A measure of choice irrationality based on opposite judgements
summary
The gist
In many choice settings the decision maker (DM) adopts a criterion which is a mediation between her preference and its opposite This pattern allows to define the compromise-based degree of…
In short
The paper introduces a measure of choice irrationality called 'compromise-based degree of irrationality' (irrComp(c)). This quantifies how much a decision-maker mediates between their true preference and the opposite ranking. It characterizes choices into three levels based on this mediation, showing that extreme choices are often driven by severe conflict between judgments.
Key concepts
- Compromise on Preference
- This is a linear order created by shifting the top 'i' alternatives to the bottom and then rearranging them in reverse. It mathematically represents the decision-maker's tendency to mediate between their actual preference and its opposite ranking, generating different possible choices.
- irrComp(c)
- This score measures irrationality by finding the maximum index 'i' of a compromise. A higher score means the choice relies more heavily on severe mediation between the DM's true judgment and its opposite, effectively counting how many alternatives must be disregarded in a specific trade-off.
- Characterization Levels
- Choices are classified into three classes based on their compromise level: minimal compromise (irrComp(c) = 1), maximal compromise (irrComp(c) = |X| - 1), and non-rationalizable choices with minimal mediation. This categorization helps understand the underlying cognitive trade-offs in decision-making.
Terminology used across episodes
This episode discusses
- A measure of choice irrationality based on opposite judgements · Paper Radio
- A rational measure of irrationality
- Harmful Random Utility Models
The paper
A measure of choice irrationality based on opposite judgements · Read on arXiv
Angelo Enrico Petralia,
University of Catania
In many choice settings the decision maker (DM) adopts a criterion which is a mediation between her preference and its opposite. According to such compromise, the first i alternatives on top of the DM's taste are evaluated according to its negation. This pattern allows to define the compromise-based degree of irrationality, which quantifies the extent of the mediation embraced by the DM in her choice. Necessary and sufficient conditions characterizing this index are singled out. I investigate non rationalizable choices that display the lowest degree of irrationality, and I fully identify the preferences that explain the DM's picks by a minimal mediation between opposite judgments. These datasets account for some well known selection biases, such as second-best procedures, and the handicapped avoidance. I offer a simple characterization of the choice behavior that exhibits the most severe compromise, and I show that this subclass comprises almost all choices. Finally, some alternative measures of compromise are proposed, and compared with the score previously determined.
Transcript
Introduction to the show: ident: Economics. The day in economics: theory, mechanisms and the evidence beneath them.
Ruth: We're looking at the paper: "A measure of choice irrationality based on opposite judgements".
Warren: Here's the gist of the paper. In many choice settings the decision maker (DM) adopts a criterion which is a mediation between her preference and its opposite This pattern allows to define the compromise-based degree of irrationality, which quantifies the extent of the mediation embraced by the DM in her choice.
Ruth: Conceptual Framework of Mediation Individual choices are typically affected by a tension between conflicting judgments The paper introduces a notion of compromise on individual taste, which encodes the DM’s tendency to mediate between her true preference and the opposite ranking.
Warren: This process generates a collection of linear orders, called compromises on the preference, which reproduce the amplitude of the DM’s trade-off between her judgment and its opposite.
Ruth: The i-th compromise on a preference is obtained by shifting the top i alternatives to the bottom and then rearranging them in reverse order.
Title and authors: Ruth: So, we're looking at this paper called "A measure of choice irrationality based on opposite judgments." It sounds a bit technical, but essentially the authors are proposing a way to measure how much someone is just making a compromise when they make a choice.
Warren: Right. It's about this idea that people aren't always picking their absolute favorite thing; sometimes they’re actually leaning into the opposite of what they like to justify it or satisfy some other feeling. The authors define this as a mediation between preference and its opposite, and then they use that pattern to create a score for choice irrationality.
Iris: So, what's the core idea here? It sounds like you’re trying to quantify this trade-off between what someone truly prefers and the ranking they actually end up with. Is this something that applies broadly across different kinds of decisions, or is it tied to a specific type of choice?
Ruth: Well, it seems to be about choice in general, but the paper focuses on how this mediation shows up mathematically. They suggest that if you look at the top alternatives someone likes and then look at their opposite ranking, you can calculate a degree of compromise. That’s what they call the compromise-based degree of irrationality.
Warren: And they show that this index lets us see exactly how much a decision maker is mediating between her true taste and its opposite. They create these linear orders, which are compromises on the preference, and those orders reproduce the size of that trade-off between judgment and its opposite.
Iris: That sounds like a structural way to define irrationality rather than just labeling something as "irrational." So it's moving toward a more descriptive measure? What about how this relates to other ways we think about choice, like models where people can hold many different preferences at once?
Ruth: The paper actually compares their compromise-based degree of irrationality with other measures, like a multi-self model of choice. They find that while compromise is related to that approach, it offers a finer way to classify choices.
Warren: They also introduce this nudging-based degree of irrationality as another alternative measure. And they show in an example, like example nine, that these two different indices actually make different predictions about what choices people are going to make.
The paper's summary: Ruth: Moving on to what the paper actually summarizes. The authors define choice irrationality by taking the minimum across all possible linear orders and compromises to find the maximum index, which they call irrComp(c). This score essentially counts how many alternatives a decision maker has had to disregard in her final choice because she was mediating between her judgment and its opposite.
Warren: So, if the score is high, it means the person has disregarded a lot of options in their selection because of this mediation. They characterize these irrationality levels into three classes: minimal compromise, maximal compromise, and non rationalizable choices with minimal mediation.
Iris: That's an interesting classification structure. Can you give us an example of what those three classes look like in practice? For instance, what’s the difference between a choice that has minimal compromise versus one that has maximal compromise?
Ruth: The first class, minimal compromise, is when the choice relies on the decision maker's true preference but maybe she just downgrades her best option by a little bit. It's low irrationality.
Warren: Then you have choices with maximal compromise, where you can only justify them by assuming the decision maker is adopting the judgment that is completely opposite to her own. That’s high irrationality, and it means she’s ignored almost everything else in favor of going against what she actually wants.
Iris: And the third class are those non-rationalizable choices that show minimal mediation, which suggests some other mechanism is at play instead of just this simple trade-off between opposite judgments.
Ruth: So, they're trying to map out a spectrum. It’s not just about being rational or irrational; it’s about the specific way the decision maker is trading her judgment against its negation. This whole framework is meant to provide a more granular look at choice behavior than just saying someone is making a bad choice overall.
Warren: It gives us a tool to see exactly where the tension between what we think we want and what we actually pick lives. And that leads us nicely into how these measures are improving on previous work or finding new ways to measure things.
The paper's improvements: Ruth: The paper discusses some ways they can refine this idea. They propose a rationality measure where you take into account the specific motives behind the decision maker’s mediation, which means trying to formally define some rule that links compromises directly to menus and options.
Warren: That sounds like moving from just measuring the outcome to understanding why it happened in the first place. It’s about associating those specific compromises with the actual set of alternatives available.
Iris: And they suggest extending this further by considering some randomization between a decision maker's compromise to rationalize and sorting choices that are actually random, which would be a more robust way to handle uncertainty.
Ruth: They also point out that a very promising but non-trivial extension would be creating an index of irrationality specifically for stochastic intertemporal choices. That’s looking at decisions made over time where things are uncertain, which is definitely harder than static choices.
Warren: From a quantitative standpoint, those extensions sound like they would require building new algorithms to handle the temporal aspect. It moves us from analyzing a single decision point to modeling a whole sequence of choices under uncertainty.
Iris: So they're suggesting ways to make this measure more flexible—to capture different kinds of mediation and different types of uncertainty without losing the core concept of measuring that trade-off between preference and its opposite.
Conclusion: Ruth: To wrap things up, the main implication is that violations of rationality in choices stem directly from the tension between the decision maker’s opposing judgments. The paper establishes this compromise-based degree of irrationality as a way to quantify that tension precisely across various choice settings.
Warren: They suggest this framework is useful because it gives us a way to see how much someone is mediating, and they provide tools to classify those behaviors into different levels of compromise. It moves beyond simple utility maximization by looking at the specific trade-off being made.
Iris: I think what stands out is that while the authors show some results fit known selection biases like second-best procedures and handicapped avoidance, they also identify some choices that exhibit minimal mediation, which suggests there are other forms of irrationality we haven't fully captured yet.
Ruth: Exactly. And the future work points toward defining a rule that associates compromises directly with menus, which would give us a more actionable way to apply this measure in real-world situations beyond just theoretical analysis.
Warren: And they also mention considering randomization between the decision maker's compromise to rationalize and stochastic choices, which sounds like the next step for applying this idea to things that aren't perfectly predictable.
Iris: So, by focusing on quantifying that mediation, this paper gives us a concrete metric for understanding choice irrationality based on opposite judgments. That’s what they set out to do in "A measure of choice irrationality based on opposite judgements."
More episodes
- Daily Summary for 2026-11-19
- 2608.21274-Recommendation Quality and the Concentration of Consumption: Experimental Evidence from Netflix
- 2408.02757-A nonparametric test for diurnal variation in spot correlation processes
- 2306.16393-High-Dimensional Canonical Correlation Analysis
- 2605.17299-Geometric Brownian motion with intermittent entries and exits
- 2607.04753-Fooling Yourself: how narratives shape beliefs
- 2408.14671-Inference on Treatment Effects with Repeatedly Mismeasured High-Dimensional Controls
- 2201.06898-Difference-in-Differences Estimators for Treatments Continuously Distributed at Every Period
- 2501.15307-Influence Functions: A Unified Differentiation-Based Framework
- The day in conversation for 2026-11-19