Efficient MDP Analysis for Selfish-Mining in Blockchains
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Introduction to the show: ident: Security Radio. Generated commentary on the latest security and cryptography papers.
Nadia: We're looking at the paper: "Efficient MDP Analysis for Selfish-Mining in Blockchains".
Elias: Here's the gist of the paper. A novel technique called Probabilistic Termination Optimization (PTO) is presented to solve an Average Reward-Ratio MDP by transforming it to a conventional MDP and bounding its approximation error by O(1/H), which is an order of magnitude more efficient than the state of the art <ref:2007.05614#pg7>.
Nadia: The Core Problem and Solution The paper addresses the difficulty in finding the optimal strategy for selfish mining in Proof of Work (PoW) blockchains because their utility functions are non-linear, leading to an Average Reward-Ratio MDP (ARR-MDP) <ref:2007.05614#pg2>.
Elias: The authors propose PTO, a method that solves this by augmenting the MDP such that it terminates randomly within an expected number of rounds, transforming the ARR-MDP into a conventional Markov Decision Process (PT-MDP) <ref:2007.05614#pg4>.
Nadia: This transformation simplifies the objective function to a linear one while maintaining provably accurate approximation <ref:2007.05614#pg4>.
Title and authors: Nadia: So we're looking at this paper called "Efficient MDP Analysis for Selfish-Mining in Blockchains" by Roi Bar-Zur, Ittay Eyal, and Aviv Tamar. It sounds a bit technical, but essentially it’s about finding the best way for miners to behave when they can cheat the system.
Elias: Yeah it's about solving this problem using Markov Decision Processes or MDPs because the rewards miners get are not linear; they are a ratio function, which is what they call an Average Reward Ratio or ARR MDP. The authors say existing methods solve this by breaking it down into a series of simpler MDPs that converge to the final answer.
Priya: But what does that actually mean for us? Does it just give us a slightly better guess at how much revenue we can get from mining? I'm thinking about whether these approximations are trustworthy when we apply them to real systems.
Nadia: Exactly, Priya, it’s about the trust factor. The paper is trying to show that this new approach solves the ARR MDP by solving just a single standard MDP instead of all those smaller ones they mentioned before. It simplifies the objective function into something linear while still keeping a provably accurate approximation.
Elias: That's the core idea, though it comes with a specific technical trick: they augment the original MDP so that it terminates randomly within an expected number of rounds. They call this technique Probabilistic Termination Optimization or PTO, and that’s what they are using to transform the ARR MDP into something simpler.
Priya: So if we imagine this as a process, instead of waiting for it to finish in one specific way, the system has a chance to stop at every step? What kind of termination are they talking about here?
The paper's summary: Nadia: They are focusing on how this random termination helps them get a provably accurate approximation. The central result they prove is that for any policy we choose, the difference between the revenue calculated using their transformed process and the original ARR MDP revenue is bounded by something called O of one over H.
Elias: And that H, as they define it, is basically the expected number of rounds before termination occurs. So if you can control or bound how fast this process terminates, you get a better error guarantee on your strategy calculation. They show that for any policy we pick, the revenue from their transformed process is within O of one over H of the true optimal revenue in the original ARR MDP.
Priya: That sounds like they are giving us a mathematical guarantee on how close their answer is to the true best answer, which is really important when dealing with security thresholds. But what are these expected numbers for H? Are we talking about something small or something large?
Nadia: Well, the paper talks about bounding this error by O of one over H, and they also have a corollary that shows that as H goes to infinity, the approximate revenue from their transformed process converges to the true maximum revenue achievable in the original ARR MDP.
Elias: That means if you let that expected number of rounds grow very large, your approximation gets closer and closer to the actual optimal strategy result. It’s a way of saying we can get arbitrarily accurate results by running this transformation for a long time.
The paper's improvements: Priya: I saw some mentions about how this method compares to other work, like Optimal Selfish Mining strategies or even something called SquirRL. What are the tangible benefits they point out when we look at these comparisons?
Nadia: The main improvement they highlight is speed. They claim that PTO is about one order of magnitude faster than the state-of-the-art methods in terms of how many linear system solutions you have to solve to get an answer. That’s a big deal for practical application, especially when we're trying to find new mining strategies quickly.
Elias: And they also show empirical results for Bitcoin and Ethereum. For instance, they used this method to tighten the security threshold for Ethereum from a value of zero point twenty-six down to zero point two four six eight.
Priya: That reduction in the threshold is significant, so what’s the context there? Is that a big jump in terms of actual security or just a refinement of the bound they are using? I need to understand what that number actually means for someone who only listens to this show.
Nadia: It means they used PTO to estimate a tighter bound on the security threshold, and they say this result is considered good because increasing some parameters, like the maximum fork length, didn't drastically change their results for smaller values of alpha.
Elias: They also found that as you increase H, the approximate revenue converges very quickly to its true optimal value. Also, increasing the maximum fork length helps them get a more accurate approximation by ignoring policies that allow forks longer than some certain threshold.
Conclusion: Nadia: So to wrap up on this paper called "Efficient MDP Analysis for Selfish-Mining in Blockchains," the main thing is that PTO provides a way to solve complex Average Reward Ratio MDPs by transforming them into simpler ones, and they prove the approximation error scales with one over H.
Elias: It means we can get provably accurate results for finding optimal mining strategies much faster than previous methods, and it can be used repeatedly to find more robust reward schemes with higher security thresholds. They also show this method applies to any blockchain protocol that fits the ARR MDP model.
Priya: I just want to make sure we're clear on the practical reality here: they say this method is good for approximating results, but it stops where the underlying assumptions of their model are shaky, and they don't fully prove everything about the system dynamics.
Nadia: Exactly, Priya. It’s a powerful tool for finding strategies quickly, but you always have to remember that it’s an approximation based on some assumptions about the environment, and they are open about what the method doesn't cover.
Elias: So the key point is this "Efficient MDP Analysis for Selfish-Mining in Blockchains" paper shows a practical way to tackle these non-linear reward functions by using a probabilistic termination optimization to achieve a one over H error bound.
Priya: That’s the high level view of what they did, and it points toward methods that simplify complex control problems by introducing stochastic elements into the process.
Roi Bar-Zur, Ittay Eyal, Aviv Tamar
Technion
cs.CR
Submitted: 2020-07-10
Updated: 2020-09-15
Journal ref: AFT '20: Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies, pp. 113-131, 2020
Code: https://github.com/roibarzur/pto-selfish-mining
License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
Importance score: 93/100
The gist: A novel technique called Probabilistic Termination Optimization (PTO) is presented to solve an Average Reward-Ratio MDP by transforming it to a conventional MDP and bounding its approximation error…
Key concepts
- Average Reward-Ratio MDP (ARR-MDP)
- This is a mathematical model used to describe selfish mining in PoW blockchains where the goal is to maximize the average ratio of rewards gained over time relative to the difficulty contribution. It's complex because utility functions are non-linear, making standard optimization difficult.
- Probabilistic Termination Optimization (PTO)
- PTO is a technique that modifies an ARR-MDP by augmenting it so that it terminates randomly within an expected number of rounds. This transformation simplifies the problem into a conventional MDP, allowing standard algorithms to find solutions efficiently while maintaining provable accuracy.
- Approximation Error Bound O(1/H)
- This bound quantifies how close the approximate solution from PTO is to the true optimal solution. H represents the expected number of rounds before termination. A smaller H means a tighter bound, indicating higher accuracy in finding the best mining policy.
- Conventional MDP (PT-MDP)
- A conventional Markov Decision Process is a standard mathematical framework used for sequential decision-making problems. PTO transforms the complex ARR-MDP into this simpler form, enabling the use of well-established and efficient algorithms like value iteration or policy iteration to solve for optimal strategies.
Terminology
Summary
A novel technique called Probabilistic Termination Optimization (PTO) is presented to solve an Average Reward-Ratio MDP by transforming it to a conventional MDP and bounding its approximation error by O(1/H), which is an order of magnitude more efficient than the state of the art <ref:2007. p. 005614#pg7>.
The Core Problem and Solution
The paper addresses the difficulty in finding the optimal strategy for selfish mining in Proof of Work (PoW) blockchains because their utility functions are non-linear, leading to an Average Reward-Ratio MDP (ARR-MDP) <ref:2007.05614#pg2>. The authors propose PTO, a method that solves this by augmenting the MDP such that it terminates randomly within an expected number of rounds, transforming the ARR-MDP into a conventional Markov Decision Process (PT-MDP) <ref:2007. p. 005614#pg4>. This transformation simplifies the objective function to a linear one while maintaining provably accurate approximation <ref:2007. p. 105614#pg4>.
Model Formulation and Assumptions
The analysis begins by modeling the PoW blockchain as an MDP where the agent seeks to maximize REV = E [lim T→∞ 1/T Σ Tt=1 Rt / Σ Tt=1 Dt] <ref:2007.05614#pg5>. Key assumptions include bounding the reward (Assumption 1) and difficulty contribution (Assumption 2), and ensuring that the average difficulty contribution is lower bounded by some constant ε > 0 (Assumption 3) <ref:2007. p. 305614#pg3>. Assumption 4 states that there is a state in ARR-MDP that is positive recurrent for any policy π, which holds under reasonable conditions like not having more than 50% mining power <ref:2007. p. 305614#pg3>.
Theoretical Guarantees of Approximation
The central result proves the approximation error bound, stating that the approximation error of PTO is bounded by O(1/H), where H is the expected number of rounds before termination <ref:2007.05614#pg7>. The authors show that for any policy π, REVπARR - REVπPT(H) = O(1/H) <ref:2007. p. 105614#pg7>. Furthermore, Corollary 3 establishes that lim H→∞ max π REVπPT(H) = max π REVπARR <ref:2007. p. 505614#pg7>.
Performance and Empirical Validation
The performance of PTO is compared against the Optimal Selfish Mining (OSM) strategies, showing it is about an order of magnitude faster in terms of the number of linear system solutions solved <ref:2007.05614#pg5>. Empirical results for Bitcoin show that PTO reproduces OSM results, and for Ethereum, the security threshold is tightened from 0. p. 226 [8, 10] to 0.2468 using PTO <ref:2007. p. 005614#pg4>.
Key Findings on Parameters
The study investigates the effect of hyperparameters like the expected horizon H and maximum fork length <ref:2007.05614#pg4>. The results indicate that as H increases, the approximate revenue converges quickly to its optimal value <ref:2007. p. 805614#pg4>. Similarly, increasing the maximum fork length allows for a more accurate approximation by disregarding policies that allow forks longer than some threshold <ref:2007. p. 805614#pg4>.
Security Threshold Determination
The authors use PTO to estimate the security threshold for Ethereum, finding a tighter bound of 0.2468 <ref:2007. p. 005614#pg4>. This result is considered a good approximation because increasing the maximum fork length barely changed the results for smaller values of α <ref:2007. p. 805614#pg4>. The method is applicable to any blockchain protocol that can be modeled as an ARR-MDP <ref:2007. p. 305614#pg2>.
Conclusion
PTO is presented as an efficient method to find optimal mining strategies in PoW blockchains, proving it is correct and bounding its approximation error by O(1/H) <ref:2007.05614#pg2>. Due to its speed, it can be used repeatedly to find more robust reward schemes with higher security thresholds <ref:2007. p. 305614#pg2>. The paper concludes by demonstrating that PTO can be applied to any blockchain protocol that can be modeled as an MDP with an ARR objective function <ref:2007. p. 305614#pg2>.
Acknowledgments
The authors thank Ren Zhang for sharing his code of OSM [25] and the authors of SquirRL [12] for sharing their code <ref:2007.05614#pg2>. The research was partially supported by the Israel Science Foundation (grants No. p. 1 1641/18 and No. 759/19) and the Open Philanthropy Project Fund, an advised fund of Silicon Valley Community Foundation <ref:2007. p. 105614#pg3>.
References
[1] Dimitri P Bertsekas. 1995. Dynamic programming and optimal control. p. 9 Vol. 1 <ref:2007. p. 005614#pg4>
[2] Vitalik Buterin. 2013. Ethereum white paper <ref:2007. p. 005614#pg2>
[3] Vitalik Buterin. 2016. Ethereum GitHub Repository: Change difficulty adjustment to target mean block time including uncles <ref:2007. p. 905614#pg2>
[4] coinmarketcap.com. 2020. Cryptocurrency Market Capitalizations <ref:2007. p. 005614#pg2>
[5] Cynthia Dwork and Moni Naor. 1992. Pricing via processing or combatting junk mail <ref:2007. p. 005614#pg2>
[6] Aryaz Eghbali and Roger Wattenhofer. 2019. 12 Angry Miners <ref:2007. p. 005614#pg5>
[7] Ittay Eyal and Emin Gün Sirer. 2013. Majority is not Enough: Bitcoin Mining is Vulnerable <ref:2007. p. 005614#pg2>
[8] Chen Feng and Jianyu Niu. 2019. Selfish mining in ethereum <ref:2007. p. 0 p. 005614#pg2>
[9] Robert E Funderlic and CD Meyer Jr. 1986. Sensitivity of the stationary distribution vector for an ergodic Markov chain <ref:2007. p. 205614#pg3>
[10] Cyril Grunspan and Ricardo Pérez-Marco. 2019. Selfish mining in ethereum <ref:2007.05614#pg4>
[11] Charlie Hou, Mingxun Zhou, Yan Ji, Phil Daian, Florian Tramer, Giulia Fanti, and Ari Juels. 2019. SquirRL: Automating Attack Discovery on Blockchain Incentive Mechanisms with Deep Reinforcement Learning <ref:2007. p. 105614#pg2>
[12] Charlie Hou, Mingxun Zhou, Yan Ji, Phil Daian, Florian Tramer, Giulia Fanti, and Ari Juels. 2020. SquirRL GitHub Repository <ref:2007. p. 905614#pg2>
[13] Markus Jakobsson and Ari Juels. 1999. Proofs of work and bread pudding protocols <ref:2007. p. 005614#pg3>
[14] Yujin Kwon, Dohyun Kim, Yunmok Son, Eugene Vasserman, and Yongdae Kim. 2017. Be selfish and avoid dilemmas: Fork after withholding (faw) attacks on bitcoin <ref:2007. p. 105614#pg2>
[15] Satoshi Nakamoto. 2008. Bitcoin: a peer-to-peer electronic cash system <ref:2007. p. 005614#pg2>
[16] Kartik Nayak, Srijan Kumar, Andrew Miller, and Elaine Shi. 2016. Stubborn mining: Generalizing selfish mining and combining with an eclipse attack <ref:2007. p. 005614#pg3>
[17] Rafael Pass and Elaine Shi. 2017. Fruitchains: A fair blockchain <ref:2007. p. 005614#pg3>
[18] Fabian Ritz and Alf Zugenmaier. 2018. The impact of uncle rewards on selfish mining in ethereum <ref:2007. p. 005614#pg4>
[19] Ayelet Sapirshtein, Yonatan Sompolinsky, and Aviv Zohar. 2016. Optimal selfish mining strategies in bitcoin <ref:2007. p. 105614#pg3>
[20] Richard Serfozo. 2009. Basics of applied stochastic processes <ref:2007. p. 205614#pg4>
[21] Itay Tsabary and Ittay Eyal. 2018. The gap game <ref:2007. p. 005614#pg2>
[22] Taotao Wang, Soung Chang Liew, and Shengli Zhang. 2019. When blockchain meets AI: Optimal mining strategy achieved by machine learning <ref:2007. p. 105614#pg5>
[23] CC White. 2001. Markov decision processes <ref:2007. p. 0
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Improvements for AI systems
-
Probabilistic Termination Optimization (PTO) can be used to find optimal mining strategies by transforming an Average Reward-Ratio MDP into a conventional MDP with a probability of termination at each step, which is then solved using standard algorithms like value iteration or policy iteration.
-
The improved system can calculate the security threshold for Proof of Work blockchains like Ethereum more accurately, reducing it from 0.26 [8, 10] to 0.2468 by leveraging the tight approximation error bound of O(1/H).
-
The system can compare its performance against state-of-the-art methods like Optimal Selfish Mining (OSM) and SquirRL, demonstrating that PTO is about one order of magnitude faster in terms of the number of linear systems solved.
-
For complex protocols like Ethereum, the system can model intricate features such as uncle blocks by incorporating a detailed state space vector including parameters for uncle distance and pending blocks, reducing the state space size by a factor of 6 to approximately 5.7 compared to Bitcoin models.
Sources
- Selfish Mining in Ethereum
- SquirRL: Automating Attack Analysis on Blockchain Incentive Mechanisms with Deep Reinforcement Learning
- When Blockchain Meets AI: Optimal Mining Strategy Achieved By Machine Learning
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