Boost+: Equitable, Incentive-Compatible Block Building

arXiv:2602.04007 · cs.CR · Submitted 2026-02-03 · Read on arXiv

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Introduction to the show: ident: Security Radio. Generated commentary on the latest security and cryptography papers.

Nadia: We're looking at the paper: "Boost+: Equitable, Incentive-Compatible Block Building".

Elias: Here's the gist of the paper. Block space on the blockchain is scarce and must be allocated efficiently through block building The core of Boost+ is a mechanism MBoost+, built around a default algorithm This design aims to guarantee equitability and economic efficiency in block building by decoupling the process into collecting and ordering transactions The mechanism MBoost+ aligns incentives for both searchers (intermediaries that generate or route transactions) and builders, where truthful bidding is a dominant strategy for all builders For searchers, truthful reporting is dominant whenever the default algorithm dominates competing builders The paper proposes a concrete default block-building algorithm informed by empirical analysis of real-world transactions System Architecture and Mechanism Design Boost+ is a block-building architecture that explicitly considers all three practically important actors (searchers, builders, and proposers) and separates the process of transaction collection and algorithm execution The mechanism MBoost+ operates in two stages: first, it executes the default algorithm to compute a default block and the refund to each order flow In the second stage, it runs builder-submitted algorithms to determine the winning block and the value allocated to builders and the proposer The mechanism is based on a Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) framework This mechanism ensures that when no external builder participates or when the default algorithm outperforms all builders, truthful bidding is also dominant for searchers Default Algorithm and Empirical Validation The default algorithm is based on grouping transactions according to their read/write conflicts, so that transactions in different groups do not interfere with each other The empirical study shows that this default algorithm can construct the optimal blocks in 53.2% of cases The algorithm partitions transactions into conflict groups, and for groups of less than kcutoff transactions, it enumerates all subsets and selects the subset with the highest value The default algorithm properties show that the feasible set of blocks considered by our default algorithm is determined independently of the bids Incentive Compatibility and Integration Resistance The mechanism MBoost+ aims to achieve Searcher-DSIC, Builder-DSIC, Integration-resistance, Welfare maximization, Computational efficiency, Individual rationality (IR), Budget balance Theorem 4 states that MBoost+ is DSIC for builders Theorem 5 shows that truthful bidding is a dominant strategy for searchers with conflict-free bundles in the default-dominating scenario The analysis of the meta-game shows that the strategy of searcher i, participate and bid truthfully, weakly dominates all alternative strategies with respect to the joint utility of (i, j) for a conflict-free bundle Practical Performance and Limitations The evaluation shows that in 53.

Paper summary: Nadia: So, we're talking about this paper called "Boost+: Equitable, Incentive-Compatible Block Building". Basically it tackles the problem of block space being scarce on the blockchain and how to allocate it fairly.

Elias: Exactly. The paper proposes a system called Boost+ which aims to guarantee equitability and economic efficiency in how blocks are built by decoupling transaction collection from algorithm execution.

Priya: What does that mean practically? Does it actually solve the centralization issues we see in existing systems?

Nadia: It does, by focusing on a mechanism called MBoost+. This mechanism aligns incentives for searchers who route transactions and builders who submit block-building algorithms. Truthful bidding becomes the dominant strategy for all builders.

Elias: And for the searchers, truthful reporting is dominant whenever the default algorithm beats competing builders, and it stays dominant even when some other builder wins a block on its own.

Priya: That sounds like a strong guarantee of fairness if those conditions hold true across many transactions. But what about the actual building process?

Nadia: They propose a concrete default block-building algorithm that they developed based on looking at real-world transactions. This algorithm groups transactions by read and write conflicts, so they don't interfere with each other.

Elias: The empirical validation showed that this default algorithm can construct the optimal blocks in fifty-three point two percent of cases. It partitions all those transactions into conflict groups, and for groups smaller than a certain cutoff size k, it checks every possible subset and picks the one with the highest value.

Priya: So even though it's not perfect, it seems to have a solid foundation based on what we actually see happening in real transaction patterns. What are the trade-offs there?

Nadia: The paper lays out several goals they are trying to achieve, like Searcher Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatibility and Builder Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatibility. Plus they mention things like welfare maximization and computational efficiency for the system.

Elias: They also claim individual rationality and budget balance. For instance, Theorem four states that MBoost+ is dominant strategy incentive compatible for builders because of the way it rewards them when their algorithms win.

Priya: That's interesting, because rewarding innovation in advanced block-building algorithms sounds good, but I wonder if that reward structure doesn't accidentally create new bottlenecks somewhere else.

Nadia: The paper addresses integration resistance too. They want to make sure that this system works well even if you add other parts or different ways of doing things into the ecosystem later on.

Elias: And they show how truthful bidding for searchers is dominant whenever they have conflict-free bundles, which means when their transactions don't clash with each other.

Priya: That brings us to a big question: what does this actually change for someone who just uses the blockchain to move money or data? Is it just more complexity?

Nadia: The implication is that block space allocation becomes less about whoever has the best integration and more about following this default, efficient algorithm. It shifts the power structure around how those scarce resources are claimed.

Elias: If you look at their evaluation of the default algorithm, they found it constructs optimal blocks in fifty-three point two percent of cases across their tests. That’s a concrete number they use to back up the practicality of this approach.

Priya: Fifty-three point two percent is a specific metric, but I'm still curious about what happens when things get really complex and the transaction patterns aren't well represented in their real-world data. Where does this default algorithm stop working?

Nadia: The paper states that the feasibility set of blocks considered by their default algorithm actually depends independently of the bids—meaning it doesn't change based on who is bidding or not. That’s a key property for stability.

Elias: They also showed that searcher i 's strategy to participate and bid truthfully weakly dominates all other alternative strategies when you're looking at the joint utility for searcher i and another searcher j with a conflict-free bundle. That’s a strong proof of incentive compatibility there.

Priya: So, the core claim is that by using this default algorithm and mechanism, we get better incentives for everyone involved in block building without needing to perfectly predict every single transaction interaction upfront.

Nadia: Right. It’s about finding a practical middle ground between centralized systems and completely open competition for block space allocation. The paper "Boost+: Equitable, Incentive-Compatible Block Building" is proposing a concrete way to manage that scarcity on the blockchain by making the default choice work well empirically.

Elias: And what this means for the future is that if we can implement these incentive guarantees, then building on top of existing block-building infrastructure could become much more predictable and economically efficient.

Priya: It seems like a system designed to be robust under real-world transaction noise, which is always a good sign when you're trying to build security around something that's supposed to be decentralized.

Nadia: Exactly. The work gives us a specific algorithm and mechanism, MBoost+, built around this default idea, that they show is effective in fifty-three point two percent of cases. That’s the concrete contribution we have here.

Conclusion: Nadia: So, we're wrapping up this look at "Boost+: Equitable, Incentive-Compatible Block Building." This paper is about how to structure block building so that everyone involved—the searchers, the builders—gets a fair shot.

Elias: Yeah, the authors are looking at making sure that when you're trying to add new algorithms for building blocks, the system rewards you without letting one person hoard all the best ideas.

Nadia: It’s basically proposing this mechanism called MBoost+, which uses a default algorithm that groups transactions by how much they clash with each other.

Elias: And they show that this default approach works well in fifty-three point two percent of cases, which is a concrete number for how often it hits the mark.

Nadia: For the person just listening, what does this mean? It means we’re moving away from a system where only the biggest players can dictate how block space gets claimed.

Elias: They’re trying to create an incentive structure where being honest about your bid is actually the best thing you can do for yourself, whether you're submitting a transaction or a block-building algorithm.

Nadia: It’s about making sure the process itself is efficient and that it doesn't get bogged down by endless bidding wars between builders.

Elias: They prove that this system has certain guarantees, like individual rationality and budget balance, which are pretty important for any real-world application you want to build on top of it.

Nadia: So, the big picture here is moving towards a block building environment where fairness and efficiency aren't just theoretical concepts but something built into the core code.

Elias: It sets up a framework that should make it much more stable when you try to scale this kind of decentralized infrastructure.

Nadia: We’ll take a quick break, and after that, we’re going to look at how this default algorithm actually handles those messy real-world transaction patterns they tested.

Mengqian Zhang, Sen Yang, Kartik Nayak, Fan Zhang

Yale University · Duke University

cs.CR

Submitted: 2026-02-03

Updated: 2026-11-01

Comments: Published in NDSS 2027

DOI: 10.14722/ndss.2027.230146

Code: https://github.com/flashbots/simple-blind-arbitrage

License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

Importance score: 79/100

The gist: Block space on the blockchain is scarce and must be allocated efficiently through block building The core of Boost+ is a mechanism MBoost+…

Key concepts

MBoost+
This is the core mechanism built around a default algorithm. It decouples transaction collection from execution, allowing the system to first compute a default block and then allow builders to submit alternative algorithms. This structure aims to guarantee equitability in block building.
Default Algorithm
The default algorithm groups transactions based on read/write conflicts so that transactions in different conflict groups do not interfere with each other. For smaller transaction groups, it checks all possible subsets and selects the one with the highest value, forming a baseline for block construction.
VCG Framework
This mechanism is based on the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves framework, which is used to ensure truthful bidding. It ensures that when no external builder participates or when the default algorithm performs best, truthful reporting becomes the dominant strategy for searchers.

Terminology

Summary

Block space on the blockchain is scarce and must be allocated efficiently through block building The core of Boost+ is a mechanism MBoost+, built around a default algorithm This design aims to guarantee equitability and economic efficiency in block building by decoupling the process into collecting and ordering transactions The mechanism MBoost+ aligns incentives for both searchers (intermediaries that generate or route transactions) and builders, where truthful bidding is a dominant strategy for all builders For searchers, truthful reporting is dominant whenever the default algorithm dominates competing builders The paper proposes a concrete default block-building algorithm informed by empirical analysis of real-world transactions

System Architecture and Mechanism Design

Boost+ is a block-building architecture that explicitly considers all three practically important actors (searchers, builders, and proposers) and separates the process of transaction collection and algorithm execution The mechanism MBoost+ operates in two stages: first, it executes the default algorithm to compute a default block and the refund to each order flow In the second stage, it runs builder-submitted algorithms to determine the winning block and the value allocated to builders and the proposer The mechanism is based on a Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) framework This mechanism ensures that when no external builder participates or when the default algorithm outperforms all builders, truthful bidding is also dominant for searchers

Default Algorithm and Empirical Validation

The default algorithm is based on grouping transactions according to their read/write conflicts, so that transactions in different groups do not interfere with each other The empirical study shows that this default algorithm can construct the optimal blocks in 53.2% of cases The algorithm partitions transactions into conflict groups, and for groups of less than kcutoff transactions, it enumerates all subsets and selects the subset with the highest value The default algorithm properties show that the feasible set of blocks considered by our default algorithm is determined independently of the bids

Incentive Compatibility and Integration Resistance

The mechanism MBoost+ aims to achieve Searcher-DSIC, Builder-DSIC, Integration-resistance, Welfare maximization, Computational efficiency, Individual rationality (IR), Budget balance Theorem 4 states that MBoost+ is DSIC for builders Theorem 5 shows that truthful bidding is a dominant strategy for searchers with conflict-free bundles in the default-dominating scenario The analysis of the meta-game shows that the strategy of searcher i, participate and bid truthfully, weakly dominates all alternative strategies with respect to the joint utility of (i, j) for a conflict-free bundle

Practical Performance and Limitations

The evaluation shows that in 53.

Green — the paper says it, and the page is printed. Red — no passage carries it, so treat that sentence as unverified. The same check runs on your own text: check a summary against its source, $5.

Improvements for AI systems

  1. Decentralized Block Building Architecture: Implement a system that decouples transaction collection from ordering to ensure equal access to order flows, as proposed by Boost+. This allows searchers equal access to all collected transactions without being exclusively channeled to a single builder, mitigating integration risks.

  2. Incentive Compatible Searcher Behavior: Design the mechanism MBoost+ such that truthful reporting is a dominant strategy for all searchers, even when builders may win or when they have the technical ability to integrate with a builder, as shown by Truthful bidding is dominant whenever the default algorithm dominates competing builders.

  3. Builder Innovation Incentive: Implement a system where builders are rewarded whenever their algorithms win, such as in Case (4b) of MBoost+, which extends the VCG-based mechanism by rewarding builders for contributing algorithms that generate strictly better blocks, thus fostering innovation.

  4. Conflict Group Optimization Algorithm: Develop a concrete default block-building algorithm based on empirical insights that partitions transactions into conflict groups and resolves them using either exhaustive search for small groups or simplified structural properties for large ones, aiming to construct the optimal block in 53.2% of cases.

  5. Integration Resistance Enforcement: Incorporate a two-stage design where conflict-free bundles are handled separately before merging them into the final candidate blocks, which is described as a crucial ingredient to achieve integration-resistance for conflict-free bundles.

Abstract

Block space on the blockchain is scarce and must be allocated efficiently through block building. However, Ethereum's current block-building ecosystem, MEV-Boost, has become highly centralized due to integration, which distorts competition, reduces blockspace efficiency, and obscures MEV flow transparency. To improve equitability and economic efficiency in block building, we propose, a system that pools submitted order flows inside an attested execution environment and gives all participating block-building algorithms equal access to them. The core of is the mechanism M, built around a baseline block-building algorithm. M aligns incentives for both searchers (intermediaries that generate or route transactions) and builders: Truthful bidding is a dominant strategy for all builders. For searchers, truthful reporting is dominant whenever the baseline algorithm dominates competing builders, and it remains dominant for all conflict-free transactions, even when builders may win. We further show that even if a searcher can technically integrate with a builder, non-integration combined with truthful bidding still dominates any deviation for conflict-free transactions. We also implement a concrete baseline algorithm informed by empirical analysis of real-world transactions and evaluate its efficacy using historical data.

Sources

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