faulTPM: Exposing AMD fTPMs' Deepest Secrets

summary

The gist

Trusted Platform Modules (TPMs) are vulnerable to physical attacks against their execution environment…

In short

Researchers demonstrated that AMD firmware TPMs (fTPMs) are vulnerable to physical attacks by compromising their Trusted Execution Environment (AMD-SP) using voltage fault injection. This allows attackers to extract a chip-unique secret, bypassing authentication mechanisms like PCR validation. The findings show that BitLocker's TPM-only protector is ineffective, suggesting users should use a TPM and PIN configuration for better security.

Key concepts

fTPM
Firmware TPM is a type of Trusted Platform Module integrated into the system's firmware. Unlike discrete TPMs, fTPMs do not communicate over an exposed bus to the CPU, making them immune to certain sniffing attacks. However, this paper shows that attacking their internal execution environment can compromise the entire state.
AMD-SP
The AMD Secure Processor is the Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) for AMD's fTPMs. The attack targets vulnerabilities within this processor using voltage fault injection to extract a secret key unique to each CPU. This secret is crucial because it protects all the non-volatile data stored on the system.
Voltage Fault Injection
This is a physical attack technique where precise, temporary fluctuations in the voltage supplied to a chip are induced. The goal is to cause transient errors during critical operations within the AMD-SP. By inducing these faults, attackers can force the processor to leak sensitive information, such as the chip-unique secret.
TPM State Compromise
This means an attacker gains complete access to all data and secrets stored or sealed within the TPM. Because this attack extracts keys used for storage and integrity, it defeats security measures like Platform Configuration Register (PCR) validation, allowing extraction of cryptographic material regardless of how the system is authenticated.

Terminology used across episodes

This episode discusses

The paper

faulTPM: Exposing AMD fTPMs' Deepest Secrets · Read on arXiv

Technische Universitat Berlin · Fraunhofer SIT

Trusted Platform Modules constitute an integral building block of modern security features. Moreover, as Windows 11 made a TPM 2.0 mandatory, they are subject to an ever-increasing academic challenge. While discrete TPMs - as found in higher-end systems - have been susceptible to attacks on their exposed communication interface, more common firmware TPMs (fTPMs) are immune to this attack vector as they do not communicate with the CPU via an exposed bus. In this paper, we analyze a new class of attacks against fTPMs: Attacking their Trusted Execution Environment can lead to a full TPM state compromise. We experimentally verify this attack by compromising the AMD Secure Processor, which constitutes the TEE for AMD's fTPMs. In contrast to previous dTPM sniffing attacks, this vulnerability exposes the complete internal TPM state of the fTPM. It allows us to extract any cryptographic material stored or sealed by the fTPM regardless of authentication mechanisms such as Platform Configuration Register validation or passphrases with anti-hammering protection. First, we demonstrate the impact of our findings by - to the best of our knowledge - enabling the first attack against Full Disk Encryption solutions backed by an fTPM. Furthermore, we lay out how any application relying solely on the security properties of the TPM - like Bitlocker's TPM- only protector - can be defeated by an attacker with 2-3 hours of physical access to the target device. Lastly, we analyze the impact of our attack on FDE solutions protected by a TPM and PIN strategy. While a naive implementation also leaves the disk completely unprotected, we find that BitLocker's FDE implementation withholds some protection depending on the complexity of the used PIN. Our results show that when an fTPM's internal state is compromised, a TPM and PIN strategy for FDE is less secure than TPM-less protection with a reasonable passphrase.

DOI: 10.1109/EuroSP57164.2023.00069

Transcript

Introduction to the show: ident: Security Radio. Generated commentary on the latest security and cryptography papers.

Nadia: I'm Nadia.

Elias: And I'm Elias, here with Priya.

Nadia: We're looking at the paper: "faulTPM: Exposing AMD fTPMs' Deepest Secrets".

Elias: Here's the gist of the paper. Trusted Platform Modules (TPMs) are vulnerable to physical attacks against their execution environment, which can lead to a full TPM state compromise This vulnerability allows an attacker to extract any cryptographic material stored or sealed by the fTPM regardless of authentication mechanisms This attack can be used to successfully attack Microsoft BitLocker’s TPM-only key protector Attack Mechanism and Impact The paper demonstrates that AMD’s fTPMs are vulnerable to physical attacks against their execution environment, the AMD Secure Processor (AMD-SP) The attack utilizes the AMD-SP’s vulnerability to voltage fault injection attacks to extract a chip-unique secret from the targeted CPU This secret is subsequently used to derive the storage and integrity keys protecting the fTPM’s non-volatile (NV) data stored on the Basic Input/Output System (BIOS) flash chip In contrast to previous dTPM sniffing attacks, this approach exposes the complete internal TPM state of the fTPM Furthermore, once we have extracted the chip-unique secret through voltage fault injection, we only need to re-read the BIOS flash to defeat any TPM-based security measures Key Derivation and Extraction The authors reverse-engineered the NV storage format of AMD’s fTPM and the derivation of the chip-unique keys protecting its confidentiality and integrity The non-volatile (NV) state of AMD’s fTPM is stored on the motherboard’s BIOS flash chip The storage and integrity keys are derived from a 128 bit secret unique to each CPU This derivation process involves a sequence of steps including AES128 decryption, KDF3 application, and SHA256 HMAC calculations The chip-unique secret is contained in a read-protected area of the protected slot Case Study on FDE Security The paper evaluates the severity of its fTPM attack by conducting a case study on BitLocker’s TPM-only and TPM and PIN protectors The results show that BitLocker’s TPM-only protector is ineffective when the TPM’s internal state can be extracted In contrast, BitLocker’s TPM and PIN protector retains the protection that a PIN-only strategy would offer The authors find that a TPM and PIN protector can be implemented such that the security of a PIN-only strategy remains once the fTPM state is compromised Mitigation Strategies Stopping arbitrary code execution attacks on the AMD-SP is identified as the only way to mitigate our attack effectively For Zen 2/3 systems, mitigations involve changes in the hardware of the SoC or the ROM boot loader of the AMD-SP Intel’s introduction of digital detection circuitry into their Converged Security and Manageability Engine (CSME) is mentioned as a preemptive measure The paper concludes that users who fear a physical attacker with reasonable resources should opt for a TPM and PIN configuration When BitLocker identifies that the underlying TPM is an fTPM, users should be urged to turn their PIN into a passphrase Awareness of the required security levels and the TPM variant in use is essential Data Availability The authors publish all code necessary to mount the attack under

27: The repository further includes several intermediate results, e.g., flash memory dumps, to retrace the attack process without possessing the target boards and required hardware tools The paper's arXiv ID is 2304.14717.

Nadia: References

2: Advanced Micro Devices.

Elias: AMD Firmware TPM Updates

3: Advanced Micro Devices.

Nadia: AMD Memory Guard - Whitepaper

4: Advanced Micro Devices.

Paper summary: Nadia: We’re talking about this paper now, "faulTPM: Exposing AMD fTPMs' Deepest Secrets." The central thesis is pretty direct: Trusted Platform Modules are vulnerable to physical attacks against their execution environment, which can lead to a full TPM state compromise <ref:2304.14717#pg1>.

Elias: They claim this vulnerability lets an attacker extract any cryptographic material stored or sealed by the fTPM, no matter what authentication mechanisms you have in place <ref:2304.14717#pg2>. This is significant because it bypasses things like PCR validation or passphrases with anti-hammering protection.

Priya: So, to put it simply for the listener, this paper argues that attackers can get a complete picture of everything the TPM has sealed inside, not just what's allowed to be used.

Nadia: Right. They verify this by compromising the AMD Secure Processor, which is the Trusted Execution Environment for these fTPMs <ref:2304.14717#pg2>. By attacking this processor, they extract a chip-unique secret from the CPU <ref:2304.14717#pg2>.

Elias: That secret then lets them derive the storage and integrity keys protecting the non-volatile data on the BIOS flash chip <ref:2304.14717#pg2>. They show that this is a new class of attack against fTPMs, different from previous dTPM sniffing attacks <ref:2304.14717#pg1>.

Priya: What does this mean for the security landscape? If you use an fTPM, does that automatically put you at risk of this type of compromise?

Nadia: It means that relying on an fTPM alone isn't enough if you’re worried about physical access <ref:2304.14717#pg3>. This attack shows a way to defeat TPM-based security measures when the internal state is compromised, which we see in case studies with BitLocker <ref:2304.14717#pg3>.

Elias: The paper highlights that even with a TPM and PIN protector, if the fTPM state is compromised, it retains the protection that a PIN-only strategy would offer <ref:2304.14717#pg3>. That’s an important distinction for how you think about layered security.

Priya: So, to recap: they found a way to compromise the entire internal state of an fTPM by targeting its execution environment, which lets them extract secrets and potentially defeat standard protection methods <ref:2304.14717#pg1>.

Conclusion: Nadia: So, looking at the whole paper, "faulTPM: Exposing AMD fTPMs' Deepest Secrets," the authors are basically showing that physical access can be a serious threat to these components <ref:2304.14717#pg1>.

Elias: The authors are Hans Niklas Jacob, Christian Werling, Robert Buhren, and Jean-Pierre Seifert from Technische Universitat Berlin <ref:2304.14717#pg1>. Their work focuses on exploiting the execution environment of AMD fTPMs <ref:2304.14717#pg2>.

Priya: The implication for us is that we need to be aware of the specific TPM variant in use and what security level you actually need for your data at rest <ref:2304.14717#pg3>. This isn't just abstract theory; it’s about practical choices.

Nadia: Exactly. The paper suggests that if you fear a physical attacker with reasonable resources, the best bet is to use a TPM and PIN configuration <ref:2304.14717#pg3>. If you are using an fTPM and BitLocker detects it, you should turn your PIN into something more like a passphrase <ref:2304.14717#pg3>.

Elias: Ultimately, the paper demonstrates that if an attacker can compromise the internal state of the fTPM through voltage fault injection, any TPM-based security is potentially defeated <ref:2304.14717#pg3>. It’s a strong message about physical security versus software protection.

Priya: It really shows that securing data at rest requires considering both the software layer and the physical layer of defense <ref:2304.14717#pg3>. That balance is something we should all be thinking about when choosing our security implementations.

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