Co-Design of Cryptographic Parameters and Delay-Aware Feedback Gain for Encrypted Control Systems

summary

The gist

Encrypted control employs homomorphic encryption (HE) to protect both the computation and communication stages…

In short

The research proposes a framework to jointly design cryptographic parameters and a feedback gain for encrypted control systems. This co-design aims to maintain system stability despite performance degradation caused by encryption-induced delays during communication and computation. The method uses delay bounds derived from lemmas and solves feasibility problems via an outer-inner loop.

Key concepts

Homomorphic Encryption (HE)
HE is a cryptographic technique that allows computations to be performed directly on encrypted data without decrypting it first. In this context, it protects both the control signals and the state information during transmission and processing.
Total Delay ($ au_ heta$)
This measures the cumulative time delay introduced by various stages of encryption, communication, and decryption in a networked control system. The paper quantifies this delay using specific lemmas to establish an upper bound ($ar{ au}_ heta$), which is crucial for stability analysis.
Delay-Aware Gain Design
This involves designing the feedback gain ($K$) specifically considering the maximum possible total delay ($ au_ heta$). Instead of a fixed gain, the system seeks a gain that ensures stability across all delays within a defined range.
Outer-Inner Co-design Framework
This is an iterative design strategy. The outer loop chooses cryptographic parameters ($ heta$) based on security and delay constraints. The inner loop then searches for a stabilizing feedback gain ($K$) that works with the chosen parameters, ensuring both security and performance goals are met simultaneously.

Terminology used across episodes

This episode discusses

The paper

Co-Design of Cryptographic Parameters and Delay-Aware Feedback Gain for Encrypted Control Systems · Read on arXiv

Seoul National University

Encrypted control employs homomorphic encryption (HE) to protect both the computation and communication stages, making it a promising approach for secure networked control systems. Most existing results pre-design a controller in the plaintext domain and then implement it over encrypted data. However, this can be problematic because HE induces non-negligible communication and computation delays that typically increase with the security level, potentially degrading control performance and even destabilizing the closed-loop system. To address this issue, we propose a co-design framework for cryptographic parameters and delay-aware feedback gain. We first characterize an upper bound of the encryption-induced delay as a function of the cryptographic parameters. Then, for a given set of cryptographic parameters and feedback gain, we derive a sufficient condition under which the closed-loop system remains stable for all admissible delays, expressed as a finite set of linear matrix inequalities. This leads to a tractable outer-inner design procedure: the outer loop selects cryptographic parameters satisfying the desired security level, while the inner loop seeks a stabilizing delay-aware feedback gain.

DOI: 10.23919/SICEFES71276.2026.11739283

Transcript

Introduction to the show: ident: Robotics Radio. Generated commentary on the latest robotics and control papers.

Rosa: I'm Rosa.

Dev: And I'm Dev, here with Taro.

Rosa: We're looking at the paper: "Co-Design of Cryptographic Parameters and Delay-Aware Feedback Gain for Encrypted Control Systems".

Dev: Here's the gist of the paper. Encrypted control employs homomorphic encryption (HE) to protect both the computation and communication stages, making it a promising approach for secure networked control systems This paper proposes a co-design framework for cryptographic parameters and delay-aware feedback gain to address performance degradation caused by encryption-induced delays in encrypted control systems.

Rosa: Problem Formulation The research considers a continuous-time linear plant described by the equation x˙(t) = Ax(t) + Bu(t), x(0) = xini, (2) To stabilize this system, a discrete-time static state feedback controller u

k: = Kx

k: is used with a sampling time of Ts > 0 for k ∈ Z≥0.

Dev: The networked control system implementation integrates an LWE based scheme to protect the feedback gain and sampled state against eavesdropping The overall configuration involves encrypting the controller gain K as K = Enc′K s mod q ∈ (C′)m×n, (4) and transmitting the sampled state x

k: as x

k: = Enc x

k: r mod q ∈ Cn, (5) to a remote server.

Rosa: Quantification of Total Delay The total delay τθ is decomposed as τθ = τ Comm θ + τ Enc θ + τ Dec θ + τ ⊗ θ, (8) where the terms represent delays due to communication, sensor-side encryption, actuator-side decryption, and server-side homomorphic multiplication.

Title and authors: Rosa: So this paper is called "Co-Design of Cryptographic Parameters and Delay-Aware Feedback Gain for Encrypted Control Systems". It sounds like they're tackling the problem where you use encryption, right?

Dev: Yeah, essentially they're trying to figure out how to pick the right encryption settings and the feedback gain at the same time so that everything stays stable when there are delays introduced by that encryption.

Rosa: That makes sense for networked control systems, because if you just encrypt everything and then design a controller for the perfect system, those delays can really mess things up.

Dev: Exactly. They look at how much delay there is from communication and how much comes from the actual encryption steps, like encryption and decryption on the sensor side or homomorphic multiplication on the server side.

Taro: I wonder if this means we can design a system that doesn't just survive delays but actually performs better when it's running under those constraints.

Rosa: Right, because they are focusing on finding a stabilizing feedback gain that works for all those potential delays, not just one specific delay value.

Dev: That’s the core idea of this paper, so they aren't just looking at one fixed delay; they want a solution robust to the range of possible delays.

The paper's summary: Rosa: So, what does the paper actually propose? They seem to be suggesting a way to jointly pick those cryptographic parameters and that feedback gain.

Dev: They set up an outer loop for picking the cryptographic parameters based on security needs, and an inner loop where they test different feedback gains against a stability condition.

Rosa: The stability condition is really interesting because it boils down to checking if a certain matrix inequality holds for all possible delays within a certain range.

Dev: They characterize the total delay as an upper bound, which is important because they give us a concrete limit on how much delay we can expect based on those cryptographic parameters.

Taro: I'm interested in that bound part, because if you know the maximum possible delay, you can design a control law to handle it.

Rosa: Right. They use this upper bound to define a set of matrices where they check for stability using linear matrix inequalities, which means they turn an infinite search space into something finite and solvable.

Dev: That's what makes it practical for real-time systems, because we don't have time to test every possible combination of parameters and gains.

The paper's improvements: Rosa: One big improvement they point out is the co-design framework itself, which ties the security requirements directly into the control design.

Dev: They show how this lets you simultaneously satisfy both a desired security level for your LWE based scheme and maintain stability given the encryption delays.

Rosa: And they move away from just picking a gain that works for an ideal delay-free case, which is what they call K1, to something that works for the actual encrypted implementation.

Dev: The results show that K2 stabilizes the system even when the total delay reaches three-quarters of the upper bound, whereas K1 fails at three-quarters of that same bound.

Taro: So if you're designing a system, this suggests you need to account for those encryption delays proactively in your controller design rather than treating them as an afterthought.

Rosa: Exactly. The simulation data for state norm shows K2 keeping the system stable across different delay values compared to K1 which becomes unstable when the total delay hits three-quarters of its bound.

Dev: That means we have a specific gain choice that handles the worst-case scenario within the bounds they derived, and it’s much more robust than a general setting.

Conclusion: Rosa: So, wrapping up this paper on "Co-Design of Cryptographic Parameters and Delay-Aware Feedback Gain for Encrypted Control Systems", the main thing is this co-design framework that links cryptographic parameters to the feedback gain.

Dev: It provides a way to find a set of parameters that meet security needs while simultaneously finding a stabilizing feedback gain, which is much more robust than previous methods.

Taro: It suggests we should stop treating encryption delays as just noise and start designing controllers specifically aware of how those delays grow with the security level.

Rosa: And they showed that this approach works in simulation, demonstrating that the gain K2 stabilizes the system across different total delays, even up to three-quarters of the derived upper bound.

Dev: It’s a concrete set of results showing that for real networked control systems, you need to design your system aware of those encryption-induced delays.

Taro: It gives us a clear path on how to handle these types of problems gracefully when the world misbehaves and introduces latency through cryptography.

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