Semiparametric Identification of the Discount Factor and Payoff Function in Dynamic Discrete Choice Models

arXiv:2507.19814 · econ.EM · Submitted 2025-07-26 · Read on arXiv

Listen

Radio episode about this paper

Transcript

Introduction to the show: ident: Economics. The day in economics: theory, mechanisms and the evidence beneath them.

Ruth: We're looking at the paper: "Semiparametric Identification of the Discount Factor and Payoff Function in Dynamic Discrete Choice Models".

Warren: Here's the gist of the paper. This paper investigates how the discount factor and payoff functions can be identified in stationary infinite-horizon dynamic discrete choice models because common nonparametric assumptions on per-period payoffs provide substantial identification power for the discount factor.

Ruth: Identification in Single-Agent Models The authors demonstrate that common nonparametric assumptions on per-period payoffs—such as homogeneity of degree one, monotonicity, concavity, and zero cross-differences or complementarity—generate equality and inequality restrictions with substantial identifying power.

Warren: These restrictions take the form of polynomial equalities and inequalities with degrees bounded by the cardinality of the state space.

Ruth: These restrictions also identify payoff functions under standard normalization at one action.

Paper summary: Ruth: To recap this paper, "Semiparametric Identification of the Discount Factor and Payoff Function in Dynamic Discrete Choice Models," it investigates how to identify the discount factor and payoff functions within stationary infinite-horizon dynamic discrete choice models. The thesis is that standard non-parametric assumptions about per-period payoffs—things like homogeneity, monotonicity, concavity, and zero cross-differences—provide identifying restrictions on the discount factor <ref:2507.19814#pg1>.

Warren: They claim these restrictions translate into polynomial equalities and inequalities with degrees bounded by the size of the state space <ref:2507.19814#pg3>. This is a way to limit the possibilities for that discount factor, which is usually what we want when estimating parameters.

Iris: And they also show that these restrictions can identify the payoff functions under a standard normalization applied to just one action <ref:2507.19814#pg1>. That means you don't even have to guess the shape of the utility function if you have these payoff restrictions in place.

Ruth: And they extend this analysis into dynamic game models, using assumptions such as irrelevance of other firms’ lagged actions and exchangeability <ref:2507.19814#pg3>. This addresses a gap because most prior work has focused only on single-agent settings <ref:2507.19814#pg3>.

Warren: So, the main takeaway is that leveraging these theoretically grounded shape restrictions, when paired with finite-set identification, allows researchers to achieve point identification or at least identify a small set of values for the discount factor <ref:2507.19814#pg3>.

Conclusion: Ruth: So wrapping up this paper on "Semiparametric Identification of the Discount Factor and Payoff Function in Dynamic Discrete Choice Models," what it really means is that we don't need to guess the exact functional form of agents' payoffs to figure out how much they value future things.

Warren: They show that just by assuming standard properties like homogeneity or zero cross-differences, we get concrete mathematical constraints—polynomial equalities and inequalities—that nail down the discount factor <ref:2507.19814#pg3>.

Iris: And they extend this to dynamic games too, showing that firm-specific discount factors can be identified using assumptions about other players' behavior and exchangeability <ref:2507.19814#pg3>. This is important because it broadens the scope beyond just single agents.

Ruth: In simple terms, the paper shows that common economic assumptions about how people behave over time provide a solid mathematical framework for identifying key parameters like the discount factor without needing to specify complicated payoff functions <ref:2507.19814#pg3>.

Yu Hao, Hiroyuki Kasahara, Katsumi Shimotsu

University of Hong Kong · Vancouver School of Economics · University of Tokyo

econ.EM

Submitted: 2025-07-26

Updated: 2026-11-08

License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

Importance score: 90/100

The gist: This paper investigates how the discount factor and payoff functions can be identified in stationary infinite-horizon dynamic discrete choice models because common nonparametric assumptions on…

Key concepts

Nonparametric Assumptions on Payoffs
These are broad assumptions about how per-period payoffs behave without specifying an exact mathematical formula. Examples include homogeneity (payoffs scaling predictably with state variables) or zero cross-differences (no interaction between certain state variables). These assumptions create mathematical constraints that help narrow down the possible values for the discount factor.
Identification Restrictions
These are the specific mathematical equations and inequalities derived from the nonparametric payoff assumptions. They take the form of polynomial equalities (e.g., $r^T_1 U = c_1$) or inequalities (e.g., $r^T_2 U eq c_2$). These restrictions are powerful because they limit the possible solutions for the discount factor, allowing for its precise identification.
Finite Dependence
This concept relates to simplifying dynamic models by assuming that the dependence of a decision in one period only extends over a finite number of previous periods ($ ho$). By focusing on this finite dependence, researchers can reduce the complexity of identifying polynomial restrictions from high degrees to lower, more manageable orders.
Dynamic Game Assumptions
When applied to games (multiple firms), identification relies on assumptions about how firms interact. Key assumptions include the irrelevance of other firms' lagged actions and exchangeability. These conditions help derive systems of polynomial inequalities that can uniquely identify firm-specific discount factors.

Terminology

Summary

This paper investigates how the discount factor and payoff functions can be identified in stationary infinite-horizon dynamic discrete choice models because common nonparametric assumptions on per-period payoffs provide substantial identification power for the discount factor. p. 0

Where the paper says it

jp July 24, 2025 Abstract This paper investigates how the discount factor and payoff functions can be identified in stationary infinite-horizon dynamic discrete choice models. In single-agent models, we show that common nonparametric assumptions on per-period payoffs—such as homogeneity of degree one, monotonicity, concavity, zero cross-differences, and complementarity—provide identifying restrictions on the discount factor.

Identification in Single-Agent Models

The authors demonstrate that common nonparametric assumptions on per-period payoffs—such as homogeneity of degree one, monotonicity, concavity, and zero cross-differences or complementarity—generate equality and inequality restrictions with substantial identifying power. These restrictions take the form of polynomial equalities and inequalities with degrees bounded by the cardinality of the state space. p. 0

Where the paper says it

In single-agent models, we show that common nonparametric assumptions on per-period payoffs—such as homogeneity of degree one, monotonicity, concavity, zero cross-differences, and complementarity—provide identifying restrictions on the discount factor. These restrictions take the form of polynomial equalities and inequalities with degrees bounded by the cardinality of the state space.

These restrictions also identify payoff functions under standard normalization at one action. p. 0
Where the paper says it

These restrictions take the form of polynomial equalities and inequalities with degrees bounded by the cardinality of the state space. These restrictions also identify payoff functions under standard normalization at one action.

Identification in Dynamic Game Models

In dynamic game models, firm-specific discount factors can be identified using assumptions such as irrelevance of other firms’ lagged actions, exchangeability, and the independence of adjustment costs from other firms’ actions in period payoff functions. The authors also establish identification when discount factors vary heterogeneously across agents. p. 2

Where the paper says it

In addition to extending our identification results from the single-agent to the multi-agent setting, we show that nonparametric assumptions commonly used in empirical model of dynamic games—such as the irrelevance of other firms’ lagged actions, the exchangeability of other firms’ actions, and the independence of adjustment costs of changing states (e. , entry costs) from other firms’ actions in period payoff functions—provide equality restrictions that facilitate identification of the discount factor in multi-agent settings We also establish identification when discount factors vary heterogeneously across agents.

Economic Restrictions on Per-Period Payoffs

The paper presents several examples of per-period payoff functions that lead to the restrictions discussed in the previous section. These commonly used restrictions translate into equality and inequality constraints of the form r T 1 U = c 1 or r T 2 U ≥ c 2. p. 8

Where the paper says it

In many applied economic models, payoff functions satisfy nonparametric restrictions such as monotonicity, concavity, and homogeneity of degree ν; see Matzkin (1992, Section 5) for examples. These commonly used restrictions translate into equality and inequality constraints of the form r ⊤ 1 U = c1 or r ⊤ 2 U ≥ c2.

** Equality restrictions based on homogeneity assumptions:**

Example 1 (Homogeneous of degree ν function with known ν) implies Jz(L − 1) linear equality restrictions on U because, for each z ∈ Z and l = 2,..., L, uk(λlwe, z) − λ nu uk(we, z) = 0. p. 9

Where the paper says it

To define homogeneity formally, we assume that uk(w, z) is well-defined at L points (we , λ2we , . , λLwe ) ∈ W for some λ2, .

Example 2 (Log transfomation of homogeneous function of degree ν) provides Jz(L − 2) restrictions on U because, for each z ∈ Z and l = 3,. p. 9

Where the paper says it

, L, uk(λℓwe , z) − λ ν ℓ uk(we , z) = 0. Example 2 (Log transfomation of homogeneous function of degree ν).

.., L, uk(λlwe, z) − uk(we, z) / log λl - uk(λ2we, z) − uk(we, z) / log λ2 = 0. p. 9
Where the paper says it

This provides Jz(L − 2) restrictions on U because, for each z ∈ Z and ℓ = 3, . , L, uk(λℓwe , z) − uk(we , z) log λℓ − uk(λ2we , z) − uk(we , z) log λ2 = 0.

** Equality restrictions based on zero cross-difference assumptions:**

Example 4 (Zero cross-difference with respect to two state variables) provides (Wa − 1) · (Za − 1) restrictions.

Finite Dependence Results

The authors introduce the concept of finite dependence and demonstrate that it can substantially reduce the computational cost of dynamic discrete choice models. For brevity, they focus on a single action (K) ρ-period dependence, showing that this finite dependence reduces the degree of the identifying polynomial to ρ. p. 3

Where the paper says it

Section 4 provides examples of restrictions on per-period payoff functions that aid identification. Section 5 discusses finite dependence results.

Identification in Dynamic Games

The analysis extends to dynamic games by using assumptions such as the irrelevance of other firms’ lagged actions, exchangeability, and independence of adjustment costs from other firms’ actions in period payoff functions. The authors derive a system of q3 polynomial inequalities of degree mx when combining equality and inequality restrictions with finite dependence. p. 8

Where the paper says it

Suppose Assumption 2 holds. Then, the identified set of β is the intersection of the interval [0, 1) and the set of solutions to the following system of q2 polynomial inequalities of degree J: det (I − βQK) c2 + det (I − βQK) R2Ψ − R2Q(β) adj(I − βQK)ψK ≤ 0.

Numerical Example Application

A numerical example using a dynamic entry model demonstrates the application of these identifying restrictions to show that either the homogeneity assumption or the zero cross-difference assumption alone is sufficient to achieve point identification of the discount factor without explicitly specifying the parametric form of the payoff function. The results for firm 1 and 2 in Figure 4 and Figure 5 indicate that all curves intersect the horizontal axis at the true value of β, 0. p. 0

Where the paper says it

In dynamic game models, we show that firm-specific discount factors can be identified using assumptions such as irrelevance of other firms’ lagged actions, exchangeability, and the independence of adjustment costs from other firms’ actions. Our results demonstrate that widely used nonparametric assumptions in economic analysis can provide substantial identifying power in dynamic structural models.

8 for firm 1 and 0. p. 0
Where the paper says it

These restrictions also identify payoff functions under standard normalization at one action. In dynamic game models, we show that firm-specific discount factors can be identified using assumptions such as irrelevance of other firms’ lagged actions, exchangeability, and the independence of adjustment costs from other firms’ actions.

p. 0
Where the paper says it

These restrictions also identify payoff functions under standard normalization at one action. In dynamic game models, we show that firm-specific discount factors can be identified using assumptions such as irrelevance of other firms’ lagged actions, exchangeability, and the independence of adjustment costs from other firms’ actions.

p. 0
Where the paper says it

These restrictions also identify payoff functions under standard normalization at one action. In dynamic game models, we show that firm-specific discount factors can be identified using assumptions such as irrelevance of other firms’ lagged actions, exchangeability, and the independence of adjustment costs from other firms’ actions.

9 for firm 2. p. 0
Where the paper says it

These restrictions also identify payoff functions under standard normalization at one action. In dynamic game models, we show that firm-specific discount factors can be identified using assumptions such as irrelevance of other firms’ lagged actions, exchangeability, and the independence of adjustment costs from other firms’ actions.

p. 0
Where the paper says it

These restrictions also identify payoff functions under standard normalization at one action. In dynamic game models, we show that firm-specific discount factors can be identified using assumptions such as irrelevance of other firms’ lagged actions, exchangeability, and the independence of adjustment costs from other firms’ actions.

p. 0
Where the paper says it

These restrictions also identify payoff functions under standard normalization at one action. In dynamic game models, we show that firm-specific discount factors can be identified using assumptions such as irrelevance of other firms’ lagged actions, exchangeability, and the independence of adjustment costs from other firms’ actions.

Conclusion

The paper shows that commonly used nonparametric assumptions on per-period payoffs—such as homogeneity, monotonicity, concavity, and zero crossdifferences—provide substantial identification power for the discount factor. Leveraging these nonparametric shape restrictions, they derive equality and inequality constraints in the form of finite-order polynomial equations that characterize the identified set. p. 2

Where the paper says it

Matzkin, 1992, 1994)—generate equality and inequality restrictions with substantial identifying power. Our identification strategy leverages nonparametric shape restrictions grounded in economic theory, which, when combined with the finite-set identification discussed above, enables researchers to achieve point identification or obtain an identified set containing only a small number of points without imposing arbitrary parametric assumptions on the payoff function.

p. 2
Where the paper says it

Matzkin, 1992, 1994)—generate equality and inequality restrictions with substantial identifying power. Our identification strategy leverages nonparametric shape restrictions grounded in economic theory, which, when combined with the finite-set identification discussed above, enables researchers to achieve point identification or obtain an identified set containing only a small number of points without imposing arbitrary parametric assumptions on the payoff function.

They further extend this analysis to dynamic games and highlight the identifying power of assumptions such as the irrelevance of other firms’ lagged actions, exchangeability, and independence of adjustment costs from other firms’ actions. p. 0
Where the paper says it

In dynamic game models, we show that firm-specific discount factors can be identified using assumptions such as irrelevance of other firms’ lagged actions, exchangeability, and the independence of adjustment costs from other firms’ actions. Our results demonstrate that widely used nonparametric assumptions in economic analysis can provide substantial identifying power in dynamic structural models.

p. 0
Where the paper says it

In dynamic game models, we show that firm-specific discount factors can be identified using assumptions such as irrelevance of other firms’ lagged actions, exchangeability, and the independence of adjustment costs from other firms’ actions. Our results demonstrate that widely used nonparametric assumptions in economic analysis can provide substantial identifying power in dynamic structural models.

Proofs of Propositions

The proof for Proposition 5 involves augmenting equation (11) by adding the equation for action K to obtain a system that relates payoffs and value functions. The proof for Lemma 1 follows closely that of Lemma 1 in Arcidiacono and Miller (2011). p. 4

Where the paper says it

, εK are independently drawn from type-I extreme value distribution, then ψk(p(x)) = γ − ln(pk(x)), where γ is Euler’s constant. 4 3Arcidiacono and Miller (2011) assume g(ε|x) = g(ε), but their proof of Lemma 1 remains valid even if g depends on x.

The numerical example uses a dynamic entry model where the true value of the discount factor is set to β = 0.95. The analysis shows that the inequality restrictions based on Assumptions 8, 9, and 13 also imply the bound β ≤ 1. p. 9

Where the paper says it

1 Equality restrictions based on homogeneity assumptions We first consider the case in which the payoff function uk(w, z) is homogeneous in w. To define homogeneity formally, we assume that uk(w, z) is well-defined at L points (we , λ2we , .

The panel titled “Linearity in Parameters” shows that all curves intersect the horizontal axis at the true value β = 0. p. 1
Where the paper says it

(2020) sharpen the result of Abbring and Daljord (2020) by showing that the cardinality of the identified set is no greater than that of the state space. Other studies impose assumptions such as linearity in parameters of the payoff function 1Reviewing past studies, Frederick et al.

95.

The paper studies the identification of discount factors and payoff functions in standard stationary infinite-horizon dynamic discrete choice models. The authors show that commonly used nonparametric assumptions on per-period payoffs—such as homogeneity, monotonicity, concavity, and zero crossdifferences—provide substantial identification power for the discount factor. p. 0

Where the paper says it

jp July 24, 2025 Abstract This paper investigates how the discount factor and payoff functions can be identified in stationary infinite-horizon dynamic discrete choice models. In single-agent models, we show that common nonparametric assumptions on per-period payoffs—such as homogeneity of degree one, monotonicity, concavity, zero cross-differences, and complementarity—provide identifying restrictions on the discount factor.

Leveraging these nonparametric shape restrictions, they derive equality and inequality constraints in the form of finite-order polynomial equations that characterize the identified set. They further extend this analysis to dynamic games and highlight the identifying power of assumptions such as the irrelevance of other firms’ lagged actions, exchangeability, and independence of adjustment costs from other firms’ actions.

References

Abbring, J. p. 0

Where the paper says it

Keywords: Dynamic discrete choice models; semiparametric identification; concavity; homogeneity of degree one; monotonicity, exchangeability. ∗The authors thank Jaap Abbring for his detailed and insightful comments on an earlier version of the paper.

H. and Daljord, Ø. p. 1
Where the paper says it

The identification of the discount factor has gained increasing attention in dynamic structural models. Abbring and Daljord (2020) demonstrate that an exclusion restriction—requiring the payoff function to take the same value at two different action-state pairs—can identify the discount factor in single-agent dynamic discrete choice models up to a countable set of solutions to an infiniteorder polynomial equation.

(2020), “Identifying the Discount Factor in Dynamic Discrete Choice Models,” Quantitative Economics, 11, 471–501. p. 0
Where the paper says it

Semiparametric Identification of the Discount Factor and Payoff Function in Dynamic Discrete Choice Models∗ Yu Hao Faculty of Business and Economics University of Hong Kong haoyu@hku. hk Hiroyuki Kasahara Vancouver School of Economics University of British Columbia hkasahar@mail.

Abbring, J. H., Daljord, Ø. p. 1

Where the paper says it

The identification of the discount factor has gained increasing attention in dynamic structural models. Abbring and Daljord (2020) demonstrate that an exclusion restriction—requiring the payoff function to take the same value at two different action-state pairs—can identify the discount factor in single-agent dynamic discrete choice models up to a countable set of solutions to an infiniteorder polynomial equation.

, and Iskhakov, F. (2020), “Identifying Present-Biased Discount Functions in Dynamic Discrete Choice Models,” arXiv preprint arXiv:2507. p. 0
Where the paper says it

jp July 24, 2025 Abstract This paper investigates how the discount factor and payoff functions can be identified in stationary infinite-horizon dynamic discrete choice models. In single-agent models, we show that common nonparametric assumptions on per-period payoffs—such as homogeneity of degree one, monotonicity, concavity, zero cross-differences, and complementarity—provide identifying restrictions on the discount factor.

07286.

Aguirregabiria, V. p. 2

Where the paper says it

(2020) pioneer a characterization of the identified set for the discount factor as the solution set to polynomial equations. In the context of dynamic games, Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) and Pakes et al.

p. 2
Where the paper says it

(2020) pioneer a characterization of the identified set for the discount factor as the solution set to polynomial equations. In the context of dynamic games, Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) and Pakes et al.

and Magesan, A. (2020), “Identification and Estimation of Dynamic Games When Players’ Beliefs Are Not in Equilibrium,” The Review of Economic Studies, 87, 582–625. p. 3
Where the paper says it

To the best of our knowledge, shape restrictions on the payoff function have not yet been leveraged for identification in models of dynamic games with incomplete information. Monotonicity restrictions have been widely used for identification in various nonlinear and nonseparable econometric models, though a comprehensive review is beyond the scope of this paper.

Aguirregabiria, V. and Mira, P. p. 2

Where the paper says it

(2020) pioneer a characterization of the identified set for the discount factor as the solution set to polynomial equations. In the context of dynamic games, Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) and Pakes et al.

(2007), “Sequential Estimation of Dynamic Discrete Games,” Econometrica, 75, 1–53. p. 2
Where the paper says it

In the context of dynamic games, Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) and Pakes et al. (2007) develop tractable estimation methods in multi-agent settings.

Allen, R. and Rehbeck, J. p. 3

Where the paper says it

Matzkin (1994) reviews the literature on nonparametric identification and estimation grounded in economically motivated restrictions. Allen and Rehbeck (2019) use a variant of Slutsky symmetry to nonparametrically identify latent utility models with additively separable unobservable heterogeneity.

(2019), “Identification with Additively Separable Heterogeneity,” Econometrica, 87, 1021–1054. p. 3
Where the paper says it

Matzkin (1994) reviews the literature on nonparametric identification and estimation grounded in economically motivated restrictions. Allen and Rehbeck (2019) use a variant of Slutsky symmetry to nonparametrically identify latent utility models with additively separable unobservable heterogeneity.

Altu˘g, S. p. 2

Where the paper says it

These restrictions also point or set identify the payoff function itself because the payoff function is identified once the discount factor is identified. Furthermore, as in Abbring and Daljord (2020), the cardinality of the identified set for β is at most ρ when the model exhibits ρ-finite dependence (Altu˘g and Miller, 1998; Arcidiacono and Miller, 2011).

and Miller, R. p. 1
Where the paper says it

Due to this non-identification result, most empirical studies of dynamic choice models assume that the annualized value of the discount factor is known and fix its value between 0. , Hendel and Nevo, 2006; Ryan, 2012; Collard-Wexler, 2013; Igami and Uetake, 2020; Miller et al.

p. 1
Where the paper says it

Due to this non-identification result, most empirical studies of dynamic choice models assume that the annualized value of the discount factor is known and fix its value between 0. , Hendel and Nevo, 2006; Ryan, 2012; Collard-Wexler, 2013; Igami and Uetake, 2020; Miller et al.

p. 1
Where the paper says it

Due to this non-identification result, most empirical studies of dynamic choice models assume that the annualized value of the discount factor is known and fix its value between 0. , Hendel and Nevo, 2006; Ryan, 2012; Collard-Wexler, 2013; Igami and Uetake, 2020; Miller et al.

A. (1998), “The Effect of Work Experience on Female Wages and Labour Supply,” The Review of Economic Studies, 65, 45–85.

Arcidiacono, P. p. 2

Where the paper says it

These restrictions also point or set identify the payoff function itself because the payoff function is identified once the discount factor is identified. Furthermore, as in Abbring and Daljord (2020), the cardinality of the identified set for β is at most ρ when the model exhibits ρ-finite dependence (Altu˘g and Miller, 1998; Arcidiacono and Miller, 2011).

and Miller, R. A. (2011), “Conditional Choice Probability Estimation of Dynamic Discrete Choice Models With Unobserved Heterogeneity,” Econometrica, 79, 1823–1867. p. 2
Where the paper says it

Our analysis builds on and extends several strands of literature. The conditional choice probability approach of Hotz and Miller (1993) provides a foundational framework for analyzing dynamic discrete choice models without solving for the full solution.

— (2020), “Identifying Dynamic Discrete Choice Models Off Short Panels,” Journal of Econometrics, 215, 473–485. p. 0

Where the paper says it

jp July 24, 2025 Abstract This paper investigates how the discount factor and payoff functions can be identified in stationary infinite-horizon dynamic discrete choice models. In single-agent models, we show that common nonparametric assumptions on per-period payoffs—such as homogeneity of degree one, monotonicity, concavity, zero cross-differences, and complementarity—provide identifying restrictions on the discount factor.

Bajari, P., Benkard, C. L., and Levin, J. (2007), “Estimating dynamic models of imperfect competition,” Econometrica, 75, 1331–1370. p. 2

Where the paper says it

(2020) pioneer a characterization of the identified set for the discount factor as the solution set to polynomial equations. In the context of dynamic games, Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) and Pakes et al.

Bajari, P., Chu, C. S., Nekipelov, D., and Park, M. (2016), “Identification and Semiparametric Estimation of a Finite Horizon Dynamic Discrete Choice Model With a Terminating Action,” Quantitative Marketing and Economics, 14, 271–323. p. 0

Where the paper says it

Semiparametric Identification of the Discount Factor and Payoff Function in Dynamic Discrete Choice Models∗ Yu Hao Faculty of Business and Economics University of Hong Kong haoyu@hku. hk Hiroyuki Kasahara Vancouver School of Economics University of British Columbia hkasahar@mail.

Benkard, C. L., Jeziorski, P., and Weintraub, G. Y. (2015), “Oblivious Equilibrium for Concentrated Industries,” The RAND Journal of Economics, 46, 671–708. p. 0

Where the paper says it

Semiparametric Identification of the Discount Factor and Payoff Function in Dynamic Discrete Choice Models∗ Yu Hao Faculty of Business and Economics University of Hong Kong haoyu@hku. hk Hiroyuki Kasahara Vancouver School of Economics University of British Columbia hkasahar@mail.

Berry, S. and Tamer, E. p. 3

Where the paper says it

In two-player binary choice games of complete information, shape restrictions such as strategic substitutability have been used for identification. Berry and Tamer (2006) demonstrate that the payoff function and the distribution of unobservable heterogeneity are nonparametrically identified when the players’ actions are strategic substitutes.

(2006), “Identification in Models of Oligopoly Entry,” in Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications, Ninth World Congress, eds. p. 1
Where the paper says it

1 Introduction Dynamic discrete choice models are fundamental tools in empirical economics, providing a framework for analyzing forward-looking decision-making in contexts ranging from labor supply and human capital investment to firm entry/exit and technology adoption. While these models have proven valuable for policy analysis, a key identification challenge lies in disentangling the discount factor from other model primitives.

Blundell, R., Newey, W. p. 3
Where the paper says it

(2018) provide excellent surveys. See also Imbens and Angrist (1994), Chesher (2003), Matzkin (2008), Imbens and Newey (2009), Shi et al.

K., and Persson, T., Cambridge University Press. p. 0
Where the paper says it

Semiparametric Identification of the Discount Factor and Payoff Function in Dynamic Discrete Choice Models∗ Yu Hao Faculty of Business and Economics University of Hong Kong haoyu@hku. hk Hiroyuki Kasahara Vancouver School of Economics University of British Columbia hkasahar@mail.

Chesher, A. p. 3

Where the paper says it

(2018) provide excellent surveys. See also Imbens and Angrist (1994), Chesher (2003), Matzkin (2008), Imbens and Newey (2009), Shi et al.

(2003), “Identification in Nonseparable Models,” Econometrica, 71, 1405–1441. p. 3
Where the paper says it

To the best of our knowledge, shape restrictions on the payoff function have not yet been leveraged for identification in models of dynamic games with incomplete information. Monotonicity restrictions have been widely used for identification in various nonlinear and nonseparable econometric models, though a comprehensive review is beyond the scope of this paper.

Chetverikov, D. p. 3

Where the paper says it

Monotonicity restrictions have been widely used for identification in various nonlinear and nonseparable econometric models, though a comprehensive review is beyond the scope of this paper. Matzkin (2013) and Chetverikov et al.

, Santos, A., and Shaikh, A. M. (2018), “The Econometrics of Shape Restrictions,” Annual Review of Economics, 10, 31–63. p. 3
Where the paper says it

To the best of our knowledge, shape restrictions on the payoff function have not yet been leveraged for identification in models of dynamic games with incomplete information. Monotonicity restrictions have been widely used for identification in various nonlinear and nonseparable econometric models, though a comprehensive review is beyond the scope of this paper.

Ching, A. T. and Osborne, M. p. 1

Where the paper says it

1 Empirical studies that estimate the discount factor also reveal that optimal pricing, investment choices, and other forward-looking choices could be sensitive to the value of the discount factor. Accurately capturing individuals’ actual time preferences, especially greater impatience, can therefore significantly change conclusions about the impact of counterfactual policy interventions, compared to models under the conventional discount factor value (Ching and Osborne, 2019).

, “Identification and Estimation of Forward-looking Behavior: The Case of Consumer Stockpiling,” Tech. p. 1
Where the paper says it

1 Introduction Dynamic discrete choice models are fundamental tools in empirical economics, providing a framework for analyzing forward-looking decision-making in contexts ranging from labor supply and human capital investment to firm entry/exit and technology adoption. While these models have proven valuable for policy analysis, a key identification challenge lies in disentangling the discount factor from other model primitives.

Rep. GRU 2019 023. p. 1
Where the paper says it

, 2012; Chung et al. , 2014; Gayle and Tomlin, 2018; De Groote and Verboven, 2019; Kong et al.

Chou, C., Ridder, G., and Shi, R. p. 3

Where the paper says it

(2018) provide excellent surveys. See also Imbens and Angrist (1994), Chesher (2003), Matzkin (2008), Imbens and Newey (2009), Shi et al.

, “Identification and Estimation of Nonstationary Dynamic Binary Choice Models,” Working Paper. p. 3
Where the paper says it

Matzkin (1992) shows that binary threshold crossing and binary choice models can be identified without imposing parametric restrictions on either the utility function or the distribution of the unobservable term by employing such shape restrictions. Matzkin (1993) extends this approach to polychotomous choice models, while Matzkin (1991) develops a semiparametric estimation method for these models under monotonicity and concavity assumptions.

Chung, D. J., Steenburgh, T., and Sudhir, K., “Do Bonuses Enhance Sales Productivity? A Dynamic Structural Analysis of Bonus-Based Compensation Plans,” Marketing Science, 33, 165–187. p. 0

Where the paper says it

In dynamic game models, we show that firm-specific discount factors can be identified using assumptions such as irrelevance of other firms’ lagged actions, exchangeability, and the independence of adjustment costs from other firms’ actions. Our results demonstrate that widely used nonparametric assumptions in economic analysis can provide substantial identifying power in dynamic structural models.

Collard-Wexler, A. p. 1

Where the paper says it

Due to this non-identification result, most empirical studies of dynamic choice models assume that the annualized value of the discount factor is known and fix its value between 0. , Hendel and Nevo, 2006; Ryan, 2012; Collard-Wexler, 2013; Igami and Uetake, 2020; Miller et al.

(2013), “Demand Fluctuations in the Ready-Mix Concrete Industry,” Econometrica, 81, 1003–1037. p. 1
Where the paper says it

Due to this non-identification result, most empirical studies of dynamic choice models assume that the annualized value of the discount factor is known and fix its value between 0. , Hendel and Nevo, 2006; Ryan, 2012; Collard-Wexler, 2013; Igami and Uetake, 2020; Miller et al.

De Groote, O. p. 1

Where the paper says it

, 2012; Chung et al. , 2014; Gayle and Tomlin, 2018; De Groote and Verboven, 2019; Kong et al.

and Verboven, F. p. 1
Where the paper says it

, 2012; Chung et al. , 2014; Gayle and Tomlin, 2018; De Groote and Verboven, 2019; Kong et al.

, “Subsidies and Time Discounting in New Technology Adoption: Evidence from Solar Photovoltaic Systems,” American Economic Review, 109, 2137–72. p. 1
Where the paper says it

1 Introduction Dynamic discrete choice models are fundamental tools in empirical economics, providing a framework for analyzing forward-looking decision-making in contexts ranging from labor supply and human capital investment to firm entry/exit and technology adoption. While these models have proven valuable for policy analysis, a key identification challenge lies in disentangling the discount factor from other model primitives.

Dunker, F., Hoderlein, S., Kaido, H., and Sherman, R. (2018), “Nonparametric Identification of the Distribution of Random Coefficients in Binary Response Static Games of Complete Information,” Journal of Econometrics, 206, 83–102. p. 3

Where the paper says it

(2018) study a model with random coefficients and establish the identification of their joint distribution under strategic substitutability. To the best of our knowledge, shape restrictions on the payoff function have not yet been leveraged for identification in models of dynamic games with incomplete information.

Ericson, R. and Pakes, A. p. 2

Where the paper says it

(2020) pioneer a characterization of the identified set for the discount factor as the solution set to polynomial equations. In the context of dynamic games, Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) and Pakes et al.

, “Markov-Perfect Industry Dynamics: A Framework for Empirical Work,” The Review of Economic Studies, 62, 53–82. p. 1
Where the paper says it

1 Introduction Dynamic discrete choice models are fundamental tools in empirical economics, providing a framework for analyzing forward-looking decision-making in contexts ranging from labor supply and human capital investment to firm entry/exit and technology adoption. While these models have proven valuable for policy analysis, a key identification challenge lies in disentangling the discount factor from other model primitives.

Fowlie, M., Reguant, M., and Ryan, S. p. 1

Where the paper says it

Due to this non-identification result, most empirical studies of dynamic choice models assume that the annualized value of the discount factor is known and fix its value between 0. , Hendel and Nevo, 2006; Ryan, 2012; Collard-Wexler, 2013; Igami and Uetake, 2020; Miller et al.

P., “Market-Based Emissions Regulation and Industry Dynamics,” Journal of Political Economy, 124, 249–302. p. 9
Where the paper says it

1 Equality restrictions based on homogeneity assumptions We first consider the case in which the payoff function uk(w, z) is homogeneous in w. To define homogeneity formally, we assume that uk(w, z) is well-defined at L points (we , λ2we , .

Fox, J. T. and Lazzati, N. p. 3

Where the paper says it

Berry and Tamer (2006) demonstrate that the payoff function and the distribution of unobservable heterogeneity are nonparametrically identified when the players’ actions are strategic substitutes. Fox and Lazzati (2017) show that the payoff function can be nonparametrically identified when the econometrician knows the sign of the interaction effects.

, “A Note on Identification of Discrete Choice Models for Bundles and Binary Games,” Quantitative Economics, 8, 1021–1036. p. 3
Where the paper says it

Furthermore, Matzkin (2003) demonstrates that the homogeneity of degree one restriction enables identification of models with nonadditive unobservable heterogeneity. In two-player binary choice games of complete information, shape restrictions such as strategic substitutability have been used for identification.

Frederick, S. p. 1

Where the paper says it

(2020) sharpen the result of Abbring and Daljord (2020) by showing that the cardinality of the identified set is no greater than that of the state space. Other studies impose assumptions such as linearity in parameters of the payoff function 1Reviewing past studies, Frederick et al.

, Loewenstein, G., and O’Donoghue, T., “Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review,” Journal of Economic Literature, 40, 351–401. p. 1
Where the paper says it

1 Empirical studies that estimate the discount factor also reveal that optimal pricing, investment choices, and other forward-looking choices could be sensitive to the value of the discount factor. Accurately capturing individuals’ actual time preferences, especially greater impatience, can therefore significantly change conclusions about the impact of counterfactual policy interventions, compared to models under the conventional discount factor value (Ching and Osborne, 2019).

Gayle, G.-L. and Tomlin, S. p. 1

Where the paper says it

, 2012; Chung et al. , 2014; Gayle and Tomlin, 2018; De Groote and Verboven, 2019; Kong et al.

, “Estimating Dynastic Life-Cycle Discrete Choice Models,” Quantitative Economics, 9, 659–702. p. 0
Where the paper says it

Semiparametric Identification of the Discount Factor and Payoff Function in Dynamic Discrete Choice Models∗ Yu Hao Faculty of Business and Economics University of Hong Kong haoyu@hku. hk Hiroyuki Kasahara Vancouver School of Economics University of British Columbia hkasahar@mail.

Hao, Y., “Trust Building Dynamics in Cartel Formation: A Structural Analysis,” Working Paper 4666555. p. 0

Where the paper says it

In dynamic game models, we show that firm-specific discount factors can be identified using assumptions such as irrelevance of other firms’ lagged actions, exchangeability, and the independence of adjustment costs from other firms’ actions. Our results demonstrate that widely used nonparametric assumptions in economic analysis can provide substantial identifying power in dynamic structural models.

Hendel, I. and Nevo, A. p. 1

Where the paper says it

Due to this non-identification result, most empirical studies of dynamic choice models assume that the annualized value of the discount factor is known and fix its value between 0. , Hendel and Nevo, 2006; Ryan, 2012; Collard-Wexler, 2013; Igami and Uetake, 2020; Miller et al.

, “Measuring the Implications of Sales and Consumer Inventory Behavior,” Econometrica, 74, 1637–1673. p. 9
Where the paper says it

Example 1 (Homogeneous of degree ν function with known ν). Homogeneous functions are widely used in consumer and production theory to model returns to scale, where the degree of homogeneity ν determines whether the function exhibits increasing, constant, or decreasing returns to scale.

Hotz, V. J. and Miller, R. A., “Conditional Choice Probabilities and the Estimation of Dynamic Models,” The Review of Economic Studies, 60, 497–529. p. 1

Where the paper says it

Building on this insight, Magnac and Thesmar (2002) showed that, without restrictions on preferences, the discount factor cannot be separately identified from current payoffs using only conditional choice probabilities. Due to this non-identification result, most empirical studies of dynamic choice models assume that the annualized value of the discount factor is known and fix its value between 0.

Igami, M., “Estimating the Innovator’s Dilemma: Structural Analysis of Creative Destruction in the Hard Disk Drive Industry, 1981–1998,” Journal of Political Economy, 125, 798–847. p. 0

Where the paper says it

In dynamic game models, we show that firm-specific discount factors can be identified using assumptions such as irrelevance of other firms’ lagged actions, exchangeability, and the independence of adjustment costs from other firms’ actions. Our results demonstrate that widely used nonparametric assumptions in economic analysis can provide substantial identifying power in dynamic structural models.

Igami, M. and Uetake, K. p. 1

Where the paper says it

Due to this non-identification result, most empirical studies of dynamic choice models assume that the annualized value of the discount factor is known and fix its value between 0. , Hendel and Nevo, 2006; Ryan, 2012; Collard-Wexler, 2013; Igami and Uetake, 2020; Miller et al.

, “Mergers, Innovation, and Entry-Exit Dynamics: Consolidation of the Hard Disk Drive Industry, 1996–2016,” Review of Economic Studies, 87, 2672–2702. p. 1
Where the paper says it

1 Introduction Dynamic discrete choice models are fundamental tools in empirical economics, providing a framework for analyzing forward-looking decision-making in contexts ranging from labor supply and human capital investment to firm entry/exit and technology adoption. While these models have proven valuable for policy analysis, a key identification challenge lies in disentangling the discount factor from other model primitives.

Imbens, G. W. and Angrist, J. p. 3

Where the paper says it

(2018) provide excellent surveys. See also Imbens and Angrist (1994), Chesher (2003), Matzkin (2008), Imbens and Newey (2009), Shi et al.

D., “Identification and Estimation of Local Average Treatment Effects,” Econometrica, 62, 467–475. p. 3
Where the paper says it

Matzkin (1993) extends this approach to polychotomous choice models, while Matzkin (1991) develops a semiparametric estimation method for these models under monotonicity and concavity assumptions. Matzkin (1994) reviews the literature on nonparametric identification and estimation grounded in economically motivated restrictions.

Imbens, G. W. and Newey, W. p. 3

Where the paper says it

(2018) provide excellent surveys. See also Imbens and Angrist (1994), Chesher (2003), Matzkin (2008), Imbens and Newey (2009), Shi et al.

K., “Identification and Estimation of Triangular Simultaneous Equations Models Without Additivity,” Econometrica, 77, 1481–1512. p. 3
Where the paper says it

Matzkin (1992) shows that binary threshold crossing and binary choice models can be identified without imposing parametric restrictions on either the utility function or the distribution of the unobservable term by employing such shape restrictions. Matzkin (1993) extends this approach to polychotomous choice models, while Matzkin (1991) develops a semiparametric estimation method for these models under monotonicity and concavity assumptions.

Kalouptsidi, M. p. 2

Where the paper says it

(2007) introduce a computationally efficient two-step estimator, and Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008) introduce an asymptotic least squares approach. Aguirregabiria and Suzuki (2014), Norets and Tang (2014), Arcidiacono and Miller (2020), and Kalouptsidi et al.

, Scott, P. T., and Souza-Rodrigues, E., “Identification of Counterfactuals in Dynamic Discrete Choice Models,” Quantitative Economics, 12, 351–403. p. 0
Where the paper says it

Semiparametric Identification of the Discount Factor and Payoff Function in Dynamic Discrete Choice Models∗ Yu Hao Faculty of Business and Economics University of Hong Kong haoyu@hku. hk Hiroyuki Kasahara Vancouver School of Economics University of British Columbia hkasahar@mail.

— (2018), “Detection and Impact of Industrial Subsidies: The Case of Chinese Shipbuilding,” The Review of Economic Studies, 85, 1111–1158. p. 1

Where the paper says it

1 Empirical studies that estimate the discount factor also reveal that optimal pricing, investment choices, and other forward-looking choices could be sensitive to the value of the discount factor. Accurately capturing individuals’ actual time preferences, especially greater impatience, can therefore significantly change conclusions about the impact of counterfactual policy interventions, compared to models under the conventional discount factor value (Ching and Osborne, 2019).

Komarova, T. p. 2

Where the paper says it

or the availability of a terminal action to achieve identification in single-agent dynamic models (Bajari et al. , 2016; Komarova et al.

, Sanches, F., Silva Junior, D., and Srisuma, S. p. 0
Where the paper says it

∗The authors thank Jaap Abbring for his detailed and insightful comments on an earlier version of the paper. The authors thank Tang Srisuma, participants at the LMU-Todai workshop, and seminar attendees at the National University of Singapore and Nanyang Technological University for their valuable feedback.

, “Joint analysis of the discount factor and payoff parameters in dynamic discrete choice models,” Quantitative Economics, 9, 1153–1194. p. 1
Where the paper says it

1 Introduction Dynamic discrete choice models are fundamental tools in empirical economics, providing a framework for analyzing forward-looking decision-making in contexts ranging from labor supply and human capital investment to firm entry/exit and technology adoption. While these models have proven valuable for policy analysis, a key identification challenge lies in disentangling the discount factor from other model primitives.

Kong, X., Dub´e, J.-P., and Daljord, Ø. p. 1

Where the paper says it

The identification of the discount factor has gained increasing attention in dynamic structural models. Abbring and Daljord (2020) demonstrate that an exclusion restriction—requiring the payoff function to take the same value at two different action-state pairs—can identify the discount factor in single-agent dynamic discrete choice models up to a countable set of solutions to an infiniteorder polynomial equation.

(2024), “Non-parametric Estimation of Demand with Switching Costs: The Case of Habitual Brand Loyalty,” Working Paper.

Lau, C. P. (2024), “Sensitivity Analysis for Dynamic Discrete Choice Models,”. p. 1

Where the paper says it

(2016) and Igami (2017) investigate the sensitivity of parameter estimates to the discount factor by conducting repeated estimations with a range of discount factors surrounding the value employed in their primary analysis. Lau (2024) proposes a sensitivity analysis framework for dynamic discrete choice models that examines how target parameters respond to variations in the discount factor.

Magnac, T. and Thesmar, D. p. 1

Where the paper says it

Rust (1994) established a fundamental negative result, showing that the discount factor cannot be identified in these models without additional restrictions. Building on this insight, Magnac and Thesmar (2002) showed that, without restrictions on preferences, the discount factor cannot be separately identified from current payoffs using only conditional choice probabilities.

, “Identifying Dynamic Discrete Decision Processes,” Econometrica, 70, 801–816. p. 1
Where the paper says it

1 Introduction Dynamic discrete choice models are fundamental tools in empirical economics, providing a framework for analyzing forward-looking decision-making in contexts ranging from labor supply and human capital investment to firm entry/exit and technology adoption. While these models have proven valuable for policy analysis, a key identification challenge lies in disentangling the discount factor from other model primitives.

Magnus, J. R. and Neudecker, H. p. 6

Where the paper says it

The cofactor matrix C has the same dimension as A, and its (i, j)th element is (−1)i+jMij , where Mij is the determinant of the submatrix obtained by removing the ith row and jth column from A. The adjoint satisfies the identity (Magnus and Neudecker, 2019, p.

, Matrix Differential Calculus with Applications in Statistics and Econometrics, Wiley. p. 5
Where the paper says it

We assume uK = 0 as in Abbring and Daljord (2020) and Abbring et al. This normalization is common in empirical applications because the per-period payoff cannot be identified from the model and the observed conditional choice probability alone (Magnac and Thesmar, 2002, Proposition 2), and because data on uK or V are rarely available.

Matzkin, R. p. 2

Where the paper says it

First, we demonstrate that standard nonparametric assumptions on period payoff—such as homogeneity, monotonicity, concavity, and zero cross-derivatives or complementarity across distinct state variables (e. Matzkin, 1992, 1994)—generate equality and inequality restrictions with substantial identifying power.

L., “Semiparametric Estimation of Monotone and Concave Utility Functions for Polychotomous Choice Models,” Econometrica, 59, 1315–1327. p. 3
Where the paper says it

Matzkin (1992) shows that binary threshold crossing and binary choice models can be identified without imposing parametric restrictions on either the utility function or the distribution of the unobservable term by employing such shape restrictions. Matzkin (1993) extends this approach to polychotomous choice models, while Matzkin (1991) develops a semiparametric estimation method for these models under monotonicity and concavity assumptions.

— (1992), “Nonparametric and Distribution-Free Estimation of the Binary Threshold Crossing and The Binary Choice Models,” Econometrica, 60, 239–270. p. 3

Where the paper says it

Matzkin (1992) shows that binary threshold crossing and binary choice models can be identified without imposing parametric restrictions on either the utility function or the distribution of the unobservable term by employing such shape restrictions. Matzkin (1993) extends this approach to polychotomous choice models, while Matzkin (1991) develops a semiparametric estimation method for these models under monotonicity and concavity assumptions.

— (1993), “Nonparametric Identification and Estimation of Polychotomous Choice Models,” Journal of Econometrics, 58, 137–168. p. 3

Where the paper says it

Matzkin (1993) extends this approach to polychotomous choice models, while Matzkin (1991) develops a semiparametric estimation method for these models under monotonicity and concavity assumptions. Matzkin (1994) reviews the literature on nonparametric identification and estimation grounded in economically motivated restrictions.

— (1994), “Restrictions of Economic Theory in Nonparametric Methods,” in Handbook of Econometrics, eds. p. 2

Where the paper says it

Matzkin, 1992, 1994)—generate equality and inequality restrictions with substantial identifying power. Our identification strategy leverages nonparametric shape restrictions grounded in economic theory, which, when combined with the finite-set identification discussed above, enables researchers to achieve point identification or obtain an identified set containing only a small number of points without imposing arbitrary parametric assumptions on the payoff function.

Engle, R. F. and McFadden, D. L., Elsevier, vol. 4, chap. 42, pp. 2523–2558.

— (2003), “Nonparametric Estimation of Nonadditive Random Functions,” Econometrica, 71, 1339–1375. p. 3

Where the paper says it

Allen and Rehbeck (2019) use a variant of Slutsky symmetry to nonparametrically identify latent utility models with additively separable unobservable heterogeneity. Furthermore, Matzkin (2003) demonstrates that the homogeneity of degree one restriction enables identification of models with nonadditive unobservable heterogeneity.

— (2008), “Identification in Nonparametric Simultaneous Equations Models,” Econometrica, 76, 945–978. p. 0

Where the paper says it

Our results demonstrate that widely used nonparametric assumptions in economic analysis can provide substantial identifying power in dynamic structural models. Keywords: Dynamic discrete choice models; semiparametric identification; concavity; homogeneity of degree one; monotonicity, exchangeability.

Rust, J., “Optimal Replacement of GMC Bus Engines: An Empirical Model of Harold Zurcher,” Econometrica, 55, 999–1033. p. 1

Where the paper says it

This suggests that individuals and firms may be more impatient than typically assumed. 1 Empirical studies that estimate the discount factor also reveal that optimal pricing, investment choices, and other forward-looking choices could be sensitive to the value of the discount factor.

— (1994), “Structural Estimation of Markov Decision Processes,” in Handbook of Econometrics, eds. p. 3

Where the paper says it

Matzkin (1993) extends this approach to polychotomous choice models, while Matzkin (1991) develops a semiparametric estimation method for these models under monotonicity and concavity assumptions. Matzkin (1994) reviews the literature on nonparametric identification and estimation grounded in economically motivated restrictions.

Engle, R. F. and McFadden, D., Elsevier, vol. 4 of Handbook of Econometrics, chap. 51, pp. 3081–3143.

Ryan, S. P., “The Costs of Environmental Regulation in a Concentrated Industry,” Econometrica, 80, 1019–1061. p. 0

Where the paper says it

These restrictions also identify payoff functions under standard normalization at one action. In dynamic game models, we show that firm-specific discount factors can be identified using assumptions such as irrelevance of other firms’ lagged actions, exchangeability, and the independence of adjustment costs from other firms’ actions.

Shi, X., Shum, M., and Song, W., “Estimating Semi-parametric Panel Multinomial Choice Models using Cyclic Monotonicity,” Econometrica, 86, 737–761. p. 3

Where the paper says it

In static discrete choice and related econometric models, the literature has examined the identifying power of shape restrictions on utility functions derived from economic theory, such as monotonicity, concavity, and homogeneity of degree one. Matzkin (1992) shows that binary threshold crossing and binary choice models can be identified without imposing parametric restrictions on either the utility function or the distribution of the unobservable term by employing such shape restrictions.

Tauchen, G., “Finite State Markov-Chain Approximations to Univariate and Vector Autoregressions,” Economics Letters, 20, 177–181.

Yao, S., Mela, C. F., Chiang, J., and Chen, Y., “Determining Consumers’ Discount Rates with Field Studies,” Journal of Marketing Research, 49, 822–841. p. 1

Where the paper says it

Building on this insight, Magnac and Thesmar (2002) showed that, without restrictions on preferences, the discount factor cannot be separately identified from current payoffs using only conditional choice probabilities. Due to this non-identification result, most empirical studies of dynamic choice models assume that the annualized value of the discount factor is known and fix its value between 0.

The numerical example uses a dynamic game model where the true value of β is 0.8 for firm 1 and 0.9 for firm 2. The results in Figure 4 and Figure 5 indicate that all curves intersect the horizontal axis at the true value of β, 0. p. 3

Where the paper says it

We use “:=” to denote “equals by definition. ” Let 1{A} denote the indicator function that takes the value one when A is true and zero otherwise.

8 for firm 1 and 0.9 for firm 2. These are the only values in [0, 1) at which all curves intersect the horizontal axis. p. 1
Where the paper says it

, Hendel and Nevo, 2006; Ryan, 2012; Collard-Wexler, 2013; Igami and Uetake, 2020; Miller et al. However, several recent studies that explicitly estimate the discount factor report values below the conventional lower bound of 0.

Green — the paper says it, and the page is printed. Red — no passage carries it, so treat that sentence as unverified. The same check runs on your own text: check a summary against its source, $5.

Improvements for AI systems

  1. Enhance identification power in single-agent models by explicitly leveraging standard nonparametric assumptions such as homogeneity of degree one, monotonicity, concavity, and zero cross-differences to generate identifying restrictions that are polynomial equalities and inequalities with degrees bounded by the cardinality of the state space.

  2. Improve identification in dynamic game models by incorporating assumptions like irrelevance of other firms’ lagged actions and exchangeability to establish equality restrictions that facilitate the identification of firm-specific discount factors, even when discount factors vary heterogeneously across agents.

  3. Develop a methodology for estimating discount factors below the conventional lower bound of 0.9 by utilizing exclusion restrictions, such as requiring the payoff function to take the same value at two different action-state pairs, which can identify the factor up to a countable set of solutions to an infinite order polynomial equation.

  4. Enhance counterfactual prediction capabilities by refining estimation procedures using identification results derived from finite dependence, showing that under specific conditions, the cardinality of the identified set of beta is no larger than rho when action sequences lead to the same state distribution after a finite number of periods.

  5. Implement robust estimation procedures for multi-agent dynamic games by utilizing Assumption 12, which combines equality and inequality restrictions to derive a system where the identified set of discount factors is the intersection of intervals, roots of polynomials, and sets satisfying polynomial inequalities.

Abstract

This paper studies the identification of the discount factor and payoff function in stationary infinite-horizon dynamic discrete choice models. In single-agent models, we show that nonparametric assumptions on per-period payoffs implied by economic theory, such as homogeneity, monotonicity, concavity, zero cross-differences, and complementarity, yield polynomial equalities and inequalities in the discount factor. These restrictions can identify the discount factor and the payoff function without normalizing the payoff of one action. Even when the payoff function is not point identified, they may still identify the discount factor. In dynamic games, we identify firm-specific discount factors by combining the irrelevance of other firms' lagged actions with restrictions such as exchangeability, even when the scrap value is unknown. We illustrate the approach with numerical examples and an empirical application to farmers' crop choices.

Sources

Related papers