MAD-DAG: Protecting Blockchain Consensus from MEV
summary
The gist
Blockchain security is threatened by selfish mining, where a miner (operator) deviates from the protocol to increase their revenue The state-of-the-art selfish-mining-resistant blockchain protocol…
In short
MAD-DAG is a new blockchain protocol designed to stop selfish mining, where miners cheat to gain extra revenue. It introduces a unique ledger function that discards transactions from chains of equal length competing for the longest chain. This makes it resistant to adverse conditions like rushing attacks and petty-compliant miners, offering robust security comparable to existing protocols.
Key concepts
- Selfish Mining
- This is when a miner ignores the network rules to increase their personal profit by manipulating transactions or block creation. It's an incentive for miners to act selfishly rather than following the protocol, which threatens blockchain security.
- MAD Ledger Function
- A novel function in MAD-DAG that decides which transactions are valid. It works by discarding the contents of blocks on the longest chain if another chain of equal length exists, preventing selfish miners from profiting from these conflicting chains.
- Markov Decision Process (MDP)
- A mathematical model used to analyze how a rational miner makes decisions in a blockchain network. The authors use this model to create conservative reward rules, allowing them to find the minimum computational power needed for selfish mining profit.
Terminology used across episodes
This episode discusses
- MAD-DAG: Protecting Blockchain Consensus from MEV · Paper Radio
- Colordag: An Incentive-Compatible Blockchain
- On profitability of selfish mining
- SquirRL: Automating Attack Analysis on Blockchain Incentive Mechanisms with Deep Reinforcement Learning
- Automated Selfish Mining Analysis for DAG-Based PoW Consensus Protocols
- Tailstorm: A Secure and Fair Blockchain for Cash Transactions
- BBCA-CHAIN: Low Latency, High Throughput BFT Consensus on a DAG
- Bitcoin under Volatile Block Rewards: How Mempool Statistics Can Influence Bitcoin Mining
- Mining Power Destruction Attacks in the Presence of Petty-Compliant Mining Pools
The paper
MAD-DAG: Protecting Blockchain Consensus from MEV · Read on arXiv
Technion
Blockchain security is threatened by selfish mining, where a miner (operator) deviates from the protocol to increase their revenue. Selfish mining is exacerbated by adverse conditions: rushing (network propagation advantage for the selfish miner), varying block rewards due to block contents, called miner extractable value (MEV), and petty-compliant miners who accept bribes from the selfish miner. The state-of-the-art selfish-mining-resistant blockchain protocol, Colordag, does not treat these adverse conditions and was proven secure only when its latency is impractically high. We present MAD-DAG, Mutually-Assured-Destruction Directed-Acyclic-Graph, the first practical protocol to counter selfish mining under adverse conditions. MAD-DAG achieves this thanks to its novel ledger function, which discards the contents of equal-length chains competing to be the longest. We analyze selfish mining in both Colordag and MAD-DAG by modeling a rational miner using a Markov Decision Process (MDP). We obtain a tractable model for both by developing conservative reward rules that favor the selfish miner to yield an upper bound on selfish mining revenue. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first tractable model of selfish mining in a practical DAG-based blockchain. This enables us to obtain a lower bound on the security threshold, the minimum fraction of computational power a miner needs in order to profit from selfish mining. MAD-DAG withstands adverse conditions under which Colordag and Bitcoin fail, while otherwise maintaining comparable security. For example, with petty-compliant miners and high levels of block reward variability, MAD-DAG's security threshold ranges from 11% to 31%, whereas both Colordag and Bitcoin achieve 0% for all levels.
DOI: 10.1109/SP63933.2026.00176
Transcript
Introduction to the show: ident: Security Radio. Generated commentary on the latest security and cryptography papers.
Nadia: I'm Nadia.
Elias: And I'm Elias, here with Priya.
Nadia: We're looking at the paper: "MAD-DAG: Protecting Blockchain Consensus from MEV".
Elias: Here's the gist of the paper. Blockchain security is threatened by selfish mining, where a miner (operator) deviates from the protocol to increase their revenue The state-of-the-art selfish-mining-resistant blockchain protocol, Colordag, does not treat these adverse conditions and was proven secure only when its latency is impractically high We present MAD-DAG, Mutual Assured Destruction DirectedAcyclic-Graph, the first practical protocol to counter selfish mining under adverse conditions MAD-DAG achieves this thanks to its novel ledger function, which discards the contents of equal-length chains competing to be the longest This approach is in contrast to both NC and Colordag, which simply take the content of all blocks in the longest chain MAD-DAG withstands adverse conditions under which Colordag and Bitcoin fail, while otherwise maintaining comparable security Core Mechanism Introduction MAD-DAG introduces a novel ledger function that determines the content of the ledger (the transactions that are considered valid) given all the observed blocks and their contents The MAD (Mutual Assured Destruction) ledger function takes a novel approach by completely discarding the content of blocks on the longest chain that have another chain with the same length This ensures that the miner does not receive any transactions fees or MEV Our MAD ledger function is also incentive compatible to pettycompliant miners: If a selfish miner attempts to bribe a pettycompliant miner to mine on their chain that has equal length to the longest chain, the petty-compliant miner can point to both chains, causing their contents to be discarded and enabling the petty-compliant miner to use the content in their own block Modeling Selfish Mining We analyze selfish mining in both Colordag and MAD-DAG by modeling a rational miner using a Markov Decision Process (MDP) We obtain a tractable model for both by developing conservative reward rules that favor the selfish miner to yield an upper bound on selfish mining revenue To the best of our knowledge, this is the first tractable model of selfish mining in a practical DAG-based blockchain This enables us to obtain a lower bound on the security threshold, the minimum fraction of computational power a miner needs in order to profit from selfish mining Adverse Condition Resistance MAD-DAG’s difficulty-adjustment mechanism increases the security threshold from 25% in NC and 34% in Colordag to 39% in MAD-DAG, in the presence of a rushing adversary and in a practical setting where Nl = 25 When petty-compliant miners are present, Colordag’s security threshold drops to 0% at a mild level of block reward variability while MADDAG’s security threshold remains unaffected by their presence and remains above 11% even with extreme block reward variability Security Threshold Analysis We compare the security threshold of the three protocols as a function of fork sensitivity Nl (Figure 4) Canonical-DAG has a higher security threshold compared to NC and Colordag for all tie-breaking rules and all values of Nl MAD-DAG is significantly higher than Canonical-DAG for the worst-case tie-breaking rule, with the security threshold being above 30% for Nl ≥ 15 We present MAD-DAG, the first practical DAG-based blockchain protocol that disincentivizes selfish mining under adverse conditions including rushing attacks, varying block rewards, and pettycompliant miners MAD-DAG provides the most robust defense available We conduct the first tractable MDP-based analysis of selfish mining in DAG-based blockchains using a novel upper-bound model that conservatively favors the selfish miner MAD-DAG’s security threshold consistently matches or exceeds Colordag’s and NC’s Critically, MAD-DAG retains its security against well-connected selfish miners and petty-compliant miners, while selfish mining becomes profitable in both NC and Colordag for miners of any size This is achieved with fork sensitivity as low as 15, enabling practical deployment unlike Colordag which requires impractically high values MAD-DAG provides the most robust defense available References
Title and authors: Elias: Moving on to the specifics of "MAD-DAG: Protecting Blockchain Consensus from MEV", the paper dives into how they built this ledger function and what it actually does under different chain length scenarios.
Nadia: They introduce two types of MAD ledger functions based on whether the competing chains are equal in length or not >
Priya: Can you explain those two cases? It sounds like the core difference is how they treat the content of those blocks when there's a tie in length >
Elias: Case A is the MAD ledger function for equal length chains, which it completely discards >
Nadia: That means if you have multiple chains of the same length competing to be longest, this specific function just throws away all their contents >
Priya: And Case B is the MAD ledger function for different length chains, which seems to take a different approach entirely >
Elias: Case B is for different length chains, and it takes the contents of those blocks from both competing chains >
Nadia: This difference is what allows them to disincentivize selfish mining due to transaction fees, because in Case A, a miner doesn't get those fees anymore >
Priya: But I'm curious about the incentive compatibility bit they mentioned earlier; how does that work with this ledger function choice?
Elias: The second key feature is that their MAD ledger function is also incentive compatible to petty-compliant miners >
Nadia: If a selfish miner tries to bribe a petty-compliant miner who is on an equal length chain, the petty-compliant miner can point to both chains >
Priya: And by pointing to both, they cause the contents of those equal length chains to be discarded, which lets them use that content in their own block >
Elias: That mechanism prevents the bribe from working because they can't get the fees from both sides simultaneously >
Nadia: So it’s not just about discarding data; it’s about structuring the interaction so that honesty is rewarded with access to those transactions >
Priya: It seems like a clever way to solve a specific problem that simpler reward mechanisms just couldn't handle, especially when dealing with MEV >
Elias: Exactly; they chose this approach because simply burning transaction fees didn't work well for MEV because it’s transparent to the consensus protocol >
Nadia: So this paper is really showing how you can make a DAG structure robust against specific economic attacks by designing the ledger function around those attacks >
The paper's summary: Priya: Let's talk about the tangible improvements they propose beyond just having a new ledger function; what are the actual advancements in terms of security thresholds and performance?
Nadia: One major improvement is their difficulty adjustment mechanism, which increases the security threshold from twenty-five percent in NC and thirty-four percent in Colordag up to thirty-nine percent for MAD-DAG > <ref:2511.21552#pg1>
Elias: That jump to thirty-nine percent is notable, especially when you consider they are operating under adverse conditions where N equal length is actually twenty-five > <ref:2511.21552#pg1>
Priya: I remember reading that Colordag’s security threshold drops all the way to zero when there's mild block reward variability and petty-compliant miners involved >
Nadia: That’s true, and in that same scenario, MAD-DAG's security threshold remains unaffected by their presence and stays above eleven percent even with extreme block reward variability > <ref:2511.21552#pg1>
Elias: So it seems like the key improvement here is resilience against varying block rewards and the presence of petty-compliant miners >
Priya: Also, they modeled selfish mining using a Markov Decision Process, which lets them find a tractable upper bound on selfish mining revenue that favors the selfish miner >
Nadia: That's true; they developed conservative reward rules that favor the selfish miner to yield an upper bound on their potential profit >
Elias: That modeling effort is what allows them to get a lower bound on the security threshold, which is that minimum fraction of computational power a miner needs to profit from selfish mining >
Priya: So this whole section is about showing that their defense isn't just theoretical; it has quantifiable results against these specific threats >
Nadia: It really shows how they managed to stay ahead of the curve by accounting for all these adverse conditions in their design, which is something Colordag didn't handle well >
The paper's improvements: Elias: So we've seen how MAD-DAG handles equal length chains and incentive compatibility, and now we wrap up with what this means for the practical deployment of this protocol.
Nadia: The main implication is that MAD-DAG provides the most robust defense available against selfish mining under conditions like rushing attacks, varying block rewards, and petty-compliant miners >
Priya: It sounds like they managed to match or exceed Colordag's and NC's security thresholds while keeping the attack profitable for any size of miner >
Elias: That’s right; it retains its security against well-connected selfish miners and petty-compliant miners, even though selfishness is still profitable for miners of any size in both NC and Colordag >
Nadia: The crucial part is that this is achieved with fork sensitivity as low as fifteen which means it can be deployed practically instead of requiring the impractically high values seen in Colordag > <ref:2511.21552#pg1>
Priya: It's encouraging to hear that the model gives us a concrete number like fork sensitivity as low as fifteen making deployment feasible for real systems > <ref:2511.21552#pg1>
Elias: In short, "MAD-DAG: Protecting Blockchain Consensus from MEV" presents a protocol that is highly resilient and addresses real-world challenges in decentralized systems >
Nadia: We’ve looked at how this paper tackles these issues, and it shows that we can build defenses that are robust against adverse conditions using novel ledger functions >
Priya: It’s a solid piece of research because it gives us a concrete way to measure the security threshold against real-world attacks >
Elias: Indeed, MAD-DAG is presenting itself as the most practical solution for countering selfish mining in this context.
Conclusion: Nadia: So, to wrap up, this paper introduces MAD-DAG, which they claim is the first practical Directed Acyclic Graph based protocol that stops selfish mining under really tough conditions like rushing attacks and varying block rewards >
Elias: And the core of their defense is this novel ledger function. It completely discards the contents of any blocks on a chain that has another chain with exactly the same length, which they call the MAD function >
Priya: So when you think about what that actually does, it means a miner doesn't get those transaction fees or those MEV rewards from those equal length chains >
Nadia: Exactly. And they also have this incentive compatibility feature where if a petty-compliant miner tries to bribe someone on an equal length chain, the petty-compliant miner can point to both chains and get their content in their own block anyway >
Elias: That's a clever way to structure the interaction so that honesty works better than trying to exploit the system with bribes or MEV >
Priya: I was looking at how they modeled selfish mining using a Markov Decision Process, which is interesting because it gives them this tractable model for finding an upper bound on what a selfish miner can actually make >
Nadia: That modeling effort lets them get a lower bound on the security threshold, which is that minimum amount of computational power a miner needs to profit from selfish mining >
Elias: And they showed that MAD-DAG’s difficulty adjustment mechanism pushes that security threshold up to thirty-nine percent when the network has twenty-five equal length chains, which is much better than what they see in Colordag or NC >
Priya: It also showed that even with petty-compliant miners around, like Colordag's security drops to zero at a mild level of block reward variability, but MAD-DAG stays above eleven percent even if the rewards are changing a lot >
Nadia: So for someone just listening, what this means is they built something that doesn't just work in perfect conditions; it’s designed to withstand messy real-world environments like unpredictable block rewards and miners trying to cheat >
Elias: It’s important to remember that they found a way to make this practical with a fork sensitivity as low as fifteen, which means it can actually be deployed instead of just sitting in theory >
Priya: Overall, the paper "MAD-DAG: Protecting Blockchain Consensus from MEV" shows how you can design the ledger function specifically around those economic attacks rather than just burning fees >
Nadia: It’s a really robust defense, and it seems like they've given us a strong blueprint for how to build DAG protocols that are truly resilient.
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