Coupling Europe's Capacity Markets

arXiv:2603.08248 · eess.SY, cs.SY · Submitted 2026-03-09 · Read on arXiv

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Introduction to the show: ident: Robotics Radio. Generated commentary on the latest robotics and control papers.

Rosa: We're looking at the paper: "Coupling Europe's Capacity Markets".

Dev: Here's the gist of the paper. European Member States are increasingly introducing national capacity mechanisms (CMs) to manage growing adequacy risks.

Rosa: This paper proposes a novel conceptual design for a coupled European capacity market that utilizes the logic of flow-based market coupling.

Dev: Conceptual Framework of Market Coupling The authors propose a two-tiered mechanism for future capacity mechanisms, which recognizes that while investment cycles are multiyear, adequacy and network conditions are non-static.

Rosa: The first tier is the Investment Layer, which consists of a long-term national capacity mechanism (e.g., in the form of a centralised, marketwide auction that uses reliability options as contracts).

Paper summary: Rosa: So this paper, "Coupling Europe's Capacity Markets," it talks about how European countries are setting up these national capacity mechanisms to handle adequacy risks, but they say that isolated national systems aren't efficient when you have a big interconnected system like Europe <ref:2603.08248#pg1>.

Dev: Right. It points out that existing arrangements for cross-border participation in capacity markets are often prone to underinvestment or over-investment and they don't properly value how much interconnection capacity contributes to the Member States' adequacy targets <ref:2603.08248#pg1>.

Taro: What does that mean for us on the ground? Does it mean we need a new way to structure these markets, or is this just academic theory?

Rosa: They propose a novel conceptual design for a coupled European capacity market using the logic of flow-based market coupling <ref:2603.08248#pg1>. It sets up a two-tiered mechanism for future capacity mechanisms because they recognize that investment cycles take many years, but things like adequacy and network conditions aren't static <ref:2603.08248#pg1>.

Dev: Okay, so the first tier is an investment layer, which they describe as a long-term national capacity mechanism, maybe a centralized auction using reliability options as contracts <ref:2603.08248#pg2>. And that layer lasts about ten to fifteen years to de-risk capital intensive resources <ref:2603.08248#pg1>.

Taro: So they're talking about a long-term commitment upfront, before the actual construction is done, which makes sense if you have those long lead times for big power plants <ref:2603.08248#pg1>.

Rosa: Exactly. And the second tier is an annual coupled capacity market where firm capacity across all zones takes part in a single annual auction with a uniform price <ref:2603.08248#pg3>. This auction implicitly accounts for network flows during anticipated scarcity events <ref:2603.08248#pg1>.

Dev: That's where they use flow-based market coupling, or FBMC logic, which is used to couple day-ahead and intraday markets in Europe <ref:2603.08248#pg2>. It lets them account for network feasibility of flows during scarcity <ref:2603.08248#pg1>.

Taro: So instead of setting fixed capacity limits, the system figures out how much power can actually flow where it needs to go when things get tight <ref:2603.08248#pg1>. That sounds like a way to handle those tricky network constraints <ref:2603.08248#pg2>.

Rosa: They build a flow-based domain by aggregating nodal injections that satisfy the power balance and thermal limits, which projects exactly the nodal feasible set onto the zonal net positions <ref:2603.08248#pg1>. This avoids defining maximum entry capacities, which they say have circular dependencies with neighbors' available capacity <ref:2603.08248#pg1>.

Dev: But what about the agents involved? The study models four types of agents interacting in perfectly competitive, zonal electricity and capacity markets <ref:2603.08248#pg1>. Generation agents try to maximize profit by choosing dispatch and capacity offers subject to constraints on availability factors and costs <ref:2603.08248#pg1>.

Paper summary: Taro: And consumer agents are trying to maximize surplus by choosing total electricity demand, balancing the stuff that's inelastic against the stuff that's elastic based on what people are willing to pay <ref:2603.08248#pg1>. That sounds like a lot of balancing act during a heatwave or something <ref:2603.08248#pg1>.

Rosa: The energy market operator coordinates clearing using this flow-based market coupling, which enforces network feasibility by requiring each admissible zonal net position to lie within the flow-based domain <ref:2603.08248#pg1>. This is a key part of how they ensure deliverability <ref:2603.08248#pg1>.

Dev: When they look at cross-border participation scenarios, they compare six different market design scenarios to address underinvestment that comes from price caps in the electricity market <ref:2603.08248#pg1>. The CM-FBMC scenario, using flow-based coupling, shows a reduction in system costs by harnessing capacity in neighboring zones while ensuring deliverability with respect to network constraints in all scarcity situations <ref:2603.08248#pg1>.

Taro: And they mention something specific about cross-border participation under both the CM-NTC and CM-FBMC scenarios, which uses coordinated scarcity assessment <ref:2603.08248#pg3>. That seems to help reduce over-procurement compared to the CMNoCBP by two point five gigawatts while still serving the same peak residual demand <ref:2603.08248#pg3>.

Rosa: The total costs under this CM-FBMC approach are reduced to fifteen thousand nine hundred twenty-nine million euros, which means the cost increase over EOM-ref is just three point four five percent <ref:2603.08248#pg1>. They also note that capacity markets eliminate ENS costs but they increase investment costs; the CM-FBMC brings the total costs down to fifteen thousand nine hundred twenty-nine million euros <ref:2603.08248#pg1>.

Dev: The flow-based approach specifically reduces capacity prices in Zones B and C by one thousand nineteen euros per megawatt and two thousand two hundred seventy-five euros per megawatt compared to the NTC case <ref:2603.08248#pg1>. That shows a clear efficiency gain in those specific zones <ref:2603.08248#pg1>.

Taro: So for someone listening who isn't in Europe, what does this all mean? It means that better market design, using this flow-based coupling, can actually make the whole system more cost-effective without sacrificing the ability to meet demand when things get hard <ref:2603.08248#pg1>.

Rosa: They conclude that this design addresses the challenges of fragmented national capacity mechanisms while respecting the different adequacy requirements of Member States and their right to steer their capacity mix <ref:2603.08248#pg1>. The CM-FBMC solves this structurally by using a detailed grid model to clear capacity offers, making sure that cleared capacity is deliverable with respect to network constraints under a set of defined scarcity scenarios <ref:2603.08248#pg1>.

Dev: It seems this design more accurately values the contribution of interconnection and yields efficiency gains <ref:2603.08248#pg1>. It also helps facilitate larger cross-border capacity trades, correctly valuing that interconnection capacity and reducing investment costs in generation capacity while maintaining resource adequacy by reallocating investments to better locations within the network <ref:2603.08248#pg1>.

Taro: So the main thing is that this coupling method doesn't just look at what's available locally, but how it flows through the whole grid when things go wrong <ref:2603.08248#pg1>. It makes sure you get what you need without overloading a specific point in the network <ref:2603.08248#pg1>.

Paper summary: Rosa: They are showing that this approach is better at valuing interconnection and yields efficiency gains because it uses a detailed grid model for clearing, which is something they say matters for real-world operation <ref:2603.08248#pg1>. It respects the heterogeneity of the adequacy requirements across different Member States, which is important <ref:2603.08248#pg1>.

Dev: The limitation they mention is that this model relies on a detailed grid model to clear capacity offers, which means it's not a simple, plug-and-play solution for every country immediately <ref:2603.08248#pg1>. It's more complex than just setting prices <ref:2603.08248#pg1>.

Taro: That makes sense; it sounds like the real world implementation of this would need a very precise model of the actual power grid, not just some simplified abstraction <ref:2603.08248#pg1>. So, is this something that could actually be put into practice soon or is it more for future planning?

Rosa: It's a conceptual design for future capacity mechanisms, but they show how it would work by comparing different scenarios in an illustrative multi-zone case study <ref:2603.08248#pg1>. It addresses the challenges of fragmented national capacity mechanisms by providing a structure that respects those different adequacy needs <ref:2603.08248#pg1>.

Dev: So to wrap up, the paper "Coupling Europe's Capacity Markets" proposes a two-tiered system—a long-term investment layer and an annual coupled market—that uses flow-based market coupling to ensure capacity is deliverable under scarcity conditions <ref:2603.08248#pg1>.

Taro: And the implication is that this method of clearing capacity allows for larger cross-border trades because it correctly values the actual interconnection capacity being used <ref:2603.08248#pg1>. It's about getting better value out of the whole system, not just one zone <ref:2603.08248#pg1>.

Rosa: That's what it is. It’s about using detailed grid modeling to ensure that capacity decisions actually lead to deliverable power when the network is stressed <ref:2603.08248#pg1>. It moves beyond just looking at local supply and demand for adequacy <ref:2603.08248#pg1>.

Dev: And it shows that this structural design reduces system costs by harnessing available capacity in neighboring zones while making sure deliverability is met across all scarcity situations <ref:2603.08248#pg1>. It's a way to manage the risk of underinvestment while keeping the investment structure sound <ref:2603.08248#pg1>.

Taro: So it's about coordinating those two tiers—the long-term investment and the annual auction—so that they work together properly for both long-term planning and short-term reliability <ref:2603.08248#pg2>. It’s a coordination problem, not just a capacity problem <ref:2603.08248#pg1>.

Rosa: Yeah, the paper shows how this structure allows Member States to steer their own energy mix through those long-term contracts while still participating in the benefits of a highly interconnected system in the annual auctions <ref:2603.08248#pg2>. It gives them control over their mix while benefiting from the interconnectedness <ref:2603.08248#pg1>.

Dev: It really does focus on how that uniform-price auction in the second tier implicitly accounts for those network flows

Conclusion: Rosa: So we've been talking about how Europe is trying to sort out these national capacity systems, right?

Dev: Yeah, this paper you're hearing about is called "Coupling Europe's Capacity Markets." It looks at how to connect those different national efforts properly.

Taro: What does that actually mean for us on the ground? Is this just theory or something that could actually run somewhere?

Rosa: Well, the authors are proposing a two-tiered structure for these capacity mechanisms. The first tier is a long-term thing, like a national mechanism over ten to fifteen years, maybe using contracts based on reliability options.

Dev: That layer seems designed to de-risk those big investments in generation resources by getting them sorted out well ahead of time, say four or five years before they're built.

Taro: Okay, so that’s the investment planning part. What about the second tier? The actual annual market operation?

Rosa: That's an annual coupled capacity market where all the firm capacity across zones participates in one big auction every year at a uniform price point.

Dev: And they use something called flow-based market coupling to make sure that this auction actually accounts for how power flows through the network during times of scarcity.

Taro: So instead of just having fixed limits, the system figures out what's deliverable based on where it needs to go when things get tight?

Rosa: Exactly. They use a flow-based domain built from nodal injections that satisfy power balance and thermal limits to project exactly what is physically possible for zonal net positions.

Dev: That avoids those tricky circular dependencies you see with maximum entry capacities that depend on your neighbors' capacity, Taro.

Taro: It sounds like they're tackling the deliverability issue head-on when the network is stressed, which is what I care about most when testing things in real life.

Rosa: The case study shows that this flow-based approach reduces system costs by using available capacity in neighboring zones while making sure deliverability holds across all scarcity situations.

Dev: They even show a two point five gigawatt reduction compared to a different cross-border scenario because they coordinate the scarcity assessment when you're participating under both the national and coupled market designs.

Taro: So, for someone just listening, it means this method of clearing capacity actually makes sense for the whole interconnected system, not just one piece of it.

Rosa: The authors conclude that this design respects each Member State's right to steer its own capacity mix while still benefiting from the interconnection benefits through that coupled auction structure.

Dev: It seems like they’ve found a way to value the contribution of interconnection more accurately and actually reduce investment costs in generation capacity while keeping adequacy safe.

Taro: It’s about coordination between those long-term planning contracts and the annual market, making sure everything lines up for both long-term goals and short-term reliability.

Rosa: The paper shows how this structure allows states to control their mix while still participating in the benefits of being highly interconnected through that coupled auction.

Dev: It’s a detailed model, so it relies on a precise grid model for clearing, which means it’s not just some simple price setting thing you can plug and play right away.

Taro: That makes sense; they need that real-world grid detail to make those flow calculations actually work in practice.

Rosa: So the main point is that this approach is structurally better at valuing interconnection because it uses a detailed grid model to ensure capacity decisions lead to deliverable power when the network is stressed.

Kamal Adekola, Laurens de Vries, Kenneth Bruninx

eess.SY, cs.SY

Submitted: 2026-03-09

Updated: 2026-11-02

License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/

Importance score: 82/100

The gist: European Member States are increasingly introducing national capacity mechanisms (CMs) to manage growing adequacy risks.

Key concepts

Investment Layer
The first tier of the mechanism involves a long-term national capacity mechanism, typically 10-15 years in duration. This layer focuses on de-risking capital-intensive resources through centralized auctions that use reliability options as contracts. Auctions are planned far in advance to account for construction timelines.
Annual Coupled Capacity Market
The second tier is an annual market where firm capacity from all zones participates in a single auction with a uniform price. This market implicitly accounts for network flows during anticipated scarcity events, ensuring that the capacity offered can actually be delivered across the grid.
Flow-Based Market Coupling (FBMC)
This logic is used to ensure network feasibility in annual auctions. It constructs a domain based on nodal injections that satisfy power balance and thermal limits. This method avoids circular dependencies found in other models, allowing the system to assess deliverability under defined scarcity conditions.
Flow-Based Domain
The flow-based domain is created by aggregating nodal injections that meet power balance and thermal constraints. By projecting the exact nodal feasible set onto zonal net positions, this approach accurately determines which capacity is physically possible to deliver within the network.

Terminology

Summary

European Member States are increasingly introducing national capacity mechanisms (CMs) to manage growing adequacy risks. p. 0

Where the paper says it

1 Coupling Europe’s Capacity Markets Kamal Adekola, Laurens de Vries, Kenneth Bruninx Abstract—European Member States are increasingly introducing national capacity mechanisms (CMs) to manage growing adequacy risks. However, isolated national CMs are inefficient in highly interconnected electricity systems, such as the European system.

This paper proposes a novel conceptual design for a coupled European capacity market that utilizes the logic of flow-based market coupling. p. 0
Where the paper says it

While progress has been made in facilitating crossborder participation by generation capacity in CMs, existing arrangements are prone to under- or over-investment and do not properly value the contribution of interconnection capacity to Member States’ adequacy targets. In this paper, we propose a novel conceptual design for a coupled European capacity market that utilises the logic of flow-based market coupling.

Conceptual Framework of Market Coupling

The authors propose a two-tiered mechanism for future capacity mechanisms, which recognizes that while investment cycles are multiyear, adequacy and network conditions are non-static. The first tier is the Investment Layer, which consists of a long-term national capacity mechanism (e. p. 1

Where the paper says it

This two-tiered approach recognises that while investment cycles are multiyear, adequacy and network conditions are non-static. On the first tier is the Investment Layer, a long-term national capacity mechanism (e.

g., in the form of a centralised, marketwide auction that uses reliability options as contracts). p. 1
Where the paper says it

On the first tier is the Investment Layer, a long-term national capacity mechanism (e. , in the form of a centralised, marketwide auction that uses reliability options as contracts).

This layer spans a duration long enough — typically 10-15 years — to de-risk capital-intensive dispatchable resources, and auctions should be conducted well in advance of delivery (Y-4 or Y-5) to accommodate construction lead times. p. 1
Where the paper says it

, in the form of a centralised, marketwide auction that uses reliability options as contracts). These reliability options should span a duration long enough — typically 10-15 years — to de-risk capital-intensive dispatchable resources, and auctions should be conducted well in advance of delivery (Y-4 or Y-5) to accommodate construction lead times.

The second tier is an annual, coupled capacity market where firm capacity across all zones participates in a single annual uniform-price auction that implicitly accounts for network flows during anticipated scarcity events. p. 2
Where the paper says it

This second tier consists of an annual, coupled capacity market. Firm capacity across all zones participates in a single annual uniform-price auction that implicitly accounts for network flows during anticipated scarcity events.

Mathematical Formalization of Agents

The study models four types of agents interacting in perfectly competitive, zonal electricity and capacity markets. The decision problems for generation agents involve maximizing profit by choosing dispatch and capacity offers subject to constraints related to availability factors and costs. p. 3

Where the paper says it

Generation agents Each generator i ∈ I, located in zone z ∈ Z maximises profit (Eq. (1a)) by choosing xi = gi,z,t, yi,z, ycm i,z : (i) its dispatch gi,z,t for all time steps t ∈ T , incurring variable operational cost C g i,z(gi,z,t) = Ai,z 2 gi,z,t + Bi,z , where Ai,z and Bi,z are technology-specific parameters; (ii) total capacity yi,z in zone z at cost C f i,z, the annualised fixed cost of new investment per MW; and (iii) its capacity offer in the capacity market, y cm i,z , up to its available capacity.

Consumer agents aim to maximize surplus by choosing total electricity demand, balancing inelastic and elastic components against willingness to pay. p. 3
Where the paper says it

Consumer agents Each representative consumer in zone z maximises its surplus (Eq. (2a)) by choosing total electricity demand d e z,t, which consists of an inelastic component d inel z,t and an elastic component d ela z,t , and unserved energy ensz,t.

The energy market operator coordinates clearing using flow-based market coupling, where the exact projection method enforces network feasibility of flows by requiring each admissible zonal net position to lie within the flow-based domain. p. 3
Where the paper says it

The nodal injection at node n is denoted by rn,t, and the corresponding line flows on ℓ are given by a DC load-flow approximation using the power transfer distribution factors PTDFℓ,n. The exact projection method [17] enforces network feasibility of flows by requiring each admissible zonal net position p E z,t to lie within the flow-based domain.

Flow-Based Coupling and Deliverability

The proposed approach leverages flow-based market coupling (FBMC) logic to account for network feasibility of flows during scarcity events in annual capacity market auctions (i.e., implicit transmission capacity allocation). p. 1

Where the paper says it

This allows us to account for network feasibility of flows during scarcity events in annual capacity market auctions (i. implicit transmission capacity allocation).

This allows the deliverability of both foreign and domestic capacity to be assessed under defined scarcity conditions. p. 2
Where the paper says it

It enables the coupling of European capacity markets within a common grid model, capturing the physical flows induced by zonal net positions, such as loop flows and internal bottlenecks. In doing so, it allows the deliverability of both foreign and domestic capacity to be assessed under defined scarcity conditions (Section II).

The flow-based domain is constructed by aggregating the nodal injections that satisfy the power balance and thermal limits, which projects exactly the nodal feasible set onto the zonal net positions. p. 3
Where the paper says it

The exact projection method [17] enforces network feasibility of flows by requiring each admissible zonal net position p E z,t to lie within the flow-based domain. The domain is constructed by aggregating the nodal injections rn,t that satisfy the power balance (Eq.

This method avoids defining Maximum Entry Capacities (MECs), which suffer from circular dependency with neighbours’ available capacity. p. 2
Where the paper says it

To reflect the network feasibility of flows from contracted capacity to serve demand during scarcity events, we extend the logic behind flow-based market coupling (FBMC) to an annual, coupled, European cross-border capacity market for annual capacity contracts. Rather than computing borderto-border maximum entry capacities (MECs), which suffer from circular dependency with neighbours’ available capacity, FBMC explicitly models flows on critical network elements resulting from cross-border trade [22].

Impact of Cross-Border Participation Scenarios

The case study compares six distinct market design scenarios to address underinvestment resulting from price caps in the electricity market. The CM-FBMC scenario, which uses flow-based coupling, is shown to reduce system costs by harnessing available capacity in neighbouring market zones while ensuring deliverability with respect to network constraints in all scarcity situations. p. 0

Where the paper says it

In this paper, we propose a novel conceptual design for a coupled European capacity market that utilises the logic of flow-based market coupling. In a comparative analysis of different market design scenarios in an illustrative multi-zone case study, using a bespoke longrun equilibrium problem, we show that the proposed flow-based coupling of capacity markets reduces system costs by harnessing available capacity in neighbouring market zones while ensuring deliverability with respect to network constraints in all scarcity situations.

Explicit cross-border participation under both CM-NTC and CM-FBMC utilizes coordinated scarcity assessment, thus reducing system-wide over-procurement w. p. 6
Where the paper says it

t EOM-ref is observed, similar to CM-NoCBP scenario. Explicit cross-border participation under both CM-NTC and CM-FBMC utilises coordinated scarcity assessment, thus reducing system-wide over-procurement w.

r.t CMNoCBP by 2. p. 6
Where the paper says it

2 GWh, 30 GWh, and 33 GWh in zones A, B, and C. A capacity market without cross-border participation (CMNoCBP) successfully eliminates ENS; however, it does so through autarky.

5 GW while serving the same peak residual demand. p. 6
Where the paper says it

CM-NoCBP by 2. 5 GW while serving the same peak residual demand.

System Costs and Efficiency Gains

The total costs under CM-FBMC are reduced to 15,929 Me, which reduces the cost increase over EOM-ref to 3.45%. Capacity markets eliminate ENS costs but increase investment costs; the CM-FBMC brings the total costs down to 15,929 Me. p. 7

Where the paper says it

CM-FBMC brings the total costs down to 15,929 Me. This reduces the cost increase over EOM-ref to 3.

The flow-based approach reduces capacity prices in Zones B and C by 1,019 e/MW and 2,275 e/MW compared to the NTC case. p. 8
Where the paper says it

Under CM-FBMC, consumers face the same average system cost as in CM-NTC. However, the flow-based approach reduces capacity prices in Zones B and C by 1,019 e/MW and 2,275 e/MW compared to the NTC case.

Conclusion on Regional Integration

The proposed design addresses challenges posed by fragmented national capacity mechanisms while respecting the heterogeneous adequacy requirements of Member States and their sovereign right to steer their capacity mix. The CM-FBMC addresses this issue structurally by using a detailed grid model to clear capacity offers, ensuring that cleared capacity is deliverable w. p. 8

Where the paper says it

The CM-FBMC addresses this issue structurally. By using a detailed grid model to clear capacity offers, it ensures that cleared capacity is deliverable w.

r.t network constraints under a set of defined scarcity scenarios. p. 8
Where the paper says it

By using a detailed grid model to clear capacity offers, it ensures that cleared capacity is deliverable w. network constraints under a set of defined scarcity scenarios.

This design more accurately values the contribution of interconnection and yields efficiency gains. p. 9
Where the paper says it

By endogenously modelling network flows in anticipated scarcity scenarios, our approach eliminates the circular dependencies between import assumptions and available capacity in implicit cross-border participation, and between maximum entry capacities and available capacity in current explicit crossborder participation methods, and guarantees the delivery of contracted capacity during those scarcity events. Our modelling results show that this design more accurately values the contribution of interconnection and yields efficiency gains.

The CM-FBMC facilitates larger cross-border capacity trades, correctly valuing interconnection capacity and reduces investment costs in generation capacity while maintaining resource adequacy by reallocating investments to more favourable locations within the network. p. 1
Where the paper says it

1: The proposed capacity market design features two layers: a national capacity market for long-term contracts and a coupled annual capacity mechanism allowing secondary trade of long-term contracts. ues interconnection capacity and reduces investment costs in generation capacity while maintaining resource adequacy by reallocating investments to more favourable locations within the network.

The paper concludes that this design more accurately values the contribution of interconnection and yields efficiency gains. p. 9
Where the paper says it

By endogenously modelling network flows in anticipated scarcity scenarios, our approach eliminates the circular dependencies between import assumptions and available capacity in implicit cross-border participation, and between maximum entry capacities and available capacity in current explicit crossborder participation methods, and guarantees the delivery of contracted capacity during those scarcity events. Our modelling results show that this design more accurately values the contribution of interconnection and yields efficiency gains.

Green — the paper says it, and the page is printed. Red — no passage carries it, so treat that sentence as unverified. The same check runs on your own text: check a summary against its source, $5.

Improvements for AI systems

  1. Flow-based Market Coupling for Capacity Markets: The improved system can accurately value interconnection capacity by harnessing available capacity in neighbouring market zones while ensuring deliverability with respect to network constraints in all scarcity situations. This allows for more efficient cross-border trade by modeling loop flows and internal bottlenecks instead of using simplified Maximum Entry Capacities (MECs).

  2. Two-Tiered Capacity Mechanism Design: The system can implement a structure where "long-term contracts allow Member States to steer the development of their own energy mix, whereas the annual coupled auctions capitalise on the benefits of a highly interconnected system by facilitating cross-border participation of resources." This separates long-term de-risking from short-term operational management.

  3. Endogenous Flow Domain in Clearing: The capacity market clearing mechanism can replace static approximations with an endogenously defined flow-based domain to ensure the deliverability of the cleared capacity bids w.r.t. network constraints during scarcity events. This eliminates circular dependency between available capacity and expected imports inherent in previous models.

  4. Scarcity Scenario Integration: The system can perform a coordinated scarcity assessment using Monte Carlo simulation by Regional Coordination Centres to determine the minimum firm capacity in each zone that satisfies both simultaneous and isolated scarcity events within the coupled region. This provides a more realistic assessment of regional adequacy than isolated national assessments.

  5. Congestion Rent Capture: The system can explicitly capture value from transmission infrastructure by allowing TSOs to capture a capacity congestion rent, which is defined as the capacity price spread multiplied by the volume of reliability obligations exchanged across the zones. This creates an economic incentive for maintaining and developing interconnection infrastructure.

Abstract

European Member States are increasingly introducing national capacity mechanisms (CMs) to manage growing adequacy risks. However, isolated national CMs are inefficient in highly interconnected electricity systems, such as the European system. While progress has been made in facilitating cross-border participation by generation capacity in CMs, existing arrangements are prone to under- or over-investment and do not properly value the contribution of interconnection capacity to Member States' adequacy targets. We argue that national capacity markets, offering long-term contracts, need a second tier: an annual capacity auction coupled across zones, which sets zonal prices for firm, deliverable capacity. We design such an auction by extending the logic of flow-based market coupling to capacity markets. In a comparative analysis of different market design scenarios in an illustrative multi-zone case study, using a bespoke long-run equilibrium problem, we show that the proposed auction removes the circular dependency between imports and available capacity in current cross-border participation schemes, locates investment where it is cheapest while keeping it deliverable under network constraints in defined scarcity situations, and makes the value of additional interconnection capacity explicit.

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