Designing Public Information for Strategic Advice

summary

The gist

A principal chooses an action using advice from an expert who privately knows local conditions, and this paper investigates how a decision maker should design public information when it also shapes…

In short

The paper investigates how a principal should design public information when it simultaneously influences a later expert's incentives. It analyzes three communication protocols: optimal mediation, commitment to an action rule, and unmediated cheap talk. The findings show that the optimal study design depends entirely on the protocol used.

Key concepts

Principal (P)
The principal is the decision-maker, like a government setting a budget. They choose an action based on advice from an expert who has private local knowledge and must consider how public information affects that expert's subsequent behavior.
Expert (E)
The expert is the regional manager who provides advice. They privately know some local conditions ($ heta$) and have incentives shaped by the public information provided by the principal, which can change based on how communication is structured.
Communication Protocols
These are different ways information can be organized: optimal mediation (where value is convex in conflict), commitment to an action rule (where no info might be best), and unmediated cheap talk. The choice of protocol dictates the best way for the principal to design public information.
Optimal Study Design
This refers to choosing the distribution of posterior means ($μ_z$) that maximizes the value of advice. The optimal study can place the expert in two distant communication regimes, skipping intermediate ones, which outperforms both full revelation and no information.

Terminology used across episodes

This episode discusses

The paper

Designing Public Information for Strategic Advice · Read on arXiv

Vasudha Jain, Jaideep Roy

Department of Economic Sciences, Indian Institute of Technology Kanpur · Department of Economics, University of Bath

A principal chooses an action using advice from an expert who privately knows local conditions. Before receiving advice, she can commission a public study of an independent state, such as future demand, that changes the expected conflict between their preferred actions. We show that the communication protocol determines the optimal study. Under optimal mediation, the value of advice is convex in conflict, making full revelation optimal. Under commitment to an action rule, the principal may prefer no information, while informative optimal studies include a report certifying high conflict. Under unmediated cheap talk, changes in the number of equilibrium messages create upward kinks in the value of advice. Optimal studies avoid interior communication thresholds and can induce two distant communication regimes while skipping every regime in between, strictly outperforming both full revelation and no information. When the principal retains the raw data, selective public disclosure can improve advice without sacrificing forecasting precision. We discuss implications for fiscal forecasts and spending agencies.

Transcript

Introduction to the show: ident: Economics. The day in economics: theory, mechanisms and the evidence beneath them.

Ruth: We're looking at the paper: "Designing Public Information for Strategic Advice".

Warren: Here's the gist of the paper. A principal chooses an action using advice from an expert who privately knows local conditions, and this paper investigates how a decision maker should design public information when it also shapes the incentives of a later adviser Model Setup and Information Structure The model involves two players, a principal P (headquarters) and an expert E (the regional manager), where the payoff-relevant state has two independent components The expert privately observes θ ∼ U

0, 1: , the quality of local implementation A second state s (future demand) is unknown to both players and has a finite second moment The payoffs are defined as uP (a, θ, s) = − (a − θ − wP s) and uE(a, θ, s) = − (a − θ − wEs) The principal commits to a public study π(z s), and the report z is seen by both players before the expert speaks The timing involves Nature drawing (θ, s), the principal committing to the study, observing z, and then the expert sending a costless message m Communication Protocols and Value of Advice The value of advice depends on how the communication is organized through three protocols Under optimal mediation, the value of advice is convex in conflict, making full revelation optimal Under commitment to an action rule, the principal may prefer no information, while informative optimal studies include a report certifying high conflict Under unmediated cheap talk, changes in the number of equilibrium messages create upward kinks in the value of advice The optimal study can place the expert in two communication regimes far apart, skipping every regime in between, strictly outperforming both full revelation and no information Optimal Study Design and Key Results The principal's problem is to choose a distribution of posterior means µz with mean µ0 that maximizes E

W(µz): The optimal study can place the expert in two communication regimes far apart, skipping every regime in between, while beating both full revelation and no information Blurring is common, occurring for about four priors in ten, while skipping is rarer The gains are moderate and largest near babbling Implications for Policy and Governance The model has a direct political reading where the principal is a government setting the budget, and the expert is a spending agency The results give five implications for fiscal governance For example, publishing the official forecast in broad categories can help budgeting A treasury that keeps its own detailed forecast can let the fiscal council publish coarse categories at no cost to its own budget decisions Commitment and information design are substitutes, as a cap on discretion handles the bias directly The protocol decides whether and how to inform depends on how the subsequent conversation is organized The paper demonstrates that the protocol determines the optimal study, revealing that under commitment, a cap handles small conflicts well and the distinctive report certifies high conflict The most valuable news under cheap talk is news that removes the conflict, because it restores full communication Data governance shows that keeping raw data allows for selective public disclosure without sacrificing forecasting precision The protocol dictates the design, revealing that reveal under mediation, blur under cheap talk, and stay quiet unless conflict is large under commitment are the three main options The implications for fiscal councils and spending agencies show how precisely the official forecast should be published The protocol decides whether and how to inform depends on how the subsequent conversation is organized Page 50 --- References Agastya, Murali, Parimal Kanti Bag, and Indranil Chakraborty.

Warren: “Communication and Authority with a Partially Informed Expert.” RAND Journal of Economics 45(1): 176–197 Alonso, Ricardo, and Niko Matouschek.

Paper summary: Warren: So wrapping up this paper "Designing Public Information for Strategic Advice," it boils down to three main options based on that protocol we talked about. Under optimal mediation, you reveal everything because the value of advice is convex in conflict, so full revelation works best.

Iris: Then under commitment to an action rule, you might prefer no information at all because a cap on discretion handles small conflicts well and the value there is concave.

Ruth: And finally, under unmediated cheap talk with no study, changes in the number of equilibrium messages create upward kinks in the value of advice. This means that even just tweaking how many messages are sent can affect how valuable the expert's advice is when there's uncertainty about what they know and want to say.

Warren: The most valuable news under cheap talk, it seems, is actually news that removes the conflict because it restores full communication. That’s a key finding on where to focus your information design efforts.

Iris: And for governance, the results show that keeping raw data allows for selective public disclosure without sacrificing forecasting precision because you can choose how much detail to share based on the protocol you've set up.

Ruth: It really shows that the protocol dictates whether you reveal under mediation, blur under cheap talk, and stay quiet unless conflict is large under commitment. The paper demonstrates that the structure of communication is what determines the optimal public study design.

Conclusion: Ruth: So we've looked at how the structure of communication changes what advice is actually worth under different scenarios in this paper "Designing Public Information for Strategic Advice."

Warren: Yeah, I mean, the authors are looking at this principal and expert setup where local conditions matter, and they're trying to figure out how much information the principal should give when that information also shapes how much the expert will actually do.

Iris: Exactly. The core idea is that if you change *how* you deliver the information—whether it's a full report, or just a summary—it totally changes the value of that advice depending on what kind of communication environment we're in, like cheap talk versus when commitments are involved.

Ruth: It really boils down to the protocol itself determining the study design. If you're dealing with mediation, full disclosure is usually best because the conflict between what you know and what they do matters a lot.

Warren: But if it's just cheap talk, the paper suggests that revealing too much detail actually hurts things; blurring that information can be better because it restores some kind of communication flow.

Iris: And under commitment, where there's a cap on how much the expert can deviate from what they say, keeping things very tight and not giving too much detail seems to work pretty well for handling those small conflicts.

Ruth: So the big implication for me is that when we think about setting budgets or forecasting things out loud, the way we publish that information—whether it's coarse categories or a very detailed forecast—has a direct effect on how much the decision maker actually trusts and uses that advice.

Warren: It means if you want good outcomes, you need to design your public information structure around those incentive rules, not just throw out the most data possible.

Iris: And that leads us to thinking about what happens when we try to actually implement this in a real government setting, because the results suggest a pretty specific way things should be published.

More episodes

← Home