Partially Active Automated Market Makers

summary

The gist

We introduce a new class of automated market maker (AMM), the partially active automated market maker (PA-AMM)…

In short

The Partially Active Automated Market Maker (PA-AMM) introduces a new trading strategy that splits pool reserves into active and passive parts. This reduces losses from arbitrageurs while managing tracking error. The optimal level of activity depends on market conditions, suggesting PA-AMM is beneficial in markets with high adverse selection costs.

Key concepts

Active Reserves (Ractive)
These are the portion of the pool's total reserves that are actually used for trading. In PA-AMM, only this active fraction is exposed to arbitrageurs at the top of each block. This division happens once per block.
Passive Reserves (Rpassive)
This is the reserve portion that remains unused for immediate trading purposes. By keeping a passive part, the mechanism reduces exposure to per-block adverse selection, which is when bad trades occur at the end of a trading period.
Loss-versus-Rebalancing (LVR)
LVR measures how much value is lost due to an arbitrage opportunity. It compares the total asset value before and after an arbitrage event. The goal of PA-AMM is to minimize this loss while controlling tracking error.
Activeness Level ($\lambda$)
This parameter determines what fraction of immediate rebalancing occurs at the top of each block. A value of $\lambda=1$ is a standard fully-active model, while $\lambda < 1$ means only a fraction of rebalancing happens, trading off loss reduction against tracking error.

Terminology used across episodes

This episode discusses

The paper

Partially Active Automated Market Makers · Read on arXiv

KAIST

We introduce a new class of automated market maker (AMM), the partially active automated market maker (PA-AMM). PA-AMM divides its reserves into two parts, the active and the passive parts, and uses only the active part for trading. At the top of every block, such a division is done again to keep the active reserves always being λ-portion of total reserves, where λ in (0, 1] is an activeness parameter. We show that this simple mechanism reduces adverse selection costs, measured by loss-versus-rebalancing (LVR), and thereby improves the wealth of liquidity providers (LPs) relative to plain constant-function market makers (CFMMs). As a trade-off, the asset weights within a PA-AMM pool may deviate from their target weights implied by its invariant curve. Motivated by the optimal index-tracking problem literature, we also propose and solve an optimization problem that balances such deviation and the reduction of LVR.

Transcript

Introduction to the show: ident: Quantitative Finance. The day in quantitative finance: models of markets, risk and prices.

Ruth: I'm Ruth.

Warren: And I'm Warren, here with Iris.

Ruth: We're looking at the paper: "Partially Active Automated Market Makers".

Warren: Here's the gist of the paper. We introduce a new class of automated market maker (AMM), the partially active automated market maker (PA-AMM), which divides its reserves into active and passive parts to reduce adverse selection costs while balancing tracking error.

Ruth: The PA-AMM mechanism partitions the pool’s total reserves into two distinct components, active reserves (Ractive) and passive reserves (Rpassive), and uses only the active portion for trading.

Warren: This division is done exactly once at the beginning of each block, ensuring that only a fraction λ ∈ (0, 1] of the total liquidity is exposed to arbitrageurs at the top of each block.

Ruth: The special case where λ = 1 recovers the standard fully-active CFMM with invariant function φ.

Paper summary: Iris: To wrap up, the paper introduces the partially active automated market maker or PA-AMM, which divides reserves into active and passive parts to trade only with the active part at every block.

Ruth: The main point is that this mechanism reduces loss versus rebalancing measured by LVR and thereby improves the wealth of liquidity providers relative to plain constant function market makers.

Warren: But they also found that this comes at a cost, specifically an increase in asset weights within the pool which might deviate from their target allocation.

Iris: The optimization problem they solve finds the optimal activeness level lambda star that balances that tracking error against the reduction of LVR.

Ruth: In simple terms, PA-AMM limits how much liquidity is active in a single block by gradually executing rebalancing, which cuts down on losses at the expense of some tracking error.

Warren: The paper suggests that PA-AMM might be a better option for liquidity provision in prediction markets where the costs from adverse selection are significantly higher than in other markets.

Iris: They also note that the work abstracts away gas costs and sets fees to zero, but they point out that future work should look at how to find an optimal combination of fee rates and activeness levels.

Ruth: The paper concludes by suggesting that PA-AMM might incentivize liquidity providers to provide more liquidity because the loss function is continuous with respect to latency.

Conclusion: Ruth: So we’ve been looking at this paper on Partially Active Automated Market Makers, and now we need to talk about what this actually means for liquidity providers and markets as a whole.

Warren: Yeah, I mean the title itself—Partially Active AMM—it sounds like they're introducing a way to manage risk by not being fully active all the time.

Iris: Exactly. The authors are focusing on how you can split your reserves into active and passive parts to reduce those nasty costs from adverse selection.

Ruth: Adverse selection costs, right? That’s when someone knows you’re about to trade and they profit off that information advantage before you can react.

Warren: So the mechanism they propose here, dividing liquidity into Ractive and Rpassive, is basically a way to cut down on those immediate losses at the top of each block.

Iris: They model this as an optimization problem balancing two things: tracking error and this loss versus rebalancing measure we call LVR.

Ruth: It’s a trade-off, isn't it? You reduce the risk of getting hit by bad trades, but you might end up with a bigger gap between your pool price and the actual market price.

Warren: Right. The math they use suggests there's an optimal level for this activeness, called lambda star, that balances that tracking error against minimizing LVR.

Iris: In the limit of very small time steps for block execution, this optimal activeness level settles down to a specific constant value based on some parameters from the model.

Ruth: That’s interesting because it suggests there isn't just one perfect setting for everyone; it depends on how much you care about minimizing loss versus how much you care about keeping your prices tight.

Warren: It definitely implies that for certain markets, like prediction markets where those adverse selection costs are huge, this PA-AMM approach could be a better way to set up liquidity provision.

Iris: It does. And what it means for the world is that we might need to think about dynamic ways of managing liquidity exposure in decentralized finance environments.

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