been documented, there is no principled framework
to study the interplay between design parameters and spam volumes, and the impact of spam on
various stakeholders. Designs such as encrypted mempools [4, 8, 26], when deployed, are likely to
only increase spam MEV by further reducing the information available for targeted MEV strategies. While the prevalence of spam MEV has been documented, there is no principled framework
to study the interplay between design parameters and spam volumes, and the impact of spam on
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Green — the paper says it, and the page is printed. Red — no passage carries it, so treat that sentence as unverified. The same check runs on your own text: check a summary against its source, $5.
Improvements for AI systems
-
Improve MEV strategy detection by implementing a system that identifies spam transactions based on their
absence of any ERC-20 token transfer
rather than just on-chain activity. This allows for better classification of speculative probes, which are identified ascontracts that repeatedly probe for MEV opportunities that never trigger meaningful state changes.
-
Develop a dynamic resource allocation policy where the system adjusts block size and minimum gas price floor based on the computed marginal user share (muser). This system can adopt a rule like
require that at least an alpha fraction of the next unit of capacity go to users
to prevent disproportionate spam while maximizing user welfare. -
Implement an approximate priority fee ordering mechanism that dynamically partitions block capacity into early and late sub-blocks based on valuation distribution. This allows the system to leverage PFO to reduce spam share by making earlier positions
more expensive
when high-value users demand them, as shown in Figure 7. -
Design a system that adapts its scaling strategy based on aggregate opportunity value growth with user demand. Instead of simply increasing block size, the AI can utilize the finding that
spam's share of included gas does not vanish as demand grows
and instead use the refined MMUS rule to ensure spam remains below a desired threshold even when scaling. -
Create a validator revenue and externality monitoring module that tracks the counterfactual gaps between worlds with and without spam for different design parameters. This module can provide real-time guidance on which combination of block size (Bmax) and gas price floor (gmin) maximizes user welfare while minimizing the
additional execution burden created by spam.
Abstract
On high-throughput, low-fee blockchains, a qualitatively new form of maximal extractable value (MEV), spam MEV, has emerged: searchers submit large volumes of speculative transactions, whose profitability is resolved only at execution time. On major rollups, it can consume more than half of block gas, even though only a small fraction of probes ultimately results in a trade. Despite growing awareness of this phenomenon, there is no principled framework for understanding how blockchain design parameters shape its prevalence and impact. We develop such a framework, modeling spam transactions competing for on-chain opportunities under a competitive equilibrium that drives their profits to zero, and deriving equilibrium spam volumes as a function of block capacity, minimum gas price, and the transaction fee mechanism. Empirical evidence from Base and Arbitrum is consistent with several predictions of the model: spam grew sharply as block capacity was scaled up and fell when minimum gas prices were introduced. Our analysis yields three main insights. First, spam is always costly: when block capacity is scarce, it displaces users and drives up gas prices; as block capacity grows, it increasingly consumes execution resources, raising network externality, i.e., the cost of provisioning and processing blocks. We show that spam takes an increasing share of each additional unit of block capacity, so capping it before all users are included creates a favorable trade-off: forgoing a small amount of user welfare eliminates disproportionate spam and externality. Second, we extend the analysis to approximate priority fee ordering and show that it can reduce spam by making earlier block positions more expensive, as spammers pay more to reach early block positions. Third, as user demand grows and blockspace is scaled accordingly, spam's share of block capacity plateaus rather than growing indefinitely.
Sources
- Auctioning Time to Mitigate Latency Races: Theory and Evidence from Blockchains
- Cross-Rollup MEV: Non-Atomic Arbitrage Across L2 Blockchains
- When Priority Fails: Revert-Based MEV on Fast-Finality Rollups
- Timing Games: Probabilistic backrunning and spam
- Unity is Strength: A Formalization of Cross-Domain Maximal Extractable Value
- Crossing walls and windows: the curious escape of Lyman-$\alpha$ photons through ionised channels
- Cross-Chain Arbitrage: The Next Frontier of MEV in Decentralized Finance
- Extracting Godl [sic] from the Salt Mines: Ethereum Miners Extracting Value
- Rolling in the Shadows: Analyzing the Extraction of MEV Across Layer-2 Rollups
- Time to Bribe: Measuring Block Construction Market
- To Wait or To Probe: Arbitrage Competition on High-Throughput Blockchains
- A2MM: Mitigating Frontrunning, Transaction Reordering and Consensus Instability in Decentralized Exchanges
- Quantifying the Value of Revert Protection
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