Equilibria in routing games with connected autonomous vehicles may not be strong, as exclusive clubs may form
cs.GT, cs.MA
Submitted: 2025-10-14
Updated: 2026-10-29
License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
The gist: User Equilibrium (UE) is the standard representation of the so-called routing game in which drivers adjust their route choices to arrive at their destinations as fast as possible.
Terminology
Abstract
User Equilibrium (UE) is the standard representation of the so-called routing game in which drivers adjust their route choices to arrive at their destinations as fast as possible. Asking whether UE is strong has, so far, been meaningless for human drivers, who do not form coalitions because of technical and behavioral constraints. Here, we demonstrate that this will not necessarily hold for Connected Autonomous Vehicles (CAVs), which can communicate and collaborate to form routing coalitions by exploiting adaptive signal control. Within game-theoretical formulations of Nash Equilibria, we provide a methodological framework and report the novel phenomena through a carefully designed toy-network example, in which we identify so-called clubs emerging in different CAV penetration rates and adaptive traffic-light configurations. We detail one such club where three CAVs deviate from the UE and benefit (arrive faster). The formation of such a club has negative consequences for other users (who are not invited to join and must now travel longer) and for the system (making it suboptimal and disequilibrated), thereby triggering adaptation dynamics. These findings raise questions about equity in future mixed-autonomy traffic systems.
Sources
- Wardropian Cycles make traffic assignment both optimal and fair by eliminating price-of-anarchy with Cyclical User Equilibrium for compliant connected autonomous vehicles
- Learning How to Dynamically Route Autonomous Vehicles on Shared Roads
- Collaboration Between the City and Machine Learning Community is Crucial to Efficient Autonomous Vehicles Routing
Related papers
- How Many Votes is a Lie Worth? Measuring Strategyproofness through Resource Augmentation
- Effective Horizons for Prophet Inequalities with Discounted I.I.D. Rewards
- Truthful-in-Expectation Mechanism with Constant Maximin-Share Guarantee
- The Power of Recruiting the Smaller Side: Two Additional Traders Suffice in Two-Sided Markets
- From signaling to interviews in random matching markets
- Optimizing Social Utility in Sequential Experiments