Zirah: A Post-Quantum True Random Number Generator Hardware Signer With an Avalanche Noise
summary
The gist
Zirah is a hardware signer built around an STM32F407 microcontroller and its purpose is to find out where a post-quantum signing key is exposed and what actually protects it The device draws every…
In short
Zirah is a hardware signer built around an STM32F407 to investigate post-quantum key exposure. It generates true random bits from an avalanche noise source, computes ML-DSA-65 using arithmetic masking, and combines it with ECDSA P-256 from a secure element. The device tests the security implications of this hybrid signing approach.
Key concepts
- Entropy Source Assessment
- This section evaluates the random number generator's quality by measuring its output. It uses a physical noise source, amplifies it, and then checks it against NIST SP 800-90B standards to determine how many truly unpredictable bits are available for cryptographic use.
- ML-DSA-65
- This is the specific post-quantum digital signature algorithm implemented on the STM32 microcontroller. The implementation uses two-share arithmetic masking during secret key multiplications to protect these sensitive operations from attacks that target this type of chip architecture.
- Two-Share Arithmetic Masking
- This is a technique used in cryptography where a secret value is split into multiple shares, and operations are performed on these shares separately. In Zirah, this masking protects the secret-key multiplications within the ML-DSA-65 computation.
- Hybrid Signature Design
- Zirah uses two different signing methods simultaneously: ML-DSA-65 (post-quantum) and ECDSA P-256 (classical). The goal is that if one algorithm is broken, the other can still provide security. However, the paper notes its quantum security relies heavily on the microcontroller's readout protection.
Terminology used across episodes
This episode discusses
- Zirah: A Post-Quantum True Random Number Generator Hardware Signer With an Avalanche Noise · Paper Radio
The paper
Zirah: A Post-Quantum True Random Number Generator Hardware Signer With an Avalanche Noise · Read on arXiv
Muhammad Shaheer Bin Junaid
Zirah is a hardware signer built around an STM32F407 microcontroller, and its purpose is to find out, on inexpensive hardware, where a post-quantum signing key is exposed and what actually protects it. The device draws every random bit from a reverse-biased 2N3904 junction in avalanche breakdown, amplified by an LM358 and screened by SP 800-90B health tests, computes ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204, hedged) on the STM32 with two-share arithmetic masking of the secret-key multiplications, and adds ECDSA P-256 from an ATECC608 secure element over the same digest, once a person has matched an eight-digit digest prefix on its OLED with the PC and pressed a button. A desktop application and a command-line tool drive the board and verify its output, and because only a 32-byte manifest digest reaches the device, it signs files of any type and size, returning signed copies for PDF, Office Open XML, ZIP, PNG and JPEG files and detached records for every other format. NIST's SP 800-90B tool rejected the IID assumption for 1,000,000 raw samples and assessed 6.898 bits of min-entropy per byte on the non-IID track, against the 1 bit the firmware credits, while spectral lines near 116 Hz that hold about 5 % of the variance remain unexplained. At 168 MHz the masked signature took a median of 157 ms over 20 runs and a complete signing operation under 0.8 s, and the signer matched the pq-crystals reference in 1,976 checks natively and on an emulated Cortex-M4. The ATECC608 can neither store the 4,032-byte ML-DSA-65 key nor compute with it, so that key sits in ordinary flash behind readout protection, and on an earlier board, before that protection was enabled, a debugger copied it out and the copy produced a valid ML-DSA-65 signature without the device, although the leakage results come from an instruction-level emulator and nothing here is certified.
Transcript
Introduction to the show: ident: Security Radio. Generated commentary on the latest security and cryptography papers.
Nadia: We're looking at the paper: "Zirah: A Post-Quantum True Random Number Generator Hardware Signer With an Avalanche Noise".
Elias: Here's the gist of the paper. Zirah is a hardware signer built around an STM32F407 microcontroller and its purpose is to find out where a post-quantum signing key is exposed and what actually protects it The device draws every random bit from a reverse-biased 2N3904 junction in avalanche breakdown, amplified by an LM358 and screened by SP 800-90B health tests, computes ML-DSA-65 on the STM32 with two-share arithmetic masking of the secret-key multiplications, and adds ECDSA P-256 from an ATECC608 secure element over the same digest.
Nadia: System Architecture and Components Zirah is a piece of hardware built to study that constraint It consists of one microcontroller board and two solderless prototyping boards, Board A with the noise source and Board B with the secure element and the display, which holds both signing keys, the post-quantum one in the STM32’s flash and the classical one inside the ATECC608.
Elias: The main board is a DevEBox STM32F4XX M core board with an STM32F407VE, a Cortex-M4F running at 168 MHz with 512 KB of flash, 128 KB of main SRAM and 64 KB of core-coupled memory (CCM).
Nadia: Board B holds the ATECC608 module and a 1.3-inch SH1106 OLED on a software I2C bus.
Paper summary: Nadia: So putting it all together, this paper with the title "Zirah: A Post-Quantum True Random Number Generator Hardware Signer With an Avalanche Noise" is basically showing us a prototype that tests where post-quantum signing keys might be exposed on low-cost hardware >
Elias: It demonstrates a setup where you get randomness from an avalanche noise source, process it through masking for the post-quantum part, and then combine it with a classical signature from a secure element >
Priya: The main implication I see is that even with these complex cryptographic steps running on this kind of hardware, the actual security against quantum threats comes down to basic things like memory readout protection >
Nadia: Exactly. It’s not about having the most advanced algorithm; it’s about how you physically secure the key material where it lives >
Elias: And they explicitly state their limitations: this is just a single prototype without formal certification, no independent audit, and no FIPS one hundred forty-three or SP eight hundred nine zero B validation >
Priya: So, for someone listening who just wants to know what this paper means practically, it's a demonstration of the design choices they made when trying to build something that combines post-quantum and classical cryptography on affordable chips >
Conclusion: Nadia: So, this paper is about Zirah, which is this hardware device they built to see if you can expose post-quantum signing keys on real chips and what actually protects them >
Elias: Yeah, it uses a lot of clever stuff like avalanche noise to get randomness and then masks the secret key multiplications for the post-quantum part >
Priya: And they combine that with a classical signature from a secure element, which is interesting because it's testing both sides of the crypto coin >
Nadia: It really boils down to whether you trust the hardware's internal protection against someone trying to read those keys out >
Elias: The authors are looking at how these different security layers interact when you put them all on one board, like with that STM32 and the secure element >
Priya: And they show us some performance numbers, like how fast it can do a signature, but they also lay out some real limits on what this prototype is actually doing right now >
Nadia: They admit there are no formal audits or certifications for this thing yet, which is a big caveat when we're talking about real-world security >
Elias: Exactly, and their next steps involve figuring out physical leakage from the microcontroller itself and improving the masking to make it even more secure >
Priya: It makes you wonder what kind of practical attacks they are actually trying to defend against with this setup >
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