Randomly Wrong Signals: Bayesian Auction Design with ML Predictions

arXiv:2502.08792 · cs.GT, cs.AI · Submitted 2025-02-12 · Read on arXiv

cs.GT, cs.AI

Submitted: 2025-02-12

Updated: 2026-10-10

License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/

Terminology

• Benchmark — 1× in this paper · explained in 2 episodes
• Hallucination — 1× in this paper · explained in 4 episodes

Sources

• Bicriteria Multidimensional Mechanism Design with Side Information
• Strategyproof Scheduling with Predictions
• Online Mechanism Design with Predictions
• Randomized learning-augmented auctions with revenue guarantees
• Accelerated Preference Elicitation with LLM-Based Proxies
• LaMP-Val: Large Language Models Empower Personalized Valuation in Auction
• The Role of Prescreening in Auctions with Predictions
• Mechanism Design with Predictions

Related papers

• Exact Regret Frontiers and Externality Scheduling in Centralized Serial-Dictatorship Bandits
• In-Context Credit Assignment via the Core
• Optimal Regret for Online Market Making with Limit Order Book
• Breaking 1/epsilon Barrier in Quantum Zero-Sum Games: Generalizing Metric Subregularity for Spectraplexes
• Enhancing Affine Maximizer Auctions with Correlation-Aware Payment
• LLM Bidders Preserve the Mechanism-Level Orderings of Human Bidders