SoK: Market Microstructure for Decentralized Prediction Markets (DePMs)

arXiv:2510.15612 · cs.CE, cs.CR, q-fin.TR · Submitted 2025-10-17 · Read on arXiv

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Introduction to the show: ident: Computer Science. The day in computer science: software, systems and theory on arXiv.

Tom: We're looking at the paper: "SoK: Market Microstructure for Decentralized Prediction Markets (DePMs)".

Title and authors: Tom: So we’ve seen that this paper focuses on structuring a workflow for DePMs, but what is the main point of this specific piece about the title and who wrote it?

Jane: Well, the title itself tells us they are focusing heavily on how these markets work internally—the microstructure—and linking that to decentralization.

Tom: It’s not just a general review; it’s specifically looking at the history of DePMs and why modern ones like Polymarket diverge from older designs like Truthcoin or Augur v1.

Lu: They set up this modular workflow to compare how different designs handle things like share structure and resolution, which is key to understanding what makes a market work well or fail.

Meng: I wonder if this structure actually helps when you try to deploy something on the actual blockchain, because it sounds a lot like theory right now.

Lalam: It’s about mapping the decisions involved in creating these DePMs, asking how they differ in creation, trading, and resolution mechanisms.

The paper's summary: Tom: So what is the actual summary of this paper saying? What’s the big picture they are trying to convey about these markets?

Jane: They summarize it by looking at how prediction market outcome shares are fungible and how that allows for a free market where information flows through price.

Lu: They break down the structure of those outcome shares into three categories: WTA, YNB, and Scalar markets.

Meng: So they’re showing us the specific types of contracts you can have when someone wagers on an event outcome.

Tom: And they detail what WTA markets need—the outcomes have to be mutually exclusive so only one share wins, and at least one share has to win for the contract to complete.

Jane: It’s important because it gives us a taxonomy of how these contracts are structured, which is fundamental before we even talk about how they trade.

Lalam: They establish this framework so we can see the recurring patterns in design choices that lead to operational problems or failures in these systems.

The paper's improvements: Tom: Now, the paper points out some research gaps, and I want to talk about what they suggest as improvements for the ecosystem.

Jane: They highlight a few things researchers are missing, like how to use accuracy metrics to compare centralized and decentralized prediction markets.

Lu: They also point out a need for better machine-checkable predicate specifications when writing market topics so that we can eliminate ambiguities and corner cases in those definitions.

Meng: That’s useful because if the definitions are messy, it becomes impossible for us to actually build something reliable at scale.

Tom: And they suggest measuring Maximum Extractable Value on chain, and quantifying the improvements from negRisk gadgets to see how they actually encourage price parity between equivalent positions.

Lalam: They also call for a tool that can replay past markets using on chain data, external data like news or social media, to avoid hindsight bias when analyzing historical results.

Conclusion: Jane: So wrapping up the whole discussion of "SoK: Market Microstructure for Decentralized Prediction Markets (DePMs)," what is the final takeaway for us?

Tom: The main conclusion is that a DePM will likely use a hybrid or chained approach to resolution, meaning it won't rely on just one method, like only arbiters or only crowdsourced votes.

Lu: They conclude that the modular framework helps illustrate the trade-offs between different design choices and how systems like Polymarket deviate from earlier designs like Truthcoin and Augur v1.

Meng: So they’re showing us that there isn't one single best design, but rather a set of trade-offs related to decentralization and correctness.

Lalam: They conclude that the taxonomy helps identify recurring failure modes related to decentralization, usability, and the correctness of resolution mechanisms in DePMs.

Tom: So it’s essentially a learning resource for anyone trying to catch up on the history and current state of DePM design across all those different choices.

Jane: Yeah, it’s a comprehensive review that lays out where things are now so we can better understand the landscape moving forward.

Nahid Rahman, Joseph Al-Chami, Jeremy Clark

Concordia University

cs.CE, cs.CR, q-fin.TR

Submitted: 2025-10-17

Updated: 2026-11-17

Code: https://github.com/MadibaGroup/2024-PredictionMarkets

Importance score: 89/100

The gist: Decentralized prediction markets (DePMs) allow open participation in event-based wagering without fully relying on centralized intermediaries.

Key concepts

Modular Workflow
The paper breaks the creation of a DePM into eight distinct stages: infrastructure, topic definition, share structure, initialization, trading, resolution, settlement, and archiving. This allows researchers to compare different design choices across these steps to evaluate trade-offs like decentralization and manipulation resistance.
Market Structure Taxonomy
This classifies wagering systems into types like Event wagering and Prediction markets (DePMs). A key feature is that prediction market outcome shares are fungible, meaning participants can freely trade them, which allows the market to communicate information through share prices.
Resolution Mechanisms
These define how a market determines the winning outcome. Options range from oracle-less designs using auto-resolve rules and splitting/merging shares to crowdsourced votes involving an electorate. The paper suggests DePMs will likely use a hybrid or chained approach for reliability.

Terminology

Summary

Decentralized prediction markets (DePMs) allow open participation in event-based wagering without fully relying on centralized intermediaries. p. 0 The central thesis of this systemization of knowledge (SoK) paper is that Polymarket found success in bucking the trend<ref:2510. p. 015612#pg2>.

Modular Workflow and Design Review

The paper presents a modular workflow comprising eight stages for DePMs, including underlying infrastructure, market topic, share structure and pricing, initialization, trading, market resolution, settlement, and archiving <ref:2510.15612#pg2>. For each module enumerated in this workflow the authors analyze design variants to evaluate trade-offs concerning decentralization, expressiveness, and manipulation resistance <ref:2510.15612#pg2>. This modular approach breaks competing designs into a common set of steps for side-by-side comparison <ref:2510. p. 115612#pg4>.

Market Structure Taxonomy

The taxonomy of wagering systems distinguishes between Event wagering, Bookmakers, Prediction markets, Centralized (CePMs), and Decentralized (DePMs) <ref:2510.15612#pg4>. A key distinction is that prediction market outcome shares are fungible and can be freely traded between participants, enabling a free market that communicates information through outcome share prices <ref:2510. p. 215612#pg5>. The structure of outcome shares typically falls into three categories: WTA, YNB, and Scalar markets <ref:2510. p. 815612#pg11>. WTA markets require outcomes to be mutually exclusive so no more than one share wins and complete so at least one share wins <ref:2510. p. 815612#pg11>.

Market Initialization Options

There are three options for how the first trade happens in market initialization: automated bookmaking, splitting, and matching <ref:2510.15612#pg13>. Automated bookmaking involves a loss fund and a pricing rule for token types to issue shares algorithmically <ref:2510. p. 515612#pg13>. Splitting provides counterparty-free state transitions for a fixed unit bundle of WTA token types by mapping 1 N to Pj j (minting one unit of each j in B) <ref:2510. p. 515612#pg13>. Matching accepts orders and executes a trade only when a buy order and a sell order coincide on (j, q, p) creating two shares and giving them to Alice and Bob <ref:2510.15612#pg14>.

Resolution Mechanisms

Market resolution approaches specify how the winning outcome is determined through oracle-less designs, designated arbiters, reporter networks, or crowdsourced votes <ref:2510.15612#pg15>. Oracle-less designs include self-settling markets relying on splitting and merging of shares or auto-resolve rules that finalize outcomes when token trades exceed a certain threshold <ref:2510.15612#pg15>. Crowdsourced vote involves an electorate, ballots, aggregation methods like plurality for categorical questions, and incentives for participants <ref:2510.15612#pg16>.

Research Gaps Identified

The paper identifies several research gaps concerning the DePM ecosystem <ref:2510.15612#pg3>. These include whether accuracy metrics can be used to compare CePM and DePM platforms <ref:2510. p. 615612#pg8>, meaningful correlations between accuracy and microstructure options, and classifying copy traders <ref:2510. p. 615612#pg4>. Other gaps involve writing market topics with machine-checkable predicate specifications, measuring MEV extraction on-chain, quantifying improvements from negRisk gadgets, and creating a tool to replay past markets with external data. p. 8

Archival Data Utility

Publicly accessible DePM data provides a useful forecasting tool for society and enables calibration of findings <ref:2510.15612#pg17>. Archival datasets inherit strong archival properties allowing records to be replayed via deterministic chain indexers or stored in content-addressed systems <ref:2510.15612#pg17>. Two artifacts matter most for archival purposes: market semantics, including topic and resolution rules, and market data such as trading volume and outcome share supply <ref:2510. p. 215612#pg17>. A useful tool that does not exist yet could use on-chain data to replay a past market at each timestamp to avoid hindsight bias <ref:2510.15612#pg17>.

Conclusion on Design Trade-offs

The modular framework aims to illustrate the trade-offs between different design choices, showing how systems like Polymarket deviate from earlier designs like Truthcoin and Augur v1 <ref:2510.15612#pg3>. The taxonomy helps identify recurring failure modes and operational problems related to decentralization, usability, and correctness of resolution <ref:2510. p. 115612#pg7>. The authors conclude that a DePM will likely use a hybrid or chained approach that does not rely on a single method for resolution <ref:2510. p. 015612#pg16>.

List of DePMs

The paper lists twenty notable projects in Appendix A, including Bets of Bitcoin, Truthcoin / Bitcoin Hivemind, Augur, Gnosis, and Polymarket <ref:2510.15612#pg21>. These examples illustrate the evolution from centralized event wagering systems to modern decentralized prediction markets <ref:2510. p. 215612#pg21>. The list includes active systems like Omen and BetMoose alongside projects that have been abandoned or pivoted. p. 1

Market Microstructure Details

The paper delves into microstructure topics, including how shares are structured, traded, and settled <ref:2510.15612#pg3>. It discusses the behavior of outcome shares in AMMs versus typical crypto-assets due to constraints like the price being strictly bounded between 0 and 1 <ref:2510.15612#pg14>. Research Gap 7 notes that adapting AMMs to these unique constraints is an early stage <ref:2510. p. 615612#pg14>. Arbitrageurs ensure market prices are consistent across shares, such as in a WTA market or between Yes/No bundles <ref:2510. p. 915612#pg6>. The paper also addresses the Maximum Extracted Value (MEV) problem and order-flow privacy in on-chain DePMs <ref:2510. p. 115612#pg9>.

Key Definitions

The paper provides formal definitions for an Event contract, a Prediction market system, and System Axioms governing issuance, transfer, and settlement <ref:2510.15612#pg7>. Definition 1 defines an Event contract as a tuple C = (omega, J, R, tres) specifying the outcome space and payoff rules <ref:2510. p. 515612#pg7>. Definition 3 outlines System Axioms requiring Treasury to be greater than or equal to the worst-case liability L(Q) <ref:2510. p. 515612#pg7>. These axioms ensure solvency and define how operations that change supplies must preserve solvency <ref:2510. p. 515612#pg7>.

Final Insight on Solvency

Insight 5 states that a prediction market has no need to fight against paying out a bet the way bookmakers have in practice because solvency can be demonstrated directly from blockchain data <ref:2510.15612#pg18>. The share structure ensures the operator has zero risk or predetermined bounded risk, making it financially indifferent to making any fair payout <ref:2510. p. 815612#pg18>. This contrasts with traditional bookmakers who must maintain sufficient collateral for all outcomes at all times <ref:2510. p. 215612#pg4>.

Final Conclusion

The paper provides a modular framework useful for comparing systems and uncovering unsolved research problems in DePMs <ref:2510.15612#pg7>. The taxonomy does not identify a single best design but helps illustrate the trade-offs between them <ref:2510. p. 015612#pg18>. The overall goal is to provide a learning resource for those wanting to catch up on DePMs <ref:2510.15612#pg18>. This systemization of knowledge (SoK) paper provides a comprehensive review of the history and current state of DePM design <ref:2510. p. 015612#pg2>. The authors acknowledge support from NSERC, Raymond Chabot Grant Thornton, and the AMF through a Discovery Grant <ref:2510. p. 015612#pg18>.

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Improvements for AI systems

  1. Automated bookmaking can be improved by incorporating a constant product rule to create an Automated Market Maker that mimics prediction market trading behavior, as AMMs are problematic for prediction market trading because the price is strictly bounded between 0 and 1, the value of a share can jump to 0 or 1 nearinstantly when an event outcome is finalized.

  2. Market topic moderation can be enhanced by implementing machine-checkable predicate specifications, allowing model checking to eliminate ambiguities, corner cases, and loopholes in market definitions.

  3. Resolution mechanisms can be made more robust by using hybrid or chained approaches that combine designated arbiters with crowdsourced votes to handle contentious outcomes, as a DePM will probably use a hybrid or chained approach that does not rely on a single method.

  4. Trading systems can benefit from incorporating negRisk gadgets to encourage price parity between equivalent positions and quantify their improvements for execution costs, addressing the research gap regarding how they encourage price parity.

  5. Archiving can be improved by developing a useful tool that uses on-chain data, API data, and external data (news, social media, etc.) to replay a past market, enabling researchers to avoid hindsight bias from revised data or retrospectively curated search results.

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