Semiparametric Identification of the Discount Factor and Payoff Function in Dynamic Discrete Choice Models
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Introduction to the show: ident: Economics. The day in economics: theory, mechanisms and the evidence beneath them.
Ruth: We're looking at the paper: "Semiparametric Identification of the Discount Factor and Payoff Function in Dynamic Discrete Choice Models".
Warren: Here's the gist of the paper. This paper investigates how the discount factor and payoff functions can be identified in stationary infinite-horizon dynamic discrete choice models because common nonparametric assumptions on per-period payoffs provide substantial identification power for the discount factor.
Ruth: Identification in Single-Agent Models The authors demonstrate that common nonparametric assumptions on per-period payoffs—such as homogeneity of degree one, monotonicity, concavity, and zero cross-differences or complementarity—generate equality and inequality restrictions with substantial identifying power.
Warren: These restrictions take the form of polynomial equalities and inequalities with degrees bounded by the cardinality of the state space.
Ruth: These restrictions also identify payoff functions under standard normalization at one action.
Paper summary: Ruth: To recap this paper, "Semiparametric Identification of the Discount Factor and Payoff Function in Dynamic Discrete Choice Models," it investigates how to identify the discount factor and payoff functions within stationary infinite-horizon dynamic discrete choice models. The thesis is that standard non-parametric assumptions about per-period payoffs—things like homogeneity, monotonicity, concavity, and zero cross-differences—provide identifying restrictions on the discount factor <ref:2507.19814#pg1>.
Warren: They claim these restrictions translate into polynomial equalities and inequalities with degrees bounded by the size of the state space <ref:2507.19814#pg3>. This is a way to limit the possibilities for that discount factor, which is usually what we want when estimating parameters.
Iris: And they also show that these restrictions can identify the payoff functions under a standard normalization applied to just one action <ref:2507.19814#pg1>. That means you don't even have to guess the shape of the utility function if you have these payoff restrictions in place.
Ruth: And they extend this analysis into dynamic game models, using assumptions such as irrelevance of other firms’ lagged actions and exchangeability <ref:2507.19814#pg3>. This addresses a gap because most prior work has focused only on single-agent settings <ref:2507.19814#pg3>.
Warren: So, the main takeaway is that leveraging these theoretically grounded shape restrictions, when paired with finite-set identification, allows researchers to achieve point identification or at least identify a small set of values for the discount factor <ref:2507.19814#pg3>.
Conclusion: Ruth: So wrapping up this paper on "Semiparametric Identification of the Discount Factor and Payoff Function in Dynamic Discrete Choice Models," what it really means is that we don't need to guess the exact functional form of agents' payoffs to figure out how much they value future things.
Warren: They show that just by assuming standard properties like homogeneity or zero cross-differences, we get concrete mathematical constraints—polynomial equalities and inequalities—that nail down the discount factor <ref:2507.19814#pg3>.
Iris: And they extend this to dynamic games too, showing that firm-specific discount factors can be identified using assumptions about other players' behavior and exchangeability <ref:2507.19814#pg3>. This is important because it broadens the scope beyond just single agents.
Ruth: In simple terms, the paper shows that common economic assumptions about how people behave over time provide a solid mathematical framework for identifying key parameters like the discount factor without needing to specify complicated payoff functions <ref:2507.19814#pg3>.
Yu Hao, Hiroyuki Kasahara, Katsumi Shimotsu
University of Hong Kong · Vancouver School of Economics · University of Tokyo
econ.EM
Submitted: 2025-07-26
Updated: 2026-11-08
License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Importance score: 90/100
The gist: This paper investigates how the discount factor and payoff functions can be identified in stationary infinite-horizon dynamic discrete choice models because common nonparametric assumptions on…
Key concepts
- Nonparametric Assumptions on Payoffs
- These are broad assumptions about how per-period payoffs behave without specifying an exact mathematical formula. Examples include homogeneity (payoffs scaling predictably with state variables) or zero cross-differences (no interaction between certain state variables). These assumptions create mathematical constraints that help narrow down the possible values for the discount factor.
- Identification Restrictions
- These are the specific mathematical equations and inequalities derived from the nonparametric payoff assumptions. They take the form of polynomial equalities (e.g., $r^T_1 U = c_1$) or inequalities (e.g., $r^T_2 U eq c_2$). These restrictions are powerful because they limit the possible solutions for the discount factor, allowing for its precise identification.
- Finite Dependence
- This concept relates to simplifying dynamic models by assuming that the dependence of a decision in one period only extends over a finite number of previous periods ($ ho$). By focusing on this finite dependence, researchers can reduce the complexity of identifying polynomial restrictions from high degrees to lower, more manageable orders.
- Dynamic Game Assumptions
- When applied to games (multiple firms), identification relies on assumptions about how firms interact. Key assumptions include the irrelevance of other firms' lagged actions and exchangeability. These conditions help derive systems of polynomial inequalities that can uniquely identify firm-specific discount factors.
Terminology
Summary
This paper investigates how the discount factor and payoff functions can be identified in stationary infinite-horizon dynamic discrete choice models because common nonparametric assumptions on per-period payoffs provide substantial identification power for the discount factor. p. 0 jp
July 24, 2025
Abstract
This paper investigates how the discount factor and payoff functions can be identified in
stationary infinite-horizon dynamic discrete choice models. In single-agent models, we show
that common nonparametric assumptions on per-period payoffs—such as homogeneity of degree
one, monotonicity, concavity, zero cross-differences, and complementarity—provide identifying
restrictions on the discount factor.Where the paper says it
Identification in Single-Agent Models
The authors demonstrate that common nonparametric assumptions on per-period payoffs—such as homogeneity of degree one, monotonicity, concavity, and zero cross-differences or complementarity—generate equality and inequality restrictions with substantial identifying power. These restrictions take the form of polynomial equalities and inequalities with degrees bounded by the cardinality of the state space. p. 0 In single-agent models, we show
that common nonparametric assumptions on per-period payoffs—such as homogeneity of degree
one, monotonicity, concavity, zero cross-differences, and complementarity—provide identifying
restrictions on the discount factor. These restrictions take the form of polynomial equalities and
inequalities with degrees bounded by the cardinality of the state space. These restrictions take the form of polynomial equalities and
inequalities with degrees bounded by the cardinality of the state space. These restrictions also
identify payoff functions under standard normalization at one action.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Identification in Dynamic Game Models
In dynamic game models, firm-specific discount factors can be identified using assumptions such as irrelevance of other firms’ lagged actions, exchangeability, and the independence of adjustment costs from other firms’ actions in period payoff functions. The authors also establish identification when discount factors vary heterogeneously across agents. p. 2 In addition to extending our identification
results from the single-agent to the multi-agent setting, we show that nonparametric assumptions
commonly used in empirical model of dynamic games—such as the irrelevance of other firms’ lagged
actions, the exchangeability of other firms’ actions, and the independence of adjustment costs of
changing states (e. , entry costs) from other firms’ actions in period payoff functions—provide
equality restrictions that facilitate identification of the discount factor in multi-agent settings We
also establish identification when discount factors vary heterogeneously across agents.Where the paper says it
Economic Restrictions on Per-Period Payoffs
The paper presents several examples of per-period payoff functions that lead to the restrictions discussed in the previous section. These commonly used restrictions translate into equality and inequality constraints of the form r T 1 U = c 1 or r T 2 U ≥ c 2. p. 8 In many applied economic models, payoff functions
satisfy nonparametric restrictions such as monotonicity, concavity, and homogeneity of degree ν;
see Matzkin (1992, Section 5) for examples. These commonly used restrictions translate into equality and inequality constraints of the form r
⊤
1 U = c1 or r
⊤
2 U ≥ c2.Where the paper says it
** Equality restrictions based on homogeneity assumptions:**
Example 1 (Homogeneous of degree ν function with known ν) implies Jz(L − 1) linear equality restrictions on U because, for each z ∈ Z and l = 2,..., L, uk(λlwe, z) − λ nu uk(we, z) = 0. p. 9 To define
homogeneity formally, we assume that uk(w, z) is well-defined at L points (we , λ2we , . , λLwe ) ∈ W
for some λ2, .Where the paper says it
Example 2 (Log transfomation of homogeneous function of degree ν) provides Jz(L − 2) restrictions on U because, for each z ∈ Z and l = 3,. p. 9 , L,
uk(λℓwe , z) − λ
ν
ℓ uk(we , z) = 0. Example 2 (Log transfomation of homogeneous function of degree ν). This provides Jz(L − 2) restrictions on U because, for each z ∈ Z and ℓ = 3, . , L,
uk(λℓwe , z) − uk(we , z)
log λℓ
−
uk(λ2we , z) − uk(we , z)
log λ2
= 0.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
** Equality restrictions based on zero cross-difference assumptions:**
Example 4 (Zero cross-difference with respect to two state variables) provides (Wa − 1) · (Za − 1) restrictions.
Finite Dependence Results
The authors introduce the concept of finite dependence and demonstrate that it can substantially reduce the computational cost of dynamic discrete choice models. For brevity, they focus on a single action (K) ρ-period dependence, showing that this finite dependence reduces the degree of the identifying polynomial to ρ. p. 3 Section 4 provides examples
of restrictions on per-period payoff functions that aid identification. Section 5 discusses finite
dependence results.Where the paper says it
Identification in Dynamic Games
The analysis extends to dynamic games by using assumptions such as the irrelevance of other firms’ lagged actions, exchangeability, and independence of adjustment costs from other firms’ actions in period payoff functions. The authors derive a system of q3 polynomial inequalities of degree mx when combining equality and inequality restrictions with finite dependence. p. 8 Suppose Assumption 2 holds. Then, the identified set of β is the intersection of
the interval [0, 1) and the set of solutions to the following system of q2 polynomial inequalities of
degree J:
det (I − βQK) c2 + det (I − βQK) R2Ψ − R2Q(β) adj(I − βQK)ψK ≤ 0.Where the paper says it
Numerical Example Application
A numerical example using a dynamic entry model demonstrates the application of these identifying restrictions to show that either the homogeneity assumption or the zero cross-difference assumption alone is sufficient to achieve point identification of the discount factor without explicitly specifying the parametric form of the payoff function. The results for firm 1 and 2 in Figure 4 and Figure 5 indicate that all curves intersect the horizontal axis at the true value of β, 0. p. 0 In dynamic game models,
we show that firm-specific discount factors can be identified using assumptions such as irrelevance
of other firms’ lagged actions, exchangeability, and the independence of adjustment costs from
other firms’ actions. Our results demonstrate that widely used nonparametric assumptions in
economic analysis can provide substantial identifying power in dynamic structural models. These restrictions also
identify payoff functions under standard normalization at one action. In dynamic game models,
we show that firm-specific discount factors can be identified using assumptions such as irrelevance
of other firms’ lagged actions, exchangeability, and the independence of adjustment costs from
other firms’ actions. These restrictions also
identify payoff functions under standard normalization at one action. In dynamic game models,
we show that firm-specific discount factors can be identified using assumptions such as irrelevance
of other firms’ lagged actions, exchangeability, and the independence of adjustment costs from
other firms’ actions. These restrictions also
identify payoff functions under standard normalization at one action. In dynamic game models,
we show that firm-specific discount factors can be identified using assumptions such as irrelevance
of other firms’ lagged actions, exchangeability, and the independence of adjustment costs from
other firms’ actions. These restrictions also
identify payoff functions under standard normalization at one action. In dynamic game models,
we show that firm-specific discount factors can be identified using assumptions such as irrelevance
of other firms’ lagged actions, exchangeability, and the independence of adjustment costs from
other firms’ actions. These restrictions also
identify payoff functions under standard normalization at one action. In dynamic game models,
we show that firm-specific discount factors can be identified using assumptions such as irrelevance
of other firms’ lagged actions, exchangeability, and the independence of adjustment costs from
other firms’ actions. These restrictions also
identify payoff functions under standard normalization at one action. In dynamic game models,
we show that firm-specific discount factors can be identified using assumptions such as irrelevance
of other firms’ lagged actions, exchangeability, and the independence of adjustment costs from
other firms’ actions.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Conclusion
The paper shows that commonly used nonparametric assumptions on per-period payoffs—such as homogeneity, monotonicity, concavity, and zero crossdifferences—provide substantial identification power for the discount factor. Leveraging these nonparametric shape restrictions, they derive equality and inequality constraints in the form of finite-order polynomial equations that characterize the identified set. p. 2 Matzkin, 1992, 1994)—generate equality
and inequality restrictions with substantial identifying power. Our identification strategy leverages nonparametric shape restrictions grounded in economic theory, which, when combined with
the finite-set identification discussed above, enables researchers to achieve point identification or
obtain an identified set containing only a small number of points without imposing arbitrary parametric assumptions on the payoff function. Matzkin, 1992, 1994)—generate equality
and inequality restrictions with substantial identifying power. Our identification strategy leverages nonparametric shape restrictions grounded in economic theory, which, when combined with
the finite-set identification discussed above, enables researchers to achieve point identification or
obtain an identified set containing only a small number of points without imposing arbitrary parametric assumptions on the payoff function. In dynamic game models,
we show that firm-specific discount factors can be identified using assumptions such as irrelevance
of other firms’ lagged actions, exchangeability, and the independence of adjustment costs from
other firms’ actions. Our results demonstrate that widely used nonparametric assumptions in
economic analysis can provide substantial identifying power in dynamic structural models. In dynamic game models,
we show that firm-specific discount factors can be identified using assumptions such as irrelevance
of other firms’ lagged actions, exchangeability, and the independence of adjustment costs from
other firms’ actions. Our results demonstrate that widely used nonparametric assumptions in
economic analysis can provide substantial identifying power in dynamic structural models.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Proofs of Propositions
The proof for Proposition 5 involves augmenting equation (11) by adding the equation for action K to obtain a system that relates payoffs and value functions. The proof for Lemma 1 follows closely that of Lemma 1 in Arcidiacono and Miller (2011). p. 4 , εK are independently drawn from
type-I extreme value distribution, then ψk(p(x)) = γ − ln(pk(x)), where γ is Euler’s constant. 4
3Arcidiacono and Miller (2011) assume g(ε|x) = g(ε), but their proof of Lemma 1 remains valid even if g depends
on x.Where the paper says it
The numerical example uses a dynamic entry model where the true value of the discount factor is set to β = 0.95. The analysis shows that the inequality restrictions based on Assumptions 8, 9, and 13 also imply the bound β ≤ 1. p. 9 1 Equality restrictions based on homogeneity assumptions
We first consider the case in which the payoff function uk(w, z) is homogeneous in w. To define
homogeneity formally, we assume that uk(w, z) is well-defined at L points (we , λ2we , . (2020) sharpen the result of Abbring and Daljord
(2020) by showing that the cardinality of the identified set is no greater than that of the state
space. Other studies impose assumptions such as linearity in parameters of the payoff function
1Reviewing past studies, Frederick et al.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
The paper studies the identification of discount factors and payoff functions in standard stationary infinite-horizon dynamic discrete choice models. The authors show that commonly used nonparametric assumptions on per-period payoffs—such as homogeneity, monotonicity, concavity, and zero crossdifferences—provide substantial identification power for the discount factor. p. 0 jp
July 24, 2025
Abstract
This paper investigates how the discount factor and payoff functions can be identified in
stationary infinite-horizon dynamic discrete choice models. In single-agent models, we show
that common nonparametric assumptions on per-period payoffs—such as homogeneity of degree
one, monotonicity, concavity, zero cross-differences, and complementarity—provide identifying
restrictions on the discount factor.Where the paper says it
References
Abbring, J. p. 0 Keywords: Dynamic discrete choice models; semiparametric identification; concavity; homogeneity of degree one; monotonicity, exchangeability. ∗The authors thank Jaap Abbring for his detailed and insightful comments on an earlier version of the paper. The identification of the discount factor has gained increasing attention in dynamic structural
models. Abbring and Daljord (2020) demonstrate that an exclusion restriction—requiring the payoff
function to take the same value at two different action-state pairs—can identify the discount factor
in single-agent dynamic discrete choice models up to a countable set of solutions to an infiniteorder polynomial equation. Semiparametric Identification of the Discount Factor
and Payoff Function in Dynamic Discrete Choice
Models∗
Yu Hao
Faculty of Business and Economics
University of Hong Kong
haoyu@hku. hk
Hiroyuki Kasahara
Vancouver School of Economics
University of British Columbia
hkasahar@mail.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Abbring, J. H., Daljord, Ø. p. 1 The identification of the discount factor has gained increasing attention in dynamic structural
models. Abbring and Daljord (2020) demonstrate that an exclusion restriction—requiring the payoff
function to take the same value at two different action-state pairs—can identify the discount factor
in single-agent dynamic discrete choice models up to a countable set of solutions to an infiniteorder polynomial equation. jp
July 24, 2025
Abstract
This paper investigates how the discount factor and payoff functions can be identified in
stationary infinite-horizon dynamic discrete choice models. In single-agent models, we show
that common nonparametric assumptions on per-period payoffs—such as homogeneity of degree
one, monotonicity, concavity, zero cross-differences, and complementarity—provide identifying
restrictions on the discount factor.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Aguirregabiria, V. p. 2 (2020) pioneer a characterization of the identified set for the
discount factor as the solution set to polynomial equations. In the context of dynamic games,
Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) and Pakes et al. (2020) pioneer a characterization of the identified set for the
discount factor as the solution set to polynomial equations. In the context of dynamic games,
Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) and Pakes et al. To the best of our knowledge, shape restrictions on the payoff function have not yet been leveraged for identification in
models of dynamic games with incomplete information. Monotonicity restrictions have been widely used for identification in various nonlinear and
nonseparable econometric models, though a comprehensive review is beyond the scope of this
paper.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Aguirregabiria, V. and Mira, P. p. 2 (2020) pioneer a characterization of the identified set for the
discount factor as the solution set to polynomial equations. In the context of dynamic games,
Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) and Pakes et al. In the context of dynamic games,
Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) and Pakes et al. (2007) develop tractable estimation methods in
multi-agent settings.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Allen, R. and Rehbeck, J. p. 3 Matzkin (1994) reviews the literature on nonparametric identification and
estimation grounded in economically motivated restrictions. Allen and Rehbeck (2019) use a variant
of Slutsky symmetry to nonparametrically identify latent utility models with additively separable
unobservable heterogeneity. Matzkin (1994) reviews the literature on nonparametric identification and
estimation grounded in economically motivated restrictions. Allen and Rehbeck (2019) use a variant
of Slutsky symmetry to nonparametrically identify latent utility models with additively separable
unobservable heterogeneity.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Altu˘g, S. p. 2 These restrictions also point or set identify the payoff
function itself because the payoff function is identified once the discount factor is identified. Furthermore, as in Abbring and Daljord (2020), the cardinality of the identified set for β is at most
ρ when the model exhibits ρ-finite dependence (Altu˘g and Miller, 1998; Arcidiacono and Miller,
2011). Due to this non-identification result, most empirical studies of dynamic choice models assume
that the annualized value of the discount factor is known and fix its value between 0. ,
Hendel and Nevo, 2006; Ryan, 2012; Collard-Wexler, 2013; Igami and Uetake, 2020; Miller et al. Due to this non-identification result, most empirical studies of dynamic choice models assume
that the annualized value of the discount factor is known and fix its value between 0. ,
Hendel and Nevo, 2006; Ryan, 2012; Collard-Wexler, 2013; Igami and Uetake, 2020; Miller et al. Due to this non-identification result, most empirical studies of dynamic choice models assume
that the annualized value of the discount factor is known and fix its value between 0. ,
Hendel and Nevo, 2006; Ryan, 2012; Collard-Wexler, 2013; Igami and Uetake, 2020; Miller et al.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Arcidiacono, P. p. 2 These restrictions also point or set identify the payoff
function itself because the payoff function is identified once the discount factor is identified. Furthermore, as in Abbring and Daljord (2020), the cardinality of the identified set for β is at most
ρ when the model exhibits ρ-finite dependence (Altu˘g and Miller, 1998; Arcidiacono and Miller,
2011). Our analysis builds on and extends several strands of literature. The conditional choice probability approach of Hotz and Miller (1993) provides a foundational framework for analyzing dynamic
discrete choice models without solving for the full solution.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
— (2020), “Identifying Dynamic Discrete Choice Models Off Short Panels,” Journal of Econometrics, 215, 473–485. p. 0 jp
July 24, 2025
Abstract
This paper investigates how the discount factor and payoff functions can be identified in
stationary infinite-horizon dynamic discrete choice models. In single-agent models, we show
that common nonparametric assumptions on per-period payoffs—such as homogeneity of degree
one, monotonicity, concavity, zero cross-differences, and complementarity—provide identifying
restrictions on the discount factor.Where the paper says it
Bajari, P., Benkard, C. L., and Levin, J. (2007), “Estimating dynamic models of imperfect competition,” Econometrica, 75, 1331–1370. p. 2 (2020) pioneer a characterization of the identified set for the
discount factor as the solution set to polynomial equations. In the context of dynamic games,
Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) and Pakes et al.Where the paper says it
Bajari, P., Chu, C. S., Nekipelov, D., and Park, M. (2016), “Identification and Semiparametric Estimation of a Finite Horizon Dynamic Discrete Choice Model With a Terminating Action,” Quantitative Marketing and Economics, 14, 271–323. p. 0 Semiparametric Identification of the Discount Factor
and Payoff Function in Dynamic Discrete Choice
Models∗
Yu Hao
Faculty of Business and Economics
University of Hong Kong
haoyu@hku. hk
Hiroyuki Kasahara
Vancouver School of Economics
University of British Columbia
hkasahar@mail.Where the paper says it
Benkard, C. L., Jeziorski, P., and Weintraub, G. Y. (2015), “Oblivious Equilibrium for Concentrated Industries,” The RAND Journal of Economics, 46, 671–708. p. 0 Semiparametric Identification of the Discount Factor
and Payoff Function in Dynamic Discrete Choice
Models∗
Yu Hao
Faculty of Business and Economics
University of Hong Kong
haoyu@hku. hk
Hiroyuki Kasahara
Vancouver School of Economics
University of British Columbia
hkasahar@mail.Where the paper says it
Berry, S. and Tamer, E. p. 3 In two-player binary choice games of complete information, shape restrictions such as strategic
substitutability have been used for identification. Berry and Tamer (2006) demonstrate that the
payoff function and the distribution of unobservable heterogeneity are nonparametrically identified
when the players’ actions are strategic substitutes. 1 Introduction
Dynamic discrete choice models are fundamental tools in empirical economics, providing a framework for analyzing forward-looking decision-making in contexts ranging from labor supply and
human capital investment to firm entry/exit and technology adoption. While these models have
proven valuable for policy analysis, a key identification challenge lies in disentangling the discount
factor from other model primitives. (2018) provide excellent surveys. See also Imbens
and Angrist (1994), Chesher (2003), Matzkin (2008), Imbens and Newey (2009), Shi et al. Semiparametric Identification of the Discount Factor
and Payoff Function in Dynamic Discrete Choice
Models∗
Yu Hao
Faculty of Business and Economics
University of Hong Kong
haoyu@hku. hk
Hiroyuki Kasahara
Vancouver School of Economics
University of British Columbia
hkasahar@mail.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Chesher, A. p. 3 (2018) provide excellent surveys. See also Imbens
and Angrist (1994), Chesher (2003), Matzkin (2008), Imbens and Newey (2009), Shi et al. To the best of our knowledge, shape restrictions on the payoff function have not yet been leveraged for identification in
models of dynamic games with incomplete information. Monotonicity restrictions have been widely used for identification in various nonlinear and
nonseparable econometric models, though a comprehensive review is beyond the scope of this
paper.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Chetverikov, D. p. 3 Monotonicity restrictions have been widely used for identification in various nonlinear and
nonseparable econometric models, though a comprehensive review is beyond the scope of this
paper. Matzkin (2013) and Chetverikov et al. To the best of our knowledge, shape restrictions on the payoff function have not yet been leveraged for identification in
models of dynamic games with incomplete information. Monotonicity restrictions have been widely used for identification in various nonlinear and
nonseparable econometric models, though a comprehensive review is beyond the scope of this
paper.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Ching, A. T. and Osborne, M. p. 1 1 Empirical studies that estimate the discount
factor also reveal that optimal pricing, investment choices, and other forward-looking choices could
be sensitive to the value of the discount factor. Accurately capturing individuals’ actual time
preferences, especially greater impatience, can therefore significantly change conclusions about the
impact of counterfactual policy interventions, compared to models under the conventional discount
factor value (Ching and Osborne, 2019). 1 Introduction
Dynamic discrete choice models are fundamental tools in empirical economics, providing a framework for analyzing forward-looking decision-making in contexts ranging from labor supply and
human capital investment to firm entry/exit and technology adoption. While these models have
proven valuable for policy analysis, a key identification challenge lies in disentangling the discount
factor from other model primitives. , 2012; Chung et al. , 2014; Gayle and
Tomlin, 2018; De Groote and Verboven, 2019; Kong et al.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Chou, C., Ridder, G., and Shi, R. p. 3 (2018) provide excellent surveys. See also Imbens
and Angrist (1994), Chesher (2003), Matzkin (2008), Imbens and Newey (2009), Shi et al. Matzkin (1992) shows that binary threshold
crossing and binary choice models can be identified without imposing parametric restrictions on
either the utility function or the distribution of the unobservable term by employing such shape
restrictions. Matzkin (1993) extends this approach to polychotomous choice models, while Matzkin
(1991) develops a semiparametric estimation method for these models under monotonicity and
concavity assumptions.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Chung, D. J., Steenburgh, T., and Sudhir, K., “Do Bonuses Enhance Sales Productivity? A Dynamic Structural Analysis of Bonus-Based Compensation Plans,” Marketing Science, 33, 165–187. p. 0 In dynamic game models,
we show that firm-specific discount factors can be identified using assumptions such as irrelevance
of other firms’ lagged actions, exchangeability, and the independence of adjustment costs from
other firms’ actions. Our results demonstrate that widely used nonparametric assumptions in
economic analysis can provide substantial identifying power in dynamic structural models.Where the paper says it
Collard-Wexler, A. p. 1 Due to this non-identification result, most empirical studies of dynamic choice models assume
that the annualized value of the discount factor is known and fix its value between 0. ,
Hendel and Nevo, 2006; Ryan, 2012; Collard-Wexler, 2013; Igami and Uetake, 2020; Miller et al. Due to this non-identification result, most empirical studies of dynamic choice models assume
that the annualized value of the discount factor is known and fix its value between 0. ,
Hendel and Nevo, 2006; Ryan, 2012; Collard-Wexler, 2013; Igami and Uetake, 2020; Miller et al.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
De Groote, O. p. 1 , 2012; Chung et al. , 2014; Gayle and
Tomlin, 2018; De Groote and Verboven, 2019; Kong et al. , 2012; Chung et al. , 2014; Gayle and
Tomlin, 2018; De Groote and Verboven, 2019; Kong et al. 1 Introduction
Dynamic discrete choice models are fundamental tools in empirical economics, providing a framework for analyzing forward-looking decision-making in contexts ranging from labor supply and
human capital investment to firm entry/exit and technology adoption. While these models have
proven valuable for policy analysis, a key identification challenge lies in disentangling the discount
factor from other model primitives.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Dunker, F., Hoderlein, S., Kaido, H., and Sherman, R. (2018), “Nonparametric Identification of the Distribution of Random Coefficients in Binary Response Static Games of Complete Information,” Journal of Econometrics, 206, 83–102. p. 3 (2018) study a model with random coefficients and establish the
identification of their joint distribution under strategic substitutability. To the best of our knowledge, shape restrictions on the payoff function have not yet been leveraged for identification in
models of dynamic games with incomplete information.Where the paper says it
Ericson, R. and Pakes, A. p. 2 (2020) pioneer a characterization of the identified set for the
discount factor as the solution set to polynomial equations. In the context of dynamic games,
Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) and Pakes et al. 1 Introduction
Dynamic discrete choice models are fundamental tools in empirical economics, providing a framework for analyzing forward-looking decision-making in contexts ranging from labor supply and
human capital investment to firm entry/exit and technology adoption. While these models have
proven valuable for policy analysis, a key identification challenge lies in disentangling the discount
factor from other model primitives.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Fowlie, M., Reguant, M., and Ryan, S. p. 1 Due to this non-identification result, most empirical studies of dynamic choice models assume
that the annualized value of the discount factor is known and fix its value between 0. ,
Hendel and Nevo, 2006; Ryan, 2012; Collard-Wexler, 2013; Igami and Uetake, 2020; Miller et al. 1 Equality restrictions based on homogeneity assumptions
We first consider the case in which the payoff function uk(w, z) is homogeneous in w. To define
homogeneity formally, we assume that uk(w, z) is well-defined at L points (we , λ2we , .Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Fox, J. T. and Lazzati, N. p. 3 Berry and Tamer (2006) demonstrate that the
payoff function and the distribution of unobservable heterogeneity are nonparametrically identified
when the players’ actions are strategic substitutes. Fox and Lazzati (2017) show that the payoff
function can be nonparametrically identified when the econometrician knows the sign of the interaction effects. Furthermore, Matzkin (2003) demonstrates that the homogeneity of
degree one restriction enables identification of models with nonadditive unobservable heterogeneity. In two-player binary choice games of complete information, shape restrictions such as strategic
substitutability have been used for identification.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Frederick, S. p. 1 (2020) sharpen the result of Abbring and Daljord
(2020) by showing that the cardinality of the identified set is no greater than that of the state
space. Other studies impose assumptions such as linearity in parameters of the payoff function
1Reviewing past studies, Frederick et al. 1 Empirical studies that estimate the discount
factor also reveal that optimal pricing, investment choices, and other forward-looking choices could
be sensitive to the value of the discount factor. Accurately capturing individuals’ actual time
preferences, especially greater impatience, can therefore significantly change conclusions about the
impact of counterfactual policy interventions, compared to models under the conventional discount
factor value (Ching and Osborne, 2019).Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Gayle, G.-L. and Tomlin, S. p. 1 , 2012; Chung et al. , 2014; Gayle and
Tomlin, 2018; De Groote and Verboven, 2019; Kong et al. Semiparametric Identification of the Discount Factor
and Payoff Function in Dynamic Discrete Choice
Models∗
Yu Hao
Faculty of Business and Economics
University of Hong Kong
haoyu@hku. hk
Hiroyuki Kasahara
Vancouver School of Economics
University of British Columbia
hkasahar@mail.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Hao, Y., “Trust Building Dynamics in Cartel Formation: A Structural Analysis,” Working Paper 4666555. p. 0 In dynamic game models,
we show that firm-specific discount factors can be identified using assumptions such as irrelevance
of other firms’ lagged actions, exchangeability, and the independence of adjustment costs from
other firms’ actions. Our results demonstrate that widely used nonparametric assumptions in
economic analysis can provide substantial identifying power in dynamic structural models.Where the paper says it
Hendel, I. and Nevo, A. p. 1 Due to this non-identification result, most empirical studies of dynamic choice models assume
that the annualized value of the discount factor is known and fix its value between 0. ,
Hendel and Nevo, 2006; Ryan, 2012; Collard-Wexler, 2013; Igami and Uetake, 2020; Miller et al. Example 1 (Homogeneous of degree ν function with known ν). Homogeneous functions are widely
used in consumer and production theory to model returns to scale, where the degree of homogeneity
ν determines whether the function exhibits increasing, constant, or decreasing returns to scale.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Hotz, V. J. and Miller, R. A., “Conditional Choice Probabilities and the Estimation of Dynamic Models,” The Review of Economic Studies, 60, 497–529. p. 1 Building on this insight, Magnac and Thesmar (2002) showed that, without
restrictions on preferences, the discount factor cannot be separately identified from current payoffs
using only conditional choice probabilities. Due to this non-identification result, most empirical studies of dynamic choice models assume
that the annualized value of the discount factor is known and fix its value between 0.Where the paper says it
Igami, M., “Estimating the Innovator’s Dilemma: Structural Analysis of Creative Destruction in the Hard Disk Drive Industry, 1981–1998,” Journal of Political Economy, 125, 798–847. p. 0 In dynamic game models,
we show that firm-specific discount factors can be identified using assumptions such as irrelevance
of other firms’ lagged actions, exchangeability, and the independence of adjustment costs from
other firms’ actions. Our results demonstrate that widely used nonparametric assumptions in
economic analysis can provide substantial identifying power in dynamic structural models.Where the paper says it
Igami, M. and Uetake, K. p. 1 Due to this non-identification result, most empirical studies of dynamic choice models assume
that the annualized value of the discount factor is known and fix its value between 0. ,
Hendel and Nevo, 2006; Ryan, 2012; Collard-Wexler, 2013; Igami and Uetake, 2020; Miller et al. 1 Introduction
Dynamic discrete choice models are fundamental tools in empirical economics, providing a framework for analyzing forward-looking decision-making in contexts ranging from labor supply and
human capital investment to firm entry/exit and technology adoption. While these models have
proven valuable for policy analysis, a key identification challenge lies in disentangling the discount
factor from other model primitives.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Imbens, G. W. and Angrist, J. p. 3 (2018) provide excellent surveys. See also Imbens
and Angrist (1994), Chesher (2003), Matzkin (2008), Imbens and Newey (2009), Shi et al. Matzkin (1993) extends this approach to polychotomous choice models, while Matzkin
(1991) develops a semiparametric estimation method for these models under monotonicity and
concavity assumptions. Matzkin (1994) reviews the literature on nonparametric identification and
estimation grounded in economically motivated restrictions.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Imbens, G. W. and Newey, W. p. 3 (2018) provide excellent surveys. See also Imbens
and Angrist (1994), Chesher (2003), Matzkin (2008), Imbens and Newey (2009), Shi et al. Matzkin (1992) shows that binary threshold
crossing and binary choice models can be identified without imposing parametric restrictions on
either the utility function or the distribution of the unobservable term by employing such shape
restrictions. Matzkin (1993) extends this approach to polychotomous choice models, while Matzkin
(1991) develops a semiparametric estimation method for these models under monotonicity and
concavity assumptions.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Kalouptsidi, M. p. 2 (2007) introduce a computationally efficient two-step estimator, and Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008) introduce an asymptotic least squares approach. Aguirregabiria and Suzuki (2014), Norets and Tang (2014), Arcidiacono and Miller (2020), and
Kalouptsidi et al. Semiparametric Identification of the Discount Factor
and Payoff Function in Dynamic Discrete Choice
Models∗
Yu Hao
Faculty of Business and Economics
University of Hong Kong
haoyu@hku. hk
Hiroyuki Kasahara
Vancouver School of Economics
University of British Columbia
hkasahar@mail.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
— (2018), “Detection and Impact of Industrial Subsidies: The Case of Chinese Shipbuilding,” The Review of Economic Studies, 85, 1111–1158. p. 1 1 Empirical studies that estimate the discount
factor also reveal that optimal pricing, investment choices, and other forward-looking choices could
be sensitive to the value of the discount factor. Accurately capturing individuals’ actual time
preferences, especially greater impatience, can therefore significantly change conclusions about the
impact of counterfactual policy interventions, compared to models under the conventional discount
factor value (Ching and Osborne, 2019).Where the paper says it
Komarova, T. p. 2 or the availability of a terminal action to achieve identification in single-agent dynamic models
(Bajari et al. , 2016; Komarova et al. ∗The authors thank Jaap Abbring for his detailed and insightful comments on an earlier version of the paper. The authors thank Tang Srisuma, participants at the LMU-Todai workshop, and seminar attendees at the National
University of Singapore and Nanyang Technological University for their valuable feedback. 1 Introduction
Dynamic discrete choice models are fundamental tools in empirical economics, providing a framework for analyzing forward-looking decision-making in contexts ranging from labor supply and
human capital investment to firm entry/exit and technology adoption. While these models have
proven valuable for policy analysis, a key identification challenge lies in disentangling the discount
factor from other model primitives.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Kong, X., Dub´e, J.-P., and Daljord, Ø. p. 1 The identification of the discount factor has gained increasing attention in dynamic structural
models. Abbring and Daljord (2020) demonstrate that an exclusion restriction—requiring the payoff
function to take the same value at two different action-state pairs—can identify the discount factor
in single-agent dynamic discrete choice models up to a countable set of solutions to an infiniteorder polynomial equation.Where the paper says it
Lau, C. P. (2024), “Sensitivity Analysis for Dynamic Discrete Choice Models,”. p. 1 (2016) and Igami (2017) investigate the sensitivity of parameter estimates to the discount factor by
conducting repeated estimations with a range of discount factors surrounding the value employed in their primary
analysis. Lau (2024) proposes a sensitivity analysis framework for dynamic discrete choice models that examines how
target parameters respond to variations in the discount factor.Where the paper says it
Magnac, T. and Thesmar, D. p. 1 Rust (1994) established a fundamental
negative result, showing that the discount factor cannot be identified in these models without additional restrictions. Building on this insight, Magnac and Thesmar (2002) showed that, without
restrictions on preferences, the discount factor cannot be separately identified from current payoffs
using only conditional choice probabilities. 1 Introduction
Dynamic discrete choice models are fundamental tools in empirical economics, providing a framework for analyzing forward-looking decision-making in contexts ranging from labor supply and
human capital investment to firm entry/exit and technology adoption. While these models have
proven valuable for policy analysis, a key identification challenge lies in disentangling the discount
factor from other model primitives.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Magnus, J. R. and Neudecker, H. p. 6 The cofactor matrix C has the same dimension as A, and its (i, j)th element is
(−1)i+jMij , where Mij is the determinant of the submatrix obtained by removing the ith row and
jth column from A. The adjoint satisfies the identity (Magnus and Neudecker, 2019, p. We assume uK = 0 as in Abbring and Daljord (2020) and Abbring et al. This normalization is common in empirical applications because the per-period payoff cannot be identified from the
model and the observed conditional choice probability alone (Magnac and Thesmar, 2002, Proposition 2), and because data on uK or V are rarely available.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Matzkin, R. p. 2 First, we demonstrate that standard nonparametric assumptions on period payoff—such as homogeneity, monotonicity, concavity, and zero cross-derivatives
or complementarity across distinct state variables (e. Matzkin, 1992, 1994)—generate equality
and inequality restrictions with substantial identifying power. Matzkin (1992) shows that binary threshold
crossing and binary choice models can be identified without imposing parametric restrictions on
either the utility function or the distribution of the unobservable term by employing such shape
restrictions. Matzkin (1993) extends this approach to polychotomous choice models, while Matzkin
(1991) develops a semiparametric estimation method for these models under monotonicity and
concavity assumptions.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
— (1992), “Nonparametric and Distribution-Free Estimation of the Binary Threshold Crossing and The Binary Choice Models,” Econometrica, 60, 239–270. p. 3 Matzkin (1992) shows that binary threshold
crossing and binary choice models can be identified without imposing parametric restrictions on
either the utility function or the distribution of the unobservable term by employing such shape
restrictions. Matzkin (1993) extends this approach to polychotomous choice models, while Matzkin
(1991) develops a semiparametric estimation method for these models under monotonicity and
concavity assumptions.Where the paper says it
— (1993), “Nonparametric Identification and Estimation of Polychotomous Choice Models,” Journal of Econometrics, 58, 137–168. p. 3 Matzkin (1993) extends this approach to polychotomous choice models, while Matzkin
(1991) develops a semiparametric estimation method for these models under monotonicity and
concavity assumptions. Matzkin (1994) reviews the literature on nonparametric identification and
estimation grounded in economically motivated restrictions.Where the paper says it
— (1994), “Restrictions of Economic Theory in Nonparametric Methods,” in Handbook of Econometrics, eds. p. 2 Matzkin, 1992, 1994)—generate equality
and inequality restrictions with substantial identifying power. Our identification strategy leverages nonparametric shape restrictions grounded in economic theory, which, when combined with
the finite-set identification discussed above, enables researchers to achieve point identification or
obtain an identified set containing only a small number of points without imposing arbitrary parametric assumptions on the payoff function.Where the paper says it
— (2003), “Nonparametric Estimation of Nonadditive Random Functions,” Econometrica, 71, 1339–1375. p. 3 Allen and Rehbeck (2019) use a variant
of Slutsky symmetry to nonparametrically identify latent utility models with additively separable
unobservable heterogeneity. Furthermore, Matzkin (2003) demonstrates that the homogeneity of
degree one restriction enables identification of models with nonadditive unobservable heterogeneity.Where the paper says it
— (2008), “Identification in Nonparametric Simultaneous Equations Models,” Econometrica, 76, 945–978. p. 0 Our results demonstrate that widely used nonparametric assumptions in
economic analysis can provide substantial identifying power in dynamic structural models. Keywords: Dynamic discrete choice models; semiparametric identification; concavity; homogeneity of degree one; monotonicity, exchangeability.Where the paper says it
Rust, J., “Optimal Replacement of GMC Bus Engines: An Empirical Model of Harold Zurcher,” Econometrica, 55, 999–1033. p. 1 This suggests that individuals and
firms may be more impatient than typically assumed. 1 Empirical studies that estimate the discount
factor also reveal that optimal pricing, investment choices, and other forward-looking choices could
be sensitive to the value of the discount factor.Where the paper says it
— (1994), “Structural Estimation of Markov Decision Processes,” in Handbook of Econometrics, eds. p. 3 Matzkin (1993) extends this approach to polychotomous choice models, while Matzkin
(1991) develops a semiparametric estimation method for these models under monotonicity and
concavity assumptions. Matzkin (1994) reviews the literature on nonparametric identification and
estimation grounded in economically motivated restrictions.Where the paper says it
Ryan, S. P., “The Costs of Environmental Regulation in a Concentrated Industry,” Econometrica, 80, 1019–1061. p. 0 These restrictions also
identify payoff functions under standard normalization at one action. In dynamic game models,
we show that firm-specific discount factors can be identified using assumptions such as irrelevance
of other firms’ lagged actions, exchangeability, and the independence of adjustment costs from
other firms’ actions.Where the paper says it
Shi, X., Shum, M., and Song, W., “Estimating Semi-parametric Panel Multinomial Choice Models using Cyclic Monotonicity,” Econometrica, 86, 737–761. p. 3 In static discrete choice and related econometric models, the literature has examined the identifying power of shape restrictions on utility functions derived from economic theory, such as monotonicity, concavity, and homogeneity of degree one. Matzkin (1992) shows that binary threshold
crossing and binary choice models can be identified without imposing parametric restrictions on
either the utility function or the distribution of the unobservable term by employing such shape
restrictions.Where the paper says it
Tauchen, G., “Finite State Markov-Chain Approximations to Univariate and Vector Autoregressions,” Economics Letters, 20, 177–181.
Yao, S., Mela, C. F., Chiang, J., and Chen, Y., “Determining Consumers’ Discount Rates with Field Studies,” Journal of Marketing Research, 49, 822–841. p. 1 Building on this insight, Magnac and Thesmar (2002) showed that, without
restrictions on preferences, the discount factor cannot be separately identified from current payoffs
using only conditional choice probabilities. Due to this non-identification result, most empirical studies of dynamic choice models assume
that the annualized value of the discount factor is known and fix its value between 0.Where the paper says it
The numerical example uses a dynamic game model where the true value of β is 0.8 for firm 1 and 0.9 for firm 2. The results in Figure 4 and Figure 5 indicate that all curves intersect the horizontal axis at the true value of β, 0. p. 3 We use “:=” to denote “equals
by definition. ” Let 1{A} denote the indicator function that takes the value one when A is true
and zero otherwise. ,
Hendel and Nevo, 2006; Ryan, 2012; Collard-Wexler, 2013; Igami and Uetake, 2020; Miller et al. However, several recent studies that explicitly estimate the discount factor report values
below the conventional lower bound of 0.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Green — the paper says it, and the page is printed. Red — no passage carries it, so treat that sentence as unverified. The same check runs on your own text: check a summary against its source, $5.
Improvements for AI systems
-
Enhance identification power in single-agent models by explicitly leveraging standard nonparametric assumptions such as homogeneity of degree one, monotonicity, concavity, and zero cross-differences to generate identifying restrictions that are
polynomial equalities and inequalities with degrees bounded by the cardinality of the state space.
-
Improve identification in dynamic game models by incorporating assumptions like
irrelevance of other firms’ lagged actions
andexchangeability
to establish equality restrictions that facilitate the identification of firm-specific discount factors, even when discount factors vary heterogeneously across agents. -
Develop a methodology for estimating discount factors below the conventional lower bound of 0.9 by utilizing exclusion restrictions, such as requiring
the payoff function to take the same value at two different action-state pairs,
which can identify the factor up to acountable set of solutions to an infinite order polynomial equation.
-
Enhance counterfactual prediction capabilities by refining estimation procedures using identification results derived from finite dependence, showing that under specific conditions, the
cardinality of the identified set of beta is no larger than rho
when action sequences lead to the same state distribution after a finite number of periods. -
Implement robust estimation procedures for multi-agent dynamic games by utilizing
Assumption 12,
which combines equality and inequality restrictions to derive a system where the identified set of discount factors is the intersection of intervals, roots of polynomials, and sets satisfying polynomial inequalities.
Abstract
This paper studies the identification of the discount factor and payoff function in stationary infinite-horizon dynamic discrete choice models. In single-agent models, we show that nonparametric assumptions on per-period payoffs implied by economic theory, such as homogeneity, monotonicity, concavity, zero cross-differences, and complementarity, yield polynomial equalities and inequalities in the discount factor. These restrictions can identify the discount factor and the payoff function without normalizing the payoff of one action. Even when the payoff function is not point identified, they may still identify the discount factor. In dynamic games, we identify firm-specific discount factors by combining the irrelevance of other firms' lagged actions with restrictions such as exchangeability, even when the scrap value is unknown. We illustrate the approach with numerical examples and an empirical application to farmers' crop choices.
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