Collusion-proof Auction Design using Side Information

arXiv:2511.12456 · cs.GT, econ.TH · Submitted 2025-11-16 · Read on arXiv

cs.GT, econ.TH

Submitted: 2025-11-16

Updated: 2026-10-29

Terminology

• False Negatives — 1× in this paper · explained in 2 episodes

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