Dynamic Pricing in Two-Sided Markets: Learning Barriers and Price Differentiation

summary

The gist

The study investigates online pricing strategies in two-sided markets where a platform repeatedly posts prices to multiple buyers and sellers, observing only binary accept/reject feedback…

In short

The study analyzes online pricing strategies in two-sided markets where a platform posts prices repeatedly to buyers and sellers, observing only accept/reject feedback. It compares three pricing mechanisms: single, two-price, and segmented. The research establishes regret bounds for maximizing profit and gains-from-trade (GFT), showing how increased price expressiveness helps overcome learning barriers in dynamic settings.

Key concepts

Two-Price Mechanisms
This mechanism involves the platform setting one specific price for sellers and a different specific price for buyers. This allows the platform to tailor pricing strategies separately for each group of traders, which is key to achieving optimal profit maximization in certain market structures.
Gains-from-Trade (GFT)
GFT measures the total surplus generated by executed trades, calculated as the sum of buyer values minus seller costs. Maximizing GFT focuses on facilitating profitable transactions rather than just maximizing platform revenue.
Contextual Setting
This extension incorporates features where traders' costs and values change based on observed, varying features (like context $x_t$). This means the price a trader accepts or demands is influenced by these dynamic, observable contextual factors in each round.

Terminology used across episodes

This episode discusses

The paper

Dynamic Pricing in Two-Sided Markets: Learning Barriers and Price Differentiation · Read on arXiv

Yiding Feng, Mengfan Ma, Bo Peng, Zongqi Wan

Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, China · Central China Normal University, China · Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, China · Great Bay University, China

We study dynamic pricing for gains-from-trade maximization in two-sided markets. Over T rounds, a platform posts prices to traders with fixed, unknown costs and values and learns from their accept/reject decisions. Under weak budget balance and random matching among accepting traders, we investigate how market composition and pricing flexibility affect the regret achievable by deterministic learning policies. Uniform pricing achieves constant regret in bilateral trade and O(T) regret in one-to-many markets, with both rates remaining order-optimal even when side-specific pricing is allowed. However, side-specific pricing incurs Ω(T) worst-case regret with only three sellers and three buyers. This barrier persists even when a common price achieves the optimum under full information. The difficulty arises from a mismatch phenomenon: less efficient accepting traders can displace more efficient traders, making price exploration costly. We overcome this barrier through segmented pricing, which partitions each side into at most two groups and assigns a price to each group. Our algorithm achieves O(n T + n 2) regret with n traders on each side, which is order-optimal in the horizon. Thus, limited price differentiation within each side restores vanishing average regret even when the platform seeks to maximize gains-from-trade. We also extend our results to contextual markets and show that side-specific pricing suffices for doubly logarithmic regret under contextual profit maximization.

Transcript

Introduction to the show: ident: Computer Science. The day in computer science: software, systems and theory on arXiv.

Tom: We're looking at the paper: "Dynamic Pricing in Two-Sided Markets".

Jane: Here's the gist of the paper. The study investigates online pricing strategies in two-sided markets where a platform repeatedly posts prices to multiple buyers and sellers, observing only binary accept/reject feedback, with objectives focused on either maximizing gains-from-trade (GFT) or profit.

Tom: The analysis considers three natural classes of price-posting mechanisms, ordered by increasing expressiveness: Single-Price Mechanisms (one price to all traders), Two-Price Mechanisms (one price for sellers and one for buyers), and Segmented-Price Mechanisms (traders partitioned into up to two groups with distinct prices per group).

Jane: For profit maximization, an algorithm based on Two-Price Mechanisms achieves an optimal regret of O(n squared T) in the time horizon T, where n is the number of traders.

Tom: For GFT maximization, the achievable regret depends heavily on market size and mechanism expressiveness.

Paper summary: Tom: To recap, this paper "Dynamic Pricing in Two-Sided Markets: Learning Barriers and Price Differentiation" looks at online pricing where a platform repeatedly posts prices to many buyers and sellers, only seeing if they accept or reject the price. The main thrust is analyzing three types of posting mechanisms: Single-Price, Two-Price, and Segmented-Price >

Jane: And they compare what you can achieve for two different goals: maximizing profit versus maximizing the gains from trade. They show that for profit maximization, an algorithm using Two-Price Mechanisms can get a regret of O of n squared log log T in time horizon T >

Lu: But the paper emphasizes that this performance is specific to the mechanism; for instance, a Single-Price approach has a lower bound on regret of Omega of log log T log log log log T if you are just dealing with one seller and two buyers >

Meng: And they also show that in full many-to-many markets, Two-Price Mechanisms lead to linear regret, which is Omega of T >

Lalam: To deal with the gains from trade maximization in those big markets, they introduce Segmented-Price Mechanisms to mitigate the mismatch phenomenon and get an O of n squared log log T plus n cubed regret >

Tom: So for profit maximization, the Two-Price Mechanism is shown to be optimal because it achieves that O of n squared log log T bound >

Jane: But if you want gains from trade, you need more expressive mechanisms when the market gets large, and Segmented-Price Mechanisms help achieve a better regret than what Single-Price can manage >

Lu: The analysis extends this to a contextual setting where costs and values depend on d dimensional features that change every round >

Meng: This means the sellers have private cost vectors theta and buyers have private value vectors beta, and in each round an adversary chooses a product context x that determines the costs c from theta and values v from beta >

Lalam: In this extension, the platform's pay per round depends on whether you're maximizing total collected revenue minus total payments for profit maximization or total surplus generated by executed trades for gains from trade maximization >

Conclusion: Tom: So, looking at the paper "Dynamic Pricing in Two-Sided Markets: Learning Barriers and Price Differentiation" and its authors, I think it boils down to this: dynamic pricing is hard when the market gets big and complex, but we can get better bounds if we use smarter pricing structures >

Jane: The authors are showing that there are clear trade-offs between maximizing pure profit versus maximizing gains from trade depending on how much expressiveness you use in your posting mechanism >

Lu: It suggests that the structural choice of how the platform posts prices is a really important part of finding an efficient learning strategy >

Meng: And for me, it means if we want to deploy this, we need to think about what kind of pricing structure fits our actual business model and how much complexity we can afford >

Lalam: Ultimately, this paper shows that even with context, you can still get polynomial regret bounds on both profit and gains from trade >

Tom: So the big message is that smart design in the way you post prices can actually give you a better learning guarantee in these dynamic online markets >

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