Fair Contracts in Principal-Agent Games with Heterogeneous Types
cs.GT, cs.LG, cs.MA
Submitted: 2025-06-18
Updated: 2026-11-15
Terminology
Sources
- Approximate Optimality of Linear Contracts Under Uncertainty
- Contracts with Private Cost per Unit-of-Effort
- Adaptive Mechanism Design: Learning to Promote Cooperation
- Designing Menus of Contracts Efficiently: The Power of Randomization
- AI-driven Prices for Externalities and Sustainability in Production Markets
- When the Agent Learns Too: Learning to Incentivize with Unobserved Rewards
- Learning to Incentivize Perfect-Knowledge Agents with Unobserved Rewards
- Fairness Through Awareness
- Multi-Agent Contracts
- Multi-Agent Combinatorial Contracts
- Algorithmic Contract Theory: A Survey
- The Complexity of Contracts
- Learning with Opponent-Learning Awareness
- Contracting with a Learning Agent
- Multi-agent Reinforcement Learning: A Comprehensive Survey
- Principal-Agent Reinforcement Learning: Orchestrating AI Agents with Contracts
- Learning Fairness in Multi-Agent Systems
- Achieving Fairness in Multi-Agent Markov Decision Processes Using Reinforcement Learning
- Multi-agent Reinforcement Learning in Sequential Social Dilemmas
- Incentivized Learning in Principal-Agent Bandit Games
Related papers
- How Many Votes is a Lie Worth? Measuring Strategyproofness through Resource Augmentation
- Effective Horizons for Prophet Inequalities with Discounted I.I.D. Rewards
- Truthful-in-Expectation Mechanism with Constant Maximin-Share Guarantee
- The Power of Recruiting the Smaller Side: Two Additional Traders Suffice in Two-Sided Markets
- From signaling to interviews in random matching markets
- Optimizing Social Utility in Sequential Experiments