A Vision for Trustworthy, Fair, and Efficient Socio-Technical Control using Karma Economies
cs.GT, cs.SY, eess.SY
Submitted: 2025-06-20
Updated: 2025-09-22
Terminology
Sources
- To Spend or to Gain: Online Learning in Repeated Karma Auctions
- Dynamic Resource Allocation with Karma: An Experimental Study
- The Limits of "Fairness'' of the Variational Generalized Nash Equilibrium
- Robust Equilibria in Shared Resource Allocation via Strengthening Border's Theorem
- Welfare and Cost Aggregation for Multi-Agent Control: When to Choose Which Social Cost Function, and Why?
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