Optimal Trading Speed on Blockchain

summary

The gist

On blockchain-based exchanges, faster blocks fundamentally alter how priority is allocated, shifting competition from a priority auction toward a first come, first served mechanism for arbitrageurs.

In short

The study models how faster blockchain blocks change competition and liquidity management. Faster blocks shift arbitrage competition from priority auctions to first-come, first-served, redistributing rents to arbitrageurs. For liquidity providers, faster blocks enable strategic capital withdrawal and fee sharing. The model predicts an optimal block speed where pool depth peaks before it declines.

Key concepts

Arbitrage Competition Shift
Faster blocks change how arbitrageurs compete for profits. Instead of a priority auction, the competition becomes more like first-come, first-served because transactions arrive faster within the same block. This reduces the advantage of paying higher fees to get priority.
Active Liquidity Provider Strategy
Active liquidity providers can use faster blocks to time their capital moves perfectly. They can withdraw funds before arbitrage trades occur, protecting capital from loss, and share fees from non-arbitrage trades. This strategy is optimized by the block speed.
Equilibrium Block Speed (Bd)
The model finds a unique optimal block speed, Bd, where pool depth reaches its maximum. If the network goes faster than Bd, liquidity depth falls and spreads widen even if external prices are tracked closely. This indicates a tension between price discovery and pool quality.
Cream-Skimming
Active LPs can benefit by avoiding 'toxic flow'—bad trades or flows that might hurt their capital. Faster blocks increase the chance that an LP can withdraw before these trades execute, allowing them to keep a higher share of profitable, non-toxic liquidity.

Terminology used across episodes

This episode discusses

The paper

Optimal Trading Speed on Blockchain · Read on arXiv

Ruizhe Jia, Shihao Yu

Stanford University · Singapore Management University

Transcript

Introduction to the show: ident: Quantitative Finance. The day in quantitative finance: models of markets, risk and prices.

Ruth: We're looking at the paper: "Optimal Trading Speed on Blockchain".

Warren: Here's the gist of the paper. On blockchain-based exchanges, faster blocks fundamentally alter how priority is allocated, shifting competition from a priority auction toward a first come, first served mechanism for arbitrageurs.

Ruth: This change reshapes the competitive landscape: faster blocks weaken priority-fee competition among arbitrageurs by shortening the time between transactions arriving in the same block, moving outcomes closer to first come, first served.

Warren: Consequently, this shift redistributes rents from the sequencer to the arbitrageurs.

Ruth: For liquidity providers (LPs), faster blocks introduce new opportunities and risks.

Title and authors: Ruth: Let's talk about the title and who wrote this thing, "Optimal Trading Speed on Blockchain." It’s pretty straightforward, but it sets up a deep look into how speed matters in digital finance.

Warren: It suggests that optimizing the speed of those blocks isn't just a technical detail; it directly impacts market structure and profitability for everyone involved.

Iris: The authors are Ruizhe Jia and Shihao Yu, and they’ve built this model based on the existing landscape of tokenized stocks trading on public blockchains like Base.

Ruth: They are using real-world data from things like the Base Flashblocks upgrade to test these ideas, showing that faster blocks do indeed weaken priority fee competition among arbitrageurs.

Warren: That means the time between transactions arriving in a single block gets shorter, which naturally favors those who can act first over those who have to wait for a priority slot.

The paper's summary: Ruth: Now, let's look at what the paper actually says about the results. They summarize that faster blocks weaken the priority fee competition among arbitrageurs and shift rents from the block producer to them.

Warren: So, in simple terms, it means faster blocks reduce those competition fees for arbitrageurs because they trade closer together within the same block, making it more like a first come first served situation.

Iris: And this leads to a big change in who benefits—the rents move from the person controlling the sequencing to the arbitrageurs themselves.

Ruth: That's right. It also looks at liquidity providers, or LPs, and shows they have new ways to play when blocks are faster. They can strategically withdraw capital ahead of price trades while still sharing fees from other things.

Warren: They can essentially cream-skim passive providers by timing their withdrawal optimally so it executes before an arbitrage trade happens, protecting their capital and letting them earn more overall.

The paper's improvements: Ruth: The authors suggest several ways to make this model better. They propose modeling the competition as either a "clash" or a "race" to better predict how those rents are actually distributed between the sequencer and the arbitrageurs.

Warren: That would be useful because it lets us predict which type of competition dominates depending on how fast those blocks are running relative to message speed.

Iris: They also refine the active liquidity management strategy for automated market makers by dynamically determining when to pull capital out or put it back in based directly on the block speed.

Ruth: Specifically, they suggest using a threshold, like that B sub two we talked about, which marks the point where the gains from withdrawing capital start to offset the fees they give up <ref:2611.13616#pg1>.

Warren: That sounds like a practical tool for anyone running an automated market maker to decide when to act on their liquidity position.

Conclusion: Ruth: To wrap up, this paper on "Optimal Trading Speed on Blockchain" shows that block speed isn't just a technical parameter; it jointly determines the allocation of rents across arbitrageurs, liquidity providers, and the sequencer.

Warren: The main implication is that faster blocks lead to higher net profit for arbitrageurs and allow active LPs to manage their risk better by cream-skimming toxic flow.

Iris: And they found that while price efficiency improves unambiguously, the effective spread widens by about zero point zero seven basis points on Base relative to Arbitrum when block speeds get higher.

Ruth: So, we see a trade-off: faster blocks help price discovery but can thin out the liquidity pool and widen those effective spreads at certain speeds.

Warren: That B sub d threshold where liquidity peaks is key—it tells us exactly when that tension between price discovery and pool depth starts to bite.

Iris: We also see that in an operating equilibrium with positive passive capital, the mean inverse depth equals one over p naught, which gives us a concrete number for how deep the pools need to be to maintain balance.

Ruth: So, as we look at this paper on "Optimal Trading Speed on Blockchain," it’s not just about speed; it’s about understanding how speed reshapes incentives for everyone in this new financial infrastructure.

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