Supply Chain Insecurity: Exposing Vulnerabilities in iOS Dependency Management Systems

arXiv:2601.20638 · cs.CR · Submitted 2026-01-28 · Read on arXiv

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Introduction to the show: ident: Security Radio. Generated commentary on the latest security and cryptography papers.

Nadia: We're looking at the paper: "Supply Chain Insecurity".

Elias: Here's the gist of the paper. Dependency management systems in iOS apps expose internal package names and versions which can lead to remote code execution on developer machines and build servers <ref:2601.20638#pg2> Attackers can exploit this leakage to register previously unclaimed dependencies in CocoaPods, enabling remote code execution (RCE) on developer machines and build servers <ref:2601.20638#pg5> Furthermore, attackers can compromise dependencies by reclaiming abandoned domains and GitHub URLs <ref:2601.20638#pg6> Analyzing a dataset of 9,212 apps, we quantify how many apps are susceptible to these vulnerabilities <ref:2601.20638#pg5> Our findings reveal that popular apps disclose internal dependency information, enabling dependency confusion attacks <ref:2601.20638#pg5> Finally, we show that hijacking a single CocoaPod library through an abandoned domain could compromise 63 iOS apps, affecting millions of users <ref:2601.20638#pg5>.

Nadia: Supply Chain Vulnerabilities Identified The paper focuses on exposing vulnerabilities in CocoaPods, Carthage, and Swift Package Manager (SwiftPM) within the iOS software supply chain <ref:2601.20638#pg2> Key issues identified include dependency confusion attacks where internal package names are exposed, which allows attackers to register malicious packages <ref:2601.20638#pg5> Dependency hijacking is also a major threat, stemming from the exploitation of abandoned domains and GitHub URLs to compromise existing libraries <ref:2601.20638#pg6> The study quantifies the impact by analyzing 9,212 iOS apps and open-source projects on GitHub to determine vulnerability susceptibility <ref:2601.20638#pg5>.

Elias: Measurement of Vulnerability Scope The measurement study reveals specific vulnerabilities across different attack vectors <ref:2601.20638#pg5> The analysis shows that dependency confusion affects 9,866 frameworks from 2,084 apps, representing 39.72% of candidates <ref:2601.20638#pg6> Owner hijacking impacts 1.30% of apps with 107 vulnerable CocoaPod libraries <ref:2601.20638#pg6> GitHub hijacking affects 6.05% of apps with 5,137 vulnerable CocoaPods libraries <ref:2601.20638#pg6>.

Nadia: Analysis of Mitigation Strategies The paper evaluates five additional dependency management systems—Cargo, Go modules, Maven, npm, and pip—to discuss mitigation strategies against the identified threats <ref:2601.20638#pg5> For Cargo, authentication via GitHub and 2FA can make hijacking impossible if strong 2FA is enforced <ref:2601.20638#pg6> Go modules exhibit a centralized behavior due to caching, which can mask the abandonment of GitHub URLs <ref:2601.20638#pg6> For npm and pip, enforcing 2FA and daily scans for abandoned domains are recommended measures to reduce hijacking risks <ref:2601.20638#pg6>.

Paper summary: Nadia: The paper focuses on CocoaPods, Carthage, and Swift Package Manager as the main systems they are examining for these vulnerabilities in the iOS software supply chain >

Elias: They evaluate five other dependency management systems too, like Cargo, Go modules, Maven, npm, and pip to see if these issues are just stuck in the iOS world >

Priya: What kind of impact does this leakage actually have on the apps themselves? The summary mentions that popular apps disclose internal dependency information which enables dependency confusion attacks >

Nadia: Exactly. They quantify how many apps are susceptible, showing that popular apps disclose internal dependency information and that this opens up the door for dependency confusion attacks >

Elias: And it's not just a theoretical risk; they demonstrate that hijacking a single CocoaPod library through an abandoned domain could compromise sixty-three iOS apps, which affects millions of users globally >

Priya: That scale is pretty concerning. So what about the other type of attack mentioned? The paper talks about compromising dependencies by reclaiming abandoned domains and GitHub URLs >

Nadia: They show that attackers can exploit abandoned domains and GitHub URLs to hijack existing libraries, which is dependency hijacking, affecting at least one hundred sixty-two apps in their dataset > <ref:2601.20638#pg1>

Elias: So we're looking at both new malicious packages being registered and old ones being hijacked through URL redirection mechanisms like namespace renaming on GitHub >

Conclusion: Nadia: So to wrap up this paper, "Supply Chain Insecurity: Exposing Vulnerabilities in iOS Dependency Management Systems," the authors show that dependency management systems expose internal package names and versions leading to remote code execution when misconfigured >

Elias: And they also show the risks from abandoned domains and GitHub namespaces, which lets attackers hijack dependencies used by at least one hundred sixty-two apps > <ref:2601.20638#pg1>

Priya: What does this mean for the average developer or end-user? It sounds like a lot of security work to do on the side with dependency management >

Nadia: It means that developers need to be very careful about where they pull their dependencies from, and they need to consider how they set up their systems because misconfigurations can lead directly to remote code execution on the build servers >

Elias: And for anyone using these systems, the paper suggests that requiring explicit specification of private dependencies and disabling code execution by default could help stop those dependency confusion attacks >

Priya: So it boils down to making sure you know exactly what you're pulling in and locking things down so those malicious actors can't sneak in >

David Schmidt, Sebastian Schrittwieser, Edgar Weippl

University of Vienna · Christian Doppler Laboratory AsTra

cs.CR

Submitted: 2026-01-28

Updated: 2026-11-03

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-032-42929-2_5

Code: https://github.com/Artsy/Spec

License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/

Importance score: 79/100

The gist: Dependency management systems in iOS apps expose internal package names and versions which can lead to remote code execution on developer machines and build servers <ref:2601.20638#pg2> Attackers can…

Key concepts

Dependency Confusion Attacks
This occurs when an app's internal package names are leaked. Attackers then register malicious packages with the same name in public repositories like CocoaPods. Developers might unknowingly pull the malicious version, leading to remote code execution on their devices.
Dependency Hijacking
Hijacking involves attackers taking control of legitimate libraries by exploiting abandoned domains or GitHub URLs. If a library is abandoned, an attacker can reclaim its identity and replace it with a malicious version, compromising the app's integrity.
Supply Chain Vulnerabilities
This refers to weaknesses in the chain of software development, specifically within iOS dependency management tools like CocoaPods. These vulnerabilities allow attackers to inject harmful code early in the development process, affecting not just one app but potentially millions of users.
Mitigation Strategies
Defense involves several steps: requiring developers to explicitly state private dependencies and disabling code execution by default. Additionally, enforcing two-factor authentication (2FA) and using commit hashes for URLs helps secure dependencies against tampering.

Terminology

Summary

Dependency management systems in iOS apps expose internal package names and versions which can lead to remote code execution on developer machines and build servers <ref:2601. p. 020638#pg2> Attackers can exploit this leakage to register previously unclaimed dependencies in CocoaPods, enabling remote code execution (RCE) on developer machines and build servers <ref:2601. p. 020638#pg5> Furthermore, attackers can compromise dependencies by reclaiming abandoned domains and GitHub URLs <ref:2601. p. 020638#pg6> Analyzing a dataset of 9,212 apps, we quantify how many apps are susceptible to these vulnerabilities <ref:2601. p. 020638#pg5> Our findings reveal that popular apps disclose internal dependency information, enabling dependency confusion attacks <ref:2601. p. 020638#pg5> Finally, we show that hijacking a single CocoaPod library through an abandoned domain could compromise 63 iOS apps, affecting millions of users <ref:2601. p. 020638#pg5>.

Supply Chain Vulnerabilities Identified

The paper focuses on exposing vulnerabilities in CocoaPods, Carthage, and Swift Package Manager (SwiftPM) within the iOS software supply chain <ref:2601.20638#pg2> Key issues identified include dependency confusion attacks where internal package names are exposed, which allows attackers to register malicious packages <ref:2601. p. 120638#pg5> Dependency hijacking is also a major threat, stemming from the exploitation of abandoned domains and GitHub URLs to compromise existing libraries <ref:2601. p. 820638#pg6> The study quantifies the impact by analyzing 9,212 iOS apps and open-source projects on GitHub to determine vulnerability susceptibility <ref:2601. p. 020638#pg5>.

Measurement of Vulnerability Scope

The measurement study reveals specific vulnerabilities across different attack vectors <ref:2601.20638#pg5> The analysis shows that dependency confusion affects 9,866 frameworks from 2,084 apps, representing 39. p. 572% of candidates <ref:2601. p. 020638#pg6> Owner hijacking impacts 1. p. 430% of apps with 107 vulnerable CocoaPod libraries <ref:2601. p. 020638#pg6> GitHub hijacking affects 6. p. 705% of apps with 5,137 vulnerable CocoaPods libraries <ref:2601. p. 720638#pg6>.

Analysis of Mitigation Strategies

The paper evaluates five additional dependency management systems—Cargo, Go modules, Maven, npm, and pip—to discuss mitigation strategies against the identified threats <ref:2601.20638#pg5> For Cargo, authentication via GitHub and 2FA can make hijacking impossible if strong 2FA is enforced <ref:2601. p. 820638#pg6> Go modules exhibit a centralized behavior due to caching, which can mask the abandonment of GitHub URLs <ref:2601. p. 920638#pg6> For npm and pip, enforcing 2FA and daily scans for abandoned domains are recommended measures to reduce hijacking risks <ref:2601. p. 920638#pg6>.

Conclusion on Defense Mechanisms

The study concludes that dependency management systems should require developers to explicitly specify private dependencies and disable code execution by default to prevent dependency confusion attacks <ref:2601.20638#pg6> Enforcing 2FA and hosting dependencies themselves are crucial for mitigating hijacking attacks <ref:2601. p. 920638#pg6> Mandating commit hashes or checksums for referenced URLs is necessary to secure dependencies against malicious modifications <ref:2601. p. 820638#pg6>.

Limitations and Future Directions

The analysis misses libraries not included in the Frameworks directory when use framework! is not set, suggesting vulnerable libraries are likely more widely used than measured <ref:2601. p. 520638#pg6> A longitudinal study is suggested to track whether the situation improves over time, as certain information like ownership is only available at collection time <ref:2601. p. 420638#pg6> Future work could investigate developers’ perspectives using qualitative research methods to understand defense mechanisms <ref:2601. p. 020638#pg6>.

Related Work Context

Related work has explored the detection of malicious packages and the threats arising from dependency confusion and hijacking attacks in other ecosystems <ref:2601.20638#pg6> The research extends previous lines of inquiry to the iOS ecosystem, demonstrating vulnerability in widely used apps <ref:2601.20638#pg6>. The paper directly addresses the mitigation of concrete attack vectors identified within iOS dependency management systems <ref:2601. p. 020638#pg6>.

Final Takeaways

The study demonstrates that leakage of library names and versions in iOS app bundles enables dependency confusion attacks leading to RCE <ref:2601.20638#pg6> Attackers can exploit abandoned domains and GitHub namespaces to hijack iOS libraries <ref:2601. p. 120638#pg6> The measurement study shows that dependencies of 162 apps (1. p. 176%) could be affected by hijacking attacks <ref:2601. p. 020638#pg6> Mitigation strategies include requiring explicit private dependency specification and disabling code execution by default <ref:2601. p. 920638#pg6>. Enforcing 2FA and hosting dependencies directly are recommended to mitigate hijacking attacks <ref:2601. p. 920638#pg6>. Mandating commit hashes or checksums for referenced URLs is essential for security <ref:2601. p. 820638#pg6>.

Ethics in Research

The research involved practical demonstration of dependency confusion attacks on apps with responsible disclosure programs to highlight exploitability <ref:2601.20638#pg6> Data collected during the attack, such as hostname and installation directory, was used to confirm installation origin <ref:2601. p. 520638#pg6> The findings contributed to CocoaPods maintainers' decision to reject new libraries containing prepare command as of May 2025 <ref:2601.20638#pg6>. Researchers proactively claimed critical abandoned domains and namespaces without interfering with functionality <ref:2601.20638#pg6> Responsible disclosure emails were sent to app developers to raise awareness and suggest mitigation strategies <ref:2601. p. 720638#pg6>.

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Improvements for AI systems

  1. Mitigation of dependency confusion attacks in iOS systems can be achieved by requiring developers to explicitly specify private dependency sources, as enforced by Cargo, to prevent misinterpretation when a package name exists in both private and public registries.

  2. Dependency management systems should disable code execution by default during package installation to reduce the attack surface, a practice recommended across multiple ecosystems.

  3. To mitigate hijacking attacks stemming from abandoned URLs, systems should enforce two-factor authentication and host dependencies themselves to ensure that domain takeover alone is no longer sufficient as suggested by the analysis of Cargo.

  4. Dependency management systems must mandate commit hashes or checksums for dependencies referenced by their URLs to prevent attackers from injecting malicious code into newly published versions.

  5. AI systems can be improved to proactively detect abandoned domains through active scanning, which reduces the likelihood of attacks, and by requiring developers to explicitly specify private dependency sources for public URLs.

  6. The system can be designed to verify the integrity of referenced URLs against known good states, such as checking if a repository has been renamed or retired according to established policies.

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