Secure Wi-Fi Ranging Today: Security and Adoption of IEEE 802.11az/bk

arXiv:2603.18687 · cs.CR · Submitted 2026-03-19 · Read on arXiv

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Introduction to the show: ident: Security Radio. Generated commentary on the latest security and cryptography papers.

Nadia: I'm Nadia.

Elias: And I'm Elias, here with Priya.

Nadia: We're looking at the paper: "Secure Wi-Fi Ranging Today".

Elias: Here's the gist of the paper. Ranging and localisation have become critical for many applications and services <ref:2603.18687#pg2>.

Nadia: This paper examines to what extent these promises hold from a security and deployability perspective <ref:2603.18687#pg2>.

Elias: The Wi-Fi (IEEE 802.11) standard is a natural candidate for providing these functions across diverse environments, given its widespread deployment <ref:2603.18687#pg2>.

Nadia: The IEEE 802.11az amendment introduces “Next Generation Positioning” mechanisms to secure and harden the existing insecure Wi-Fi Fine Timing Measurement (FTM) ranging solution <ref:2603.18687#pg3>.

Paper summary: Nadia: So, this paper, "Secure Wi-Fi Ranging Today: Security and Adoption of IEEE 802 point 11az/bk", it's looking at whether the promises of secure ranging and localization with Wi-Fi actually hold up from a security and deployment standpoint <ref:2603.18687#pg1,Secure Wi-Fi Ranging Today: Security and Adoption of IEEE 802.11az>. The main idea is that we've got these new features in the standard, like IEEE 802 point 11az, which adds "Next Generation Positioning" to make the existing fine timing measurement solution more secure <ref:2603.18687#pg2>. And they also look at how the 802 point 11bk amendment is pushing things towards centimeter level accuracy, similar to ultra-wideband systems <ref:2603.18687#pg2>.

Elias: Exactly, and what matters here is that they're not just talking about the new features in isolation; they're examining the whole thing from both the logical and physical layers <ref:2603.18687#pg2>. They’ve combined analyzing the standards themselves with simulations and real measurements from commercial hardware <ref:2603.18687#pg2>.

Priya: I'm curious what they actually found about the security aspect, because when we talk about location data, we need to trust that it's accurate and safe to use <ref:2603.18687#pg2>.

Nadia: Well, they dive into several classes of issues with secure fine timing measurement in IEEE 802 point 11az <ref:2603.18687#pg3>. They point out fragile trust assumptions in things like WPA two and WPA three personal and pass through deployments <ref:2603.18687#pg3>, as well as risks related to downgrades and denial of service attacks <ref:2603.18687#pg3>.

Elias: And they also look at the failure modes related to secure HE-LTF counters and symbol repetition in the secure fine timing measurement waveform itself <ref:2603.18687#pg3>. That means they're checking if an attacker can bias those time of arrival estimates and change the measured range even if you use advanced replicas that don't break the signal or violate spectral constraints <ref:2603.18687#pg3>.

Priya: That sounds like a lot of technical stuff. What does this mean practically for someone using a smart lock or tracking assets?

Nadia: It means they’re trying to figure out why secure Wi-Fi ranging is still not widely deployed, which is the deployment insight part <ref:2603.18687#pg3>. They combine what's currently supported in commercial and development hardware with their technical findings to suggest things device makers and standard bodies should consider for configuration choices <ref:2603.18687#pg3>.

Elias: So, the core thesis seems to be that while the standards are moving toward better accuracy with 802 point 11bk, the security and deployability hurdles are still significant when it comes to secure fine timing measurement <ref:2603.18687#pg3>.

Conclusion: Nadia: Thinking about the title, "Secure Wi-Fi Ranging Today: Security and Adoption of IEEE 802 point 11az/bk", it really captures the whole scope of what they did <ref:2603.18687#pg1>. It’s not just about making a new feature; it’s about assessing the real security risks and how people are actually using these technologies right now <ref:2603.18687#pg2>.

Elias: I think what's important is that this paper is trying to bridge the gap between the theoretical capability of these standards and their practical, secure deployment in everyday environments <ref:2603.18687#pg3>. They’re showing where the trust assumptions break down most easily in personal and pass through deployments <ref:2603.18687#pg3>.

Priya: For me, it’s about the deployment insights they gathered from looking at commercial and development hardware <ref:2603.18687#pg3>. It suggests that just having a secure mechanism isn't enough; vendors and standard bodies need to make specific configuration choices for physical layer security <ref:2603.18687#pg3>.

Nadia: Right, so the implication is that we can't just assume these new standards automatically mean better location security; there’s still a lot of work to do on how these mechanisms actually perform under real-world conditions <ref:2603.18687#pg2>.

Elias: And they’re flagging specific failure modes, like the predictable behavior of secure HE-LTF waveforms under partial observation <ref:2603.18687#pg3>, which means we need to be careful about what we assume when setting up these systems <ref:2603.18687#pg3>.

Priya: It sounds like the real message is that while the technology offers better accuracy, securing it for actual use involves checking those specific deployment challenges and configuration choices <ref:2603.18687#pg3>.

Nadia: So, to wrap up on "Secure Wi-Fi Ranging Today: Security and Adoption of IEEE 802 point 11az/bk", the paper shows that while we have better tools now, the security and deployment hurdles are still real and require specific vendor recommendations <ref:2603.18687#pg3>.

Elias: It really highlights that for applications like asset tracking or access control, we need to look at both the new features and these underlying trust assumptions when making decisions about what to deploy <ref:2603.18687#pg2>.

Priya: So, the main point is that secure ranging isn't a solved problem yet; it’s an ongoing process of analyzing security and deployment trade-offs across the standard and commercial hardware <ref:2603.18687#pg3>.

COSIC, KU Leuven, Belgium · Institute for Communications Engineering and RF-Systems, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria · DistriNet (Group T), KU Leuven, Belgium

cs.CR

Submitted: 2026-03-19

Updated: 2026-03-19

Comments: Submitted

Journal ref: 21st International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES 2026), Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), Springer, 2026

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-032-36874-4_7

License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/

Importance score: 72/100

The gist: Ranging and localisation have become critical for many applications and services <ref:2603.18687#pg2>.

Key concepts

Wi-Fi Ranging
This refers to using existing Wi-Fi technology (IEEE 802.11) to determine the distance between devices. The paper focuses on how this ranging capability can be made more secure and accurate for applications like location services.
IEEE 802.11az
This amendment introduces 'Next Generation Positioning' mechanisms designed to secure and strengthen the existing Wi-Fi Fine Timing Measurement (FTM) ranging solution. It aims to improve the reliability of distance measurements within Wi-Fi networks.
IEEE 802.11bk
This amendment increases the available bandwidth of Wi-Fi systems. The goal is to enhance ranging accuracy, pushing it closer to the centimeter-level precision typically achieved by Ultra-Wideband (UWB) systems.

Terminology

Summary

Ranging and localisation have become critical for many applications and services <ref:2603. p. 0

Where the paper says it

be Abstract. Ranging and localisation have become critical for many applications and services.

18687#pg2>. This paper examines to what extent these promises hold from a security and deployability perspective <ref:2603. p. 0
Where the paper says it

11bk amendment increases the available bandwidth with the goal of approaching the centimetre-level ranging accuracy of ultra-wideband (UWB) systems. This paper examines to what extent these promises hold from a security and deployability perspective.

18687#pg2>.

Introduction to Secure Wi-Fi Ranging

The Wi-Fi (IEEE 802.11) standard is a natural candidate for providing these functions across diverse environments, given its widespread deployment <ref:2603. p. 0

Where the paper says it

The Wi-Fi (IEEE 802. 11) standard is a natural candidate for providing these functions across diverse environments, given its widespread deployment.

18687#pg2>. The IEEE 802. p. 0
Where the paper says it

Secure Wi-Fi Ranging Today: Security and Adoption of IEEE 802. 11az/bk Nikola Antonijević 1 , Bernhard Etzlinger 2 , Dave Singelée 3 , and Bart Preneel 1 1 COSIC, KU Leuven, Belgium {nikola.

11az amendment introduces “Next Generation Positioning” mechanisms to secure and harden the existing insecure Wi-Fi Fine Timing Measurement (FTM) ranging solution <ref:2603. p. 0
Where the paper says it

The IEEE 802. 11az amendment, finalised in 2023, introduces “Next Generation Positioning” mechanisms to secure and harden the existing insecure Wi-Fi Fine Timing Measurement (FTM) ranging solution.

18687#pg3>. Moreover, the recent IEEE 802. p. 0
Where the paper says it

11az amendment, finalised in 2023, introduces “Next Generation Positioning” mechanisms to secure and harden the existing insecure Wi-Fi Fine Timing Measurement (FTM) ranging solution. Moreover, the recent IEEE 802.

11bk amendment increases the available bandwidth with the goal of approaching the centimetre-level ranging accuracy of ultra-wideband (UWB) systems <ref:2603. p. 0
Where the paper says it

Moreover, the recent IEEE 802. 11bk amendment increases the available bandwidth with the goal of approaching the centimetre-level ranging accuracy of ultra-wideband (UWB) systems.

18687#pg2>. The paper analyzes core mechanisms at both logical and physical layers, combining standards analysis with simulations and measurements on commercial and development hardware <ref:2603. p. 0
Where the paper says it

11az and IEEE 802. 11bk at both the logical and physical layers, combining standards analysis with simulations and measurements on commercial and development hardware.

18687#pg2>.

Green — the paper says it, and the page is printed. Red — no passage carries it, so treat that sentence as unverified. The same check runs on your own text: check a summary against its source, $5.

Improvements for AI systems

  1. Development of configuration-aware ranging systems that dynamically select between secure HE-LTF waveforms and legacy deterministic training sequences based on real-time network conditions to prevent mode-level downgrades. This system would actively monitor FTMR frames and enforce the requirement for both a PTK and secure HE-LTFs before proceeding with ranging, as recommended in Section 6.3.

  2. Implementation of robust counter management mechanisms that strictly enforce monotonic counters for secure HE-LTF instances to prevent keying material reuse. This directly addresses the risk that a device reuses the same counter value for multiple secure HE-LTF instances which allows attackers to mount the physical-layer attacks on ToA estimation.

  3. Creation of a spectral analysis module capable of detecting deviations in power spectral density that indicate an attacker is exploiting vulnerabilities like zero-power guard interval weaknesses. This system would use the comparison between simulated and measured PSDs to identify when the zero-power guard interval tends to spread out-of-band energy more evenly towards the mask as a sign of potential exploitation.

  4. Development of a hybrid waveform generation strategy for future standardisation bodies that explores hybrid designs such as a reduced-power pseudorandom sequence. This avoids the constraints of a zero-power GI while still mitigating deterministic repetition, easing spectral-mask compliance and lowering adoption barriers.

  5. Design of an authentication system that binds secure FTM to a uniquely trusted infrastructure entity, moving beyond WPA2/WPA3 Personal modes. This would ensure that secure FTM cannot reliably attest proximity to a uniquely trusted entity by anchoring ranging in robust mutual authentication schemes like 802.1X-based Enterprise networks when high-assurance guarantees are required.

Abstract

Ranging and localisation have become critical for many applications and services. The Wi-Fi (IEEE 802.11) standard is a natural candidate for providing these functions across diverse environments, given its widespread deployment. The IEEE 802.11az amendment, finalised in 2023, introduces "Next Generation Positioning" mechanisms to secure and harden the existing insecure Wi-Fi Fine Timing Measurement (FTM) ranging solution. Moreover, the recent IEEE 802.11bk amendment increases the available bandwidth with the goal of approaching the centimetre-level ranging accuracy of ultra-wideband (UWB) systems. This paper examines to what extent these promises hold from a security and deployability perspective. We analyse the core mechanisms of secure Wi-Fi ranging as defined in IEEE 802.11az and IEEE 802.11bk at both the logical and physical layers, combining standards analysis with simulations and measurements on commercial and development hardware. At the logical layer, we show how common deployment choices can result in unauthenticated ranging, downgrade attacks, and simple denial-of-service attacks, making it difficult to securely realise many high-stakes use cases. At the physical layer, we study the predictability of secure ranging waveforms, the security impact of symbol repetition, and how waveform design choices affect compliance with spectral masks under realistic RF behaviour. Our results show that secure Wi-Fi ranging is highly sensitive to configuration choices and is non-trivial to implement on existing hardware. This is also evidenced by the currently limited support for secure Wi-Fi ranging in commodity devices. This paper provides practical guidelines for using secure FTM safely and recommendations to vendors and standardisation bodies to improve its robustness and deployability.

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