Information Aggregation in Markets with Analysts, Experts, and Chatbots
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Introduction to the show: ident: Economics. The day in economics: theory, mechanisms and the evidence beneath them.
Ruth: We're looking at the paper: "Information Aggregation in Markets with Analysts, Experts, and Chatbots".
Warren: Here's the gist of the paper. The present paper shows that it can be advantageous for traders to publish their information on the true value of an asset even if they (i) cannot build a position in the asset prior to the publication of their information and (ii) cannot charge for the provision of information.
Ruth: The model also shows that the informational content of prices is U-shaped in the number of traders who publish their information.
Warren: Benchmark Model Foundation The paper establishes a benchmark model using the Grossman and Stiglitz (1976) model to show efficient information aggregation where equilibrium prices fully reveal the asset’s true fundamental.
Ruth: This baseline model assumes that the error terms in traders’ private signals are uncorrelated, such that equilibrium prices fully reveal the asset’s true fundamental.
Title and authors: Ruth: Let's talk about the paper Information Aggregation in Markets with Analysts, Experts, and Chatbots. It’s interesting because it tests how different types of private advice—analysts versus chatbots—impact market efficiency when you have all those players involved >
Warren: And it specifically looks at the results showing that if only one trader publishes their information about the true value, they can fully figure out the asset's fundamental value, but everyone else who got that report can't >
Iris: That’s a strong finding because it challenges the idea that more private information always leads to better market prices, suggesting a small group of distinguished experts can actually become an obstacle to aggregation >
Ruth: Exactly. It seems like the paper is arguing that the benefit of having analysts or chatbots isn't always positive for everyone in the market if you don't structure things right >
Warren: So what we saw was that when traders receive an analyst report, the informational content of those prices actually decreases because they no longer reveal the true fundamental value fully >
Iris: The paper also points out that this information content goes up if the private signal gets more precise, like when you have a better underlying analyst report, but it drops if agents don't understand that report very well >
The paper's summary: Ruth: So to summarize what the paper is showing us about this dynamic of information aggregation in markets with analysts and chatbots, it’s that the informational content of prices actually goes down when agents get these additional private signals >
Warren: It also shows that the informational content is U-shaped when you look at how many traders publish their information about their true asset value >
Iris: And the key takeaway there is about structure: information aggregation works best if either no trader publishes anything, or if every single trader publishes their private information >
Ruth: That sounds counterintuitive because we usually think having more opinions helps you get closer to the truth, but here it seems like an extreme case works better than a medium one >
Warren: And that brings us to the idea of expert groups: small groups of distinguished experts act as an obstacle rather than a help for aggregating information >
Iris: That is what Section four demonstrates about traders' incentives: they have an incentive to publish their private information even if they aren't getting paid for it > <ref:2411.01938#pg1>
The paper's improvements: Ruth: The paper suggests a few ways we can improve this situation, like ensuring that either no trader publishes their information at all, or making sure every single trader publishes their information to keep things efficient >
Warren: And another idea is that the AI system could actually help us identify when a small group of distinguished experts is acting as an obstacle instead of being a benefit for automated decision-making >
Iris: That's practical. It suggests we might strategically deploy expert advice, not just blindly trust it, by using the AI to detect when that group is causing problems in the information flow >
Ruth: It also seems like this framework could help us model the impact of publishing private information on price precision by showing that when just one trader publishes their information, the informational content of prices falls >
Warren: So we can use this as a way to assess the risk associated with spreading proprietary data because it clearly shows a trade-off between having that one piece of info and how much transparency you lose >
Conclusion: Ruth: To wrap up, the paper Information Aggregation in Markets with Analysts, Experts, and Chatbots suggests that a small group of distinguished experts is an obstacle to information aggregation >
Warren: It also shows that the informational content of prices is U-shaped based on how many traders publish their information >
Iris: And it confirms that in the "expert-free limit," where every trader publishes their opinion on the asset's value, prices once again reflect fundamentals accurately >
Ruth: It's a bit of a surprise because we see so much literature suggesting that getting better private information should improve how well prices reveal what's actually fundamental >
Warren: This paper provides a counterexample to that idea, showing that the expert-free limit works as expected when everyone participates in publishing their info >
Iris: It’s also worth noting the finding about how agents place a greater weight on an analyst report once its precision increases, which is interesting for how people use new information >
Ruth: And this whole study, Information Aggregation in Markets with Analysts, Experts, and Chatbots, shows that a trader who publishes their private information gains an information advantage over all other traders >
Wolfgang Kuhle, Corvinus University of Budapest, Max Planck Institute for Social Law and Social Policy
Corvinus University of Budapest · Max Planck Institute for Social Law and Social Policy
econ.GN, q-fin.EC
Submitted: 2024-11-04
Updated: 2026-11-08
Comments: 36 pages, 1 figure
License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Importance score: 78/100
The gist: The present paper shows that it can be advantageous for traders to publish their information on the true value of an asset even if they (i) cannot build a position in the asset prior to the…
Key concepts
- Benchmark Model Foundation
- This baseline model uses the Grossman and Stiglitz (1976) framework to show how markets should work when information is perfectly aggregated. In this ideal scenario, equilibrium prices fully reveal the asset's true fundamental value to all traders.
- Extension and Information Degradation
- The model adds a second private signal that contains common errors. This error term causes demand functions to become correlated, preventing prices from efficiently aggregating all private information and leading to adverse selection in the market.
- Incentive for Publication
- An individual trader publishing their true value gains an informational edge. If only one person publishes, they can infer the true fundamental, while others relying on research notes cannot. Traders are incentivized to publish even without payment.
- Informational Content of Prices
- This measures how much true information prices convey. The content decreases when agents receive an analyst report, but it increases with the precision of both private signals and how well agents understand the analyst's findings.
Terminology
Summary
The present paper shows that it can be advantageous for traders to publish their information on the true value of an asset even if they (i) cannot build a position in the asset prior to the publication of their information and (ii) cannot charge for the provision of information. p. 0 GN] 4 Nov 2024
Information Aggregation in Markets
with
Analysts, Experts, and Chatbots
Wolfgang Kuhle
Corvinus University of Budapest, Hungary, E-mail wkuhle@gmx. de
MEA, Max Planck Institute for Social Law and Social Policy, Munich, Germany
Abstract: The present paper shows that it can be advantageous for traders to publish their
information on the true value of an asset even if they (i) cannot build a position in the asset
prior to the publication of their information and (ii) cannot charge for the provision of information. de
MEA, Max Planck Institute for Social Law and Social Policy, Munich, Germany
Abstract: The present paper shows that it can be advantageous for traders to publish their
information on the true value of an asset even if they (i) cannot build a position in the asset
prior to the publication of their information and (ii) cannot charge for the provision of information. The model also shows that the informational content of prices is U-shaped in the
number of traders who publish their information.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Benchmark Model Foundation
The paper establishes a benchmark model using the Grossman and Stiglitz (1976) model to show efficient information aggregation where equilibrium prices fully reveal the asset’s true fundamental. This baseline model assumes that the error terms in traders’ private signals are uncorrelated, such that equilibrium prices fully reveal the asset’s true fundamental. p. 1 First, using the model of Grossman and Stiglitz (1976), we
establish a benchmark model of efficient information aggregation in Section 2. This baseline
model assumes that the error terms in traders’ private signals are uncorrelated, such that
equilibrium prices fully reveal the asset’s true fundamental. Considering (4), the market price is informationally equivalent to a signal Z, which fully
reveals the fundamental θ to traders:
Z :=
P − c
b
= θ. (5)
Given utility (3), traders’ demand is:
ki =
E[
˜θ|xi
, P] − P
γV ar(
˜θ|xi
, P)
=
E[θ|xi
, Z] − P
γV ar(
˜θ|xi
, Z)
.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Extension and Information Degradation
The model is extended by assuming traders receive an additional private signal over the assets’ true value, which contains a common error term that hinders information aggregation. This second signal results in correlated demand functions such that equilibrium prices can no longer aggregate private information efficiently. p. 1 That is, rational traders have an incentive
to use this second piece of information to improve their private understanding of the assets’
true value. At the same time, however, the demand functions that traders submit to the
market, are now correlated such that equilibrium prices can no-longer aggregate private
information efficiently. At the same time, however, the demand functions that traders submit to the
market, are now correlated such that equilibrium prices can no-longer aggregate private
information efficiently. That is, from the perspective of information aggregation, there is
adverse selection in the market regarding the information upon which traders base their
asset demands.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Incentive for Publication
Section 4 demonstrates that an individual trader who publishes his private information on the asset’s true value gains an informational advantage over all other traders. Specifically, if only one trader publishes his information, he can fully infer the assets’ true fundamental, while the traders who received the research note can no longer infer the asset’s true value. p. 1 Section 4 builds on Sections 2 and 3, to show that an individual trader, who publishes his
private information on the asset’s true value, gains an informational advantage over all other
traders, who (i) receive the news item and (ii) who do keep their own private information to
themselves. In particular, if only one traders publishes his information, he can fully infer the
assets’ true fundamental, while the traders, who received the research note can no-longer
infer the asset’s true value. Section 4 we examine
traders’ incentive to publish private information. In particular, we show that traders have
an incentive to publish their private information, even if they do not get paid for it.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Impact of Information Sources
The model shows that the informational content of prices decreases once agents receive an analyst report, as the new equilibrium price no longer reveals θ fully. Proposition 2 indicates that the informational content of prices is increasing in the private signal’s precision and in the precision of the underlying analyst report but is reducing with respect to how well agents understand the analyst’s report. p. 5 According to Proposition 2, the informational content of prices is increasing in the private
signal’s precision αx, as well as in the precision of the underlying analyst report αε. On the
contrary, the precision αy, with which agents understand the analyst’s report, is reducing the
quality of the price signal. On the
contrary, the precision αy, with which agents understand the analyst’s report, is reducing the
quality of the price signal. That is, agents place a greater weight on the analyst report once
the precision αy, with which they understand this report, increases.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Conclusion on Aggregation
The paper concludes that a small group of distinguished experts is an obstacle to information aggregation, while the informational content of prices is U-shaped in the number of published research notes. In the 1732, stress, “that the precision of endogenous public information increases with the precision
of exogenous private information. ” The present model provides a counter example to this
view, where improvements agents’ private information reduce the precision with which prices
reveal the asset’s fundamental value. In particular, we show that traders have
an incentive to publish their private information, even if they do not get paid for it. Section
5 discusses a variation of our model, where, instead of Analysts and Experts, traders turn
to chatbots for financial advice. That is, from the perspective of information aggregation, there is
adverse selection in the market regarding the information upon which traders base their
asset demands. Section 4 builds on Sections 2 and 3, to show that an individual trader, who publishes his
private information on the asset’s true value, gains an informational advantage over all other
traders, who (i) receive the news item and (ii) who do keep their own private information to
themselves. Finally, if more than one trader publishes his information, we have:
Proposition 5. The informational content of prices is U-shaped in the number of published
private research reports. That is, a small community of distinguished experts is more
harmful to information aggregation than a large group of experts, where each individual “expert” is taken less seriously. Finally, in the “expert-free limit,” where each trader publishes
his opinion on the asset’s value, prices once again reflect fundamentals accurately.expert-free limit,
where each trader publishes his opinion on the asset’s value, prices once again reflect fundamentals accurately. This provides a counterexample to literature suggesting that improvements in agents’ private information reduce the precision with which prices reveal the asset’s fundamental value. p. 8Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Green — the paper says it, and the page is printed. Red — no passage carries it, so treat that sentence as unverified. The same check runs on your own text: check a summary against its source, $5.
Improvements for AI systems
-
Improved information aggregation in markets with analysts, experts, and chatbots can be achieved by ensuring either no trader publishes their information or that every trader publishes their information to maintain informational efficiency.
-
The AI system can identify when a small group of distinguished experts acts as an obstacle to information aggregation rather than a benefit, allowing for the strategic deployment of expert advice in automated decision-making processes.
-
The system can model the impact of publishing private information on price precision by showing that
the informational content of prices falls once one trader publishes his information,
providing a framework for assessing the risk associated with disseminating proprietary data. -
The AI can detect when improvements in an agent's private information reduce the quality of a public signal, specifically noting that
the precision alphay, with which agents understand the analyst report is reducing the quality of the price signal.
-
The system can optimize trading strategies by leveraging private signals and expert opinions to infer asset fundamentals more accurately than relying solely on market prices when a single informed trader publishes information.
Abstract
We study information aggregation when traders interpret public news, such as analyst reports, differently. This differential interpretation injects noise into equilibrium prices, compounding the informational bottleneck caused by noise traders. Next to analysts and experts, we consider the role of ``AI" chatbots, which (i) provide free financial advice and (ii) analyze traders' queries to learn about the asset's fundamental. Our model predicts that (i) chatbots aggregate information more efficiently than markets, (ii) increase trade volume, and (iii) enhance the informational content of prices. Ultimately, the AI platform extracts an absolute informational advantage over other market participants, highlighting a structural shift from information aggregation through market prices to ``AI" platforms.
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