On the Role of Quantum Communication and Loss in Attacks on Quantum Position Verification
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Introduction to the show: ident: Quantum Radio. Generated commentary on the latest quantum physics and condensed matter papers.
Kai: I'm Kai.
Mira: And I'm Mira, here with Lev.
Kai: We're looking at the paper: "On the Role of Quantum Communication and Loss in Attacks on Quantum Position Verification".
Title and authors: Kai: So, we're looking at this paper today titled "On the Role of Quantum Communication and Loss in Attacks on Quantum Position Verification," and it really digs into how quantum communication can mess with position verification protocols.
Mira: Exactly. It starts by building a specific kind of protocol that is provably secure against attackers who are only allowed to use classical communication, but then it shows that a single round of simultaneous quantum communication can completely break that security.
Lev: So the central idea here is that even if you restrict the attacker to just classical messages, adding one round of quantum communication gives them a decisive advantage in attacking these protocols.
Kai: And they don't just stop there; they show something interesting about how these protocols relate to each other, suggesting that any protocol secure against classical communication can actually be transformed into one that is secure against quantum communication.
Mira: That's a pretty strong statement, implying that the security baseline we think we have against classical adversaries isn't as solid as we might think when you consider quantum capabilities.
Lev: I’m curious how they handle the actual implementation side of this; does this mean that if an adversary can use quantum communication, it means something fundamentally different about the required resources, like entanglement?
Kai: Well, they move on to looking at Bell state discrimination as a way to prove that perfect discrimination isn't possible even with one round of simultaneous communication.
Mira: They use monogamy of entanglement for this part; they consider a purified version of the task in the position verification setting, and show that the squashed entanglement is upper bounded by one half.
Lev: So they're saying that because the squashed entanglement is capped at one half, attackers simply won't be able to perfectly predict what the honest measurement will be.
Kai: And they give us an explicit bound on the attack success probability using a hashing bound, showing it can stay below zero point nine two six, and they improve that to three quarters using a different argument based on the no-cloning theorem <ref:2208.04341#pg1>.
Title and authors: Mira: They also show that even when you introduce loss, this success probability stays below one for any transmission rate between zero and one. That means Bell state discrimination remains secure in the lossy setting with quantum communication.
Lev: That's a significant result because it establishes the first fully loss tolerant position verification protocol that still stays secure when attackers are allowed quantum communication.
Kai: What they’re pointing out next is something about multi-round protocols and entanglement. They find that in a setting with loss, any multi-round position verification protocol can be broken with just a linear amount of pre-shared entanglement if the loss rate is high enough.
Mira: That observation suggests that creating a fully loss tolerant protocol that needs superlinear entanglement—meaning more qubits involved—is impossible.
Lev: From an engineering standpoint, if you have no limit on the loss, adversaries can use quantum teleportation and guess the corrections, claiming 'loss' if their guess is wrong.
Kai: That makes sense because in real-world settings, loss rates are often high anyway, and even with only one round of communication allowed for timing reasons in position verification, attackers could potentially use that quantum channel to their advantage.
Mira: This connection between loss and quantum communication seems very practical because it models realistic noise environments quite well.
Lev: So we’ve seen how entanglement attacks scale with loss, but what about the relationship between classical and quantum communication itself?
Kai: They show that any protocol secure against classical communication can be transformed into one secure against quantum communication, which is a pretty deep implication for security proofs.
Mira: It sounds like they construct a way to map out the security landscape; if you find a vulnerability in the quantum setting, you can trace it back to something that was vulnerable even before quantum communication was considered.
Lev: And they prove this by showing that any quantum communication attack implies the existence of two new position verification protocols, and then using emergent classicality to show that a secure protocol must exist against some form of classical attack.
Title and authors: Kai: It’s a recursive argument that essentially shows there must be a protocol safe against one round of simultaneous quantum communication somewhere in the chain.
Mira: That recursive structure, combined with the monogamy arguments for Bell state discrimination, is what allows them to prove security in this specific setting where attackers are allowed quantum communication.
Lev: So we have a protocol that works under these conditions, but they also point out a limitation—they only proved it's secure against quantum communication and not necessarily against attackers who can also say loss.
Kai: They do address that; they show that you still can't perfectly distinguish all Bell states even if you allow attackers to say loss sometimes, proving the success probability is strictly less than one for any transmission rate between zero and one.
Mira: That means this protocol is the first fully loss tolerant QPV protocol that remains secure even when attackers are allowed both quantum communication and saying loss.
Lev: And finally, they conclude by observing that if you allow loss for pre-shared entangled attackers, any multi-round position verification protocol can be broken with only a linear amount of entanglement if the loss rate is high enough.
Kai: So to wrap up on "On the Role of Quantum Communication and Loss in Attacks on Quantum Position Verification," we’ve seen that quantum communication can strictly improve the attack success probability over classical communication, but in some cases, it's actually worse than what non-local operations can achieve.
Mira: It really highlights that the role of quantum communication isn't always a simple upgrade; sometimes it introduces new vulnerabilities depending on the setup.
Lev: It’s a lot to take in when you think about how these bounds translate to actual hardware we're trying to build, especially when dealing with realistic loss rates.
Kai: We should keep an eye on this work because it sets a new benchmark for what we expect from position verification security in the quantum era.
The paper's summary: Kai: So, we're looking at how this paper summarizes its findings on quantum communication and loss in position verification attacks.
Mira: Basically, they build a protocol that works against classical attackers but gets broken by just one round of quantum communication.
Lev: And then they show that you can always turn any protocol secure against classical messages into one secure against quantum messages.
Kai: That's a big takeaway, suggesting that the security we get from classical communication isn't as robust as we thought when you consider what quantum adversaries can actually do.
Mira: They also tackle Bell state discrimination and show it can't be done perfectly even with local operations and one round of quantum communication, even if you allow attackers to say loss sometimes.
Lev: They use entanglement arguments here, showing that the squashed entanglement is capped at one half, so perfect prediction is impossible.
Kai: That means they found a fully loss tolerant position verification protocol that stays secure against quantum attacks.
Mira: But they also point out a limitation; you can break any multi-round protocol with just a linear amount of pre-shared entanglement if the loss rate is high enough.
Lev: So, to put it simply, if you have high noise in your system, even multiple rounds of position verification protocols don't offer superlinear protection against entanglement attacks.
Kai: That makes sense for real hardware where loss isn't something you can just ignore for infinite time.
Mira: They also show that the task of distinguishing Bell states is actually secure against attackers who allow both quantum communication and saying loss.
Lev: So the protocol they developed, based on a SWAP test, is the first one we've seen that handles both quantum communication and loss while staying secure.
Kai: It’s interesting because it shows that having quantum communication doesn't automatically mean you can break security; sometimes it just means you need to design things differently.
Mira: And this leads us into how we can use the concept of splitting schemes to distill a protocol that is secure against local operations, even when we know there might be a perfect quantum communication attack.
The paper's improvements: Kai: So, we're talking about how the paper suggests ways to make these position verification protocols even better than what they first presented.
Mira: They point out that one of the key improvements is showing how you can take a protocol secure against local operations and turn it into one that's secure against quantum communication.
Lev: That sounds like they are building a roadmap for security proofs, basically saying we don't need to worry as much about just classical adversaries if we consider the quantum capabilities an attacker might have.
Kai: They also mention the work on Bell state discrimination being able to stay secure even when you allow attackers to say loss sometimes.
Mira: That means they've refined the analysis of those entanglement bounds, showing that perfect discrimination is still impossible even with that extra flexibility for the adversary.
Lev: From an engineering side, this helps us understand the real-world impact of noise; it shows us exactly where we need to focus our error correction efforts if we want to build a truly robust position verification system.
Kai: The paper also highlights how you can use splitting schemes to take a protocol that is secure against local operations and distill it down to one that's secure against quantum communication.
Mira: That’s a neat idea for protocol design; it suggests that we can start with a very basic security assumption and then systematically add the quantum features in a controlled way.
Lev: It makes sense because we need ways to test if our error correction overhead is actually worth it, so understanding how these protocols can be distilled is useful for setting those benchmarks.
Kai: Basically, the paper shows us that just having quantum communication doesn't automatically mean you're in trouble; it depends on the specific protocol structure and what kind of loss we are dealing with.
Mira: And this leads us to thinking about how these results apply to more complex systems where entanglement is shared among multiple attackers.
Lev: That’s the next big question, because if you have a bunch of attackers sharing entanglement, how does that change the linear amount of entanglement needed to break a multi-round protocol when loss is high?
Conclusion: Tom: So, to wrap up on "On the Role of Quantum Communication and Loss in Attacks on Quantum Position Verification," we're summarizing how this paper changes our thinking about position verification security.
Kai: Basically, it shows that quantum communication isn't just an extra feature; it can fundamentally alter the security landscape by giving attackers a new way to attack protocols.
Mira: They proved that any protocol secure against classical messages can be transformed into one that handles quantum communication attacks better, which is a pretty strong statement about how we should design these systems.
Lev: From an error correction standpoint, this means we need to be thinking about quantum channels not just as noise sources but as active attack vectors in our position verification setups.
Kai: They also showed that even with loss and quantum communication allowed, you can still get a fully loss tolerant protocol that stays secure against the most aggressive attacks.
Mira: That's because they used those entanglement bounds to show that perfect Bell state discrimination is impossible, even if the attacker has access to those quantum channels.
Lev: The caveat there is that they only proved it under specific conditions for transmission rates between zero and one, so we have to be careful about applying that result exactly in a high-loss scenario.
Kai: So the implication for us is that we need to incorporate these quantum communication and loss effects right into the initial security modeling of our position verification hardware.
Mira: And this opens up a lot more avenues for building protocols that are resilient against both classical and quantum adversaries simultaneously.
Lev: I just think understanding how entanglement scales with loss, as they showed for multi-round protocols, is crucial because it tells us how much overhead we actually need to spend on error correction.
Kai: Yeah, so while the paper gives us some concrete bounds like that linear amount of entanglement needed, there's still a lot of room to explore what happens when you push the loss rate even higher.
Mira: That brings us right back to how these results connect with other areas, like how we handle entanglement attacks when multiple attackers are involved and they share resources.
Rene Allerstorfer, Harry Buhrman, Florian Speelman, Philip Verduyn Lunel
QuSoft · University of Amsterdam
quant-ph
Submitted: 2022-08-08
Updated: 2026-11-18
Comments: 23 pages, 6 figures. This work originated from a division of material previously contained in an earlier version of arXiv:2106.12911
License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Importance score: 90/100
The gist: We study the role of quantum communication in attacks on quantum position verification In this work, we construct the first known example of a QPV protocol that is provably secure against unentangled…
Key concepts
- QPV Protocol
- This is a specific type of protocol used to verify the position of a quantum state. The paper analyzes how different types of attackers—those using only classical communication versus those using quantum communication—can successfully guess or manipulate the verification outcome.
- Monogamy of Entanglement
- This principle in quantum mechanics limits how much entanglement a single qubit can share with multiple other systems. The authors use this to prove that perfectly distinguishing Bell states, even with one round of quantum communication, is impossible using only local operations.
- Loss-Tolerant QPV
- This refers to a QPV protocol that remains secure even when the transmission channel experiences significant loss of information. The paper proves that certain protocols can be fully loss-tolerant against quantum communication attacks, meaning they maintain security despite noisy channels.
- Entanglement Attacks
- These are strategies used by attackers to gain an advantage in QPV by using pre-shared quantum entanglement. The research shows that while some protocols can be broken with linear entanglement if loss is high, others require superlinear entanglement to guarantee security.
Terminology
Summary
We study the role of quantum communication in attacks on quantum position verification In this work, we construct the first known example of a QPV protocol that is provably secure against unentangled attackers restricted to classical communication, but can be perfectly attacked by local operations and a single round of simultaneous quantum communication indicating that allowing for quantum communication may break security We also show that any protocol secure against classical communication can be transformed into a protocol secure against quantum communication We further show, using arguments based on the monogamy of entanglement, that the task of Bell state discrimination cannot be done locally with a single round of quantum communication, not even probabilistically (when we allow attackers to say loss sometimes), making this the first fully loss-tolerant QPV task secure against quantum communication attacks Finally, we observe that any multi-round QPV protocol can be attacked with a linear amount of entanglement if the loss is high enough. p. 0 We further show, using arguments based on the monogamy of entanglement,
that the task of Bell state discrimination cannot be done locally with a single round of quantum
communication, not even probabilistically (when we allow attackers to say loss sometimes), making this the first fully loss-tolerant QPV task secure against quantum communication attacks. Finally, we observe that any multi-round QPV protocol can be attacked with a linear amount
of entanglement if the loss is high enough.Where the paper says it
The Role of Quantum Communication in Attacks
Some works attempt to lower bound the pre-shared entanglement required from attackers that are allowed a round of simultaneous quantum communication, while other results assume attackers restricted to communicate only classically We present the following results regarding this question:
-
First, we answer the above question in the negative: We construct a protocol that is provably secure against unentangled attackers that can use classical communication, but can be broken by a single round of simultaneous quantum communication. p. 1
Where the paper says it
1 The simplest version of this question can be asked for unentangled attackers: If a (quantum-question, classical-reply) QPV protocol is secure against unentangled attackers that communicate classically, is that protocol also secure against unentangled attackers that are allowed to use quantum communication? To that end, we present the following results: • First, we answer the above question in the negative: We construct a protocol that is provably secure against unentangled attackers that can use classical communication, but can be broken by a single round of simultaneous quantum communication.
-
Interestingly, we are additionally able to show that our counter-example is in some sense artificial: Given a protocol that is secure against classical messages, but insecure when quantum communication is allowed, it is always possible to transform this protocol into one that is secure when quantum communication is allowed. p. 1
Where the paper says it
This shows that some care has to be taken when interpreting results that restrict to classical messages only. • Interestingly, we are additionally able to show that our counter-example is in some sense artificial: Given a protocol that is secure against classical messages, but insecure when quantum communication is allowed, it is always possible to transform this protocol into one that is secure when quantum communication is allowed.
How the training signal is built
We proceed by considering the task of Bell state discrimination and prove that this task cannot be done perfectly with only local operations and one round of simultaneous communication through arguments based on the monogamy of entanglement We consider a purified version of this task in the QPV setting (delaying the honest measurement to the end of the protocol) and show that the squashed entanglement [CW04] is upper bounded by Esq(VA: VB)ρ ≤ 1/2. Hence attackers won’t be able to perfectly predict the honest result. p. 2 We
consider a purified version of this task in the QPV setting (delaying the honest measurement to
the end of the protocol) and show that the squashed entanglement [CW04] of the state ρVAVB
,
on which the honest Bell measurement is applied to, is upper bounded by Esq(VA : VB)ρ ≤ 1/2. Hence attackers won’t be able to perfectly predict the honest result. Hence attackers won’t be able to perfectly predict the honest result. To get an explicit upper
bound on the attack success probability with quantum communication p
qc
succ we use the hashing bound from [DW05] which lower bounds the squashed entanglement, allowing us to upper
bound a parameter that leads to p
qc
succ ≤ 0. To get an explicit upper
bound on the attack success probability with quantum communication p
qc
succ we use the hashing bound from [DW05] which lower bounds the squashed entanglement, allowing us to upper
bound a parameter that leads to p
qc
succ ≤ 0. We further improve this bound to p
qc
succ ≤ 3/4
via a different argument based on the no-cloning theorem. We further improve this bound to p
qc
succ ≤ 3/4
via a different argument based on the no-cloning theorem. We additionally show that even in the lossy scenario it remains that p
qc
succ(η) < 1 for any transmission rate 0 < η ≤ 1. We additionally show that even in the lossy scenario it remains that p
qc
succ(η) < 1 for any transmission rate 0 < η ≤ 1. This makes the task of Bell state discrimination, and by implication
the QPV protocol based on the SWAP-test [ABSVL22], the first fully loss tolerant QPV protocol that remains secure in the setting where attackers are allowed quantum communication.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the gains come from
We observe that in a setting with loss any multi-round QPV protocol can be broken with only a linear amount of pre-shared entanglement if the loss rate is high enough. In that sense, creating a fully loss tolerant QPV protocol which requires superlinear entanglement (in the number of qubits involved) is impossible This follows directly from a simple observation: if there is no limit to the loss, the adversaries can attempt quantum teleportation and guess the teleportation corrections, claiming ‘loss’ if the guess is incorrect. p. 2 In that sense,
creating a fully loss tolerant QPV protocol which requires superlinear entanglement (in the
number of qubits involved) is impossible. This follows directly from a simple observation: if
there is no limit to the loss, the adversaries can attempt quantum teleportation and guess the
teleportation corrections, claiming ‘loss’ if the guess is incorrect. This follows directly from a simple observation: if
there is no limit to the loss, the adversaries can attempt quantum teleportation and guess the
teleportation corrections, claiming ‘loss’ if the guess is incorrect. The aspects of loss and quantum communication are practically very relevant, since in realistic
settings loss rates will be high and, although attackers are restricted to only one round of simultaneous communication due to the timing constraints of QPV, they could in principle be able to
quantum communicate and this might give them an advantage.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Pruning redundant reasoning tokens
In section 3.1 we present the first QPV protocol that is provably secure against attackers restricted to quantum communication but broken by a single round of quantum communication However, in section 3. p. 2 1 we present the first QPV protocol that is provably secure against attackers restricted
to quantum communication but broken by a single round of quantum communication. However, in
section 3. 1 we present the first QPV protocol that is provably secure against attackers restricted
to quantum communication but broken by a single round of quantum communication. However, in
section 3. However, in
section 3. 2 we show that any protocol insecure against quantum communication but secure against
classical communication can be transformed into a protocol secure against quantum communication. However, in
section 3. 2 we show that any protocol insecure against quantum communication but secure against
classical communication can be transformed into a protocol secure against quantum communication. In section 3. 3 we show that the task of Bell state discrimination is secure against attackers who are
allowed to use quantum communication. In section 3. 3 we show that the task of Bell state discrimination is secure against attackers who are
allowed to use quantum communication. 3 we show that the task of Bell state discrimination is secure against attackers who are
allowed to use quantum communication. Extending on this result in section 3. 3 we show that the task of Bell state discrimination is secure against attackers who are
allowed to use quantum communication. Extending on this result in section 3. this is strictly secure if we allow attackers to also say loss beside quantum communication. Finally,
in section 3. this is strictly secure if we allow attackers to also say loss beside quantum communication. Finally,
in section 3. Finally,
in section 3. 5 we make the observation that allowing loss for pre-shared entangled attackers allows
for any protocol with high enough loss rate to be broken with linear entanglement. Finally,
in section 3. 5 we make the observation that allowing loss for pre-shared entangled attackers allows
for any protocol with high enough loss rate to be broken with linear entanglement.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
In section 3.1 we present the first QPV protocol that is provably secure against attackers restricted to quantum communication but broken by a single round of quantum communication However, in section 3.2 we show that any protocol insecure against quantum communication but secure against classical communication can be transformed into a protocol secure against quantum communication In section 3.3 we show that the task of Bell state discrimination is secure against attackers who are allowed to use quantum communication. Extending on this result in section 3.4 we also show that this is strictly secure if we allow attackers to also say loss beside quantum communication Finally, in section 3. p. 3 this is strictly secure if we allow attackers to also say loss beside quantum communication. Finally,
in section 3.Where the paper says it
We gave an explicit example of the first QPV protocol in which there is an advantage for attackers who share no entanglement to use quantum communication over classical communication The probability of success under LOCC operations was analytically shown to be equal to 17/18, while attackers with access to quantum communication could attack this protocol perfectly with a single round of simultaneous quantum communication This suggests that the role of quantum communication can be more important than previously thought.
Diving into the idea that there can be an advantage to using quantum communication over classical communication we also showed that this separation between quantum communication and classical communication was somewhat constructed The existence of a quantum communication attack on a protocol that is safe against attackers restricted to classical communication implies the existence of a similar protocol that is safe against quantum communication In order to prove this we showed that for every quantum communication attack, two new QPV protocols arise. By repeating this argument whenever there was a quantum communication attack, we used the theorem of emergent classicality of channels from [QR20] to show that the quantum inputs become approximately classical, which in turn implies the existence of a classical communication attack on the original protocol which violated the assumption of the original being secure against classical communication. p. 7 reduced states σAi
and σBi become approximately classical, and that attackers could immediately
measure their incoming states and share the classical measurement outcome instead of sending some
quantum message. This would lead to a contradiction since the success probability of this procedure
would be upper bounded by the LOCC bound of the original QPV protocol, while at the same time,
by assumption, this attack should become approximately close to a perfect one. 2 Splitting Scheme
In this section we present a procedure that distills a QPV protocol secure against attackers using a
single round of simultaneous quantum communication from the existence of a QPV protocol that is
secure against adversaries restricted to LOCC operations. We will use that the existence of a perfect
quantum communication attack on a QPV protocol generates two new QPV protocols, which, when
applied recursively, ultimately leads to the existence of a QPV protocol that is secure against
adversaries restricted to LOCC and cannot be perfectly attacked by adversaries using quantum
communication.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Setting out to find an explicit example of a protocol that is safe against quantum communication, we prove that the task of Bell state discrimination cannot have a higher success probability than 3/4 when two attackers are restricted to local operations and a single round of quantum communication This is higher than the optimal success probability of 1/2 for attackers restricted to classical communication. We do suspect the quantum communication bound to be lower than 3/4, but have been unable to make the bound tighter just yet. p. 1 The role of quantum communication for attacks on QPV. Some works [BRSdW11, TFKW13,
BFSS13, BCS21] attempt to lower bound the pre-shared entanglement required from attackers that
are allowed a round of simultaneous quantum communication, while other results, such as [BK11,
RG15, QS15, QLL+15, LXS+16, GC20, OCCG20] assume attackers that are restricted to communicate only classically. We also show that any protocol secure against classical communication can be transformed into a protocol secure against quantum
communication. We further show, using arguments based on the monogamy of entanglement,
that the task of Bell state discrimination cannot be done locally with a single round of quantum
communication, not even probabilistically (when we allow attackers to say loss sometimes), making this the first fully loss-tolerant QPV task secure against quantum communication attacks.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
The previous statement immediately brings up the question whether the protocol is also safe against attackers allowed to use quantum communication, and allowed to say loss We answer this question in the affirmative and prove that there cannot be a strategy that perfectly distinguishes all Bell states. However, we only find a strict inequality, i. p. 5 And it is only incorrect on symmetric inputs if both
times the state |Ψ+i was sent, this happens with probability 1/18, so the total probability of success
of the LOCC protocol then becomes 17/18. By incorporating loss in the SDP program as done in
[LXS+16] and [ABSVL22], we also find that this protocol is loss-tolerant. We further improve this bound to p
qc
succ ≤ 3/4
via a different argument based on the no-cloning theorem. We additionally show that even in the lossy scenario it remains that p
qc
succ(η) < 1 for any transmission rate 0 < η ≤ 1. We additionally show that even in the lossy scenario it remains that p
qc
succ(η) < 1 for any transmission rate 0 < η ≤ 1. This makes the task of Bell state discrimination, and by implication
the QPV protocol based on the SWAP-test [ABSVL22], the first fully loss tolerant QPV protocol that remains secure in the setting where attackers are allowed quantum communication.Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Where the paper says it
Extending on the idea of incorporating loss in different settings for attackers we note that in order for QPV to become feasible, not only do we want our protocols to be loss-tolerant against quantum communication, but we also want our protocols to be loss-tolerant against some amount of pre-shared entanglement among the attackers However, we show that any QPV protocol can be attacked by only a linear amount of entanglement in this setting, given that the loss is high enough. This is based on the simple observation that in such a scenario attackers can post-select on those rounds in which the attempted quantum teleportation did not incur teleportation corrections. p. 2 This follows directly from a simple observation: if
there is no limit to the loss, the adversaries can attempt quantum teleportation and guess the
teleportation corrections, claiming ‘loss’ if the guess is incorrect. The aspects of loss and quantum communication are practically very relevant, since in realistic
settings loss rates will be high and, although attackers are restricted to only one round of simultaneous communication due to the timing constraints of QPV, they could in principle be able to
quantum communicate and this might give them an advantage.Where the paper says it
In conclusion, in this paper we investigated the advantage of a single round of simultaneous quantum communication over classical communication in QPV attacks We find that this advantage can be strictly better than classical communication, but we also find that in some cases it is still strictly worse than the best non-local operations, which proves security for those cases.
Green — the paper says it, and the page is printed. Red — no passage carries it, so treat that sentence as unverified. The same check runs on your own text: check a summary against its source, $5.
Improvements for AI systems
-
Better security guarantees for position verification protocols by demonstrating that any protocol secure against classical communication can be transformed into one secure against quantum communication, suggesting a stronger security baseline is possible when considering quantum communication capabilities.
-
Improved analysis of Bell state discrimination tasks by showing that the task cannot be done perfectly with only local operations and one round of simultaneous quantum communication, even when allowing attackers to say loss sometimes, establishing the first fully loss-tolerant QPV task secure against quantum communication attacks without pre-shared entanglement.
-
Development of a protocol for Bell state discrimination that is provably secure against attackers restricted to quantum communication, demonstrating that the success probability is upper bounded by 3/4 when two attackers are restricted to local operations and one round of simultaneous quantum communication.
-
Enhanced understanding of entanglement attacks by showing that any multi-round QPV protocol can be broken with only a linear amount of pre-shared entanglement if the loss rate is high enough, allowing for more precise modeling of realistic noisy scenarios in position verification.
-
Construction of a splitting scheme that distills a QPV protocol secure against LOCC operations from the existence of a perfect quantum communication attack, which can be recursively applied to show the existence of protocols safe against quantum communication.
Abstract
We study the role of quantum communication in attacks on quantum position verification. In this work, we construct the first known example of a QPV protocol that is provably secure against unentangled attackers restricted to classical communication, but can be perfectly attacked by local operations and a single round of simultaneous quantum communication, indicating that allowing for quantum communication during the execution of the protocol may break security in a different way than just by establishing shared entanglement. We also show that any QPV protocol with a positive security gap against classical communication can be transformed into a protocol with an explicit positive gap between the honest prover's success probability and that of initially unentangled attackers using a single round of simultaneous quantum communication. We further show, using arguments based on the monogamy of entanglement, that the task of Bell state discrimination cannot be done locally with a single round of quantum communication, not even probabilistically (when we allow attackers to say loss sometimes), making this the first fully loss-tolerant QPV task secure against quantum communication attacks. Finally, we observe that any multi-round QPV protocol can be attacked with a linear amount of entanglement if the loss is high enough.
Sources
- A single-qubit position verification protocol that is secure against multi-qubit attacks
- Quantum fingerprinting
- Simplified instantaneous non-local quantum computation with applications to position-based cryptography
- Practical Position-Based Quantum Cryptography
- Constraining the doability of relativistic quantum tasks
- Bounds on Instantaneous Nonlocal Quantum Computation
- Enhanced No-Go Theorem for Quantum Position Verification
- Geometry of Banach spaces: a new route towards Position Based Cryptography
- Quantum Tagging: Authenticating Location via Quantum Information and Relativistic Signalling Constraints
- Insecurity of position-based quantum cryptography protocols against entanglement attacks
- Loss-tolerant quantum secure positioning with weak laser sources
- Breaking simple quantum position verification protocols with little entanglement
- Free-space reconfigurable quantum key distribution network
- Emergent classicality in general multipartite states and channels
- Loss-tolerant position-based quantum cryptography
- A Tight Lower Bound for the BB84-states Quantum-Position-Verification Protocol
- A Monogamy-of-Entanglement Game With Applications to Device-Independent Quantum Cryptography
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